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This thesis examines the impact of policies which provide cash support for unemployed and 
workless persons on social inequalities in mental health. It contributes to a body of literature 
which has tended to assume that more generous cash benefits will reduce health gaps 
between advantaged and less advantaged groups. It notes that while there is some empirical 
support for this proposition, the evidence remains inconclusive. The thesis addresses this 
research problem by examining how cash benefits influence health inequalities. It defines 
デｴヴWW I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ に generosity, activation and conditionality に and explores 
WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ゲヮWIｷaｷI けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲげく 
Chapter Four focuses on one causal pathway に the influence of cash benefits via social stress. 
OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏWゲげが ｷデ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aヴﾗﾏ 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe for a relationship between welfare 
regimes and inequalities in depressive symptoms. It finds evidence that the Scandinavian 
regime has the least inequalities in depressive symptoms, suggesting that cash benefits 
generosity remains an important buffer for stress among disadvantaged groups. 
Chapter Five uses two more precise measures of cash benefits policies: passive and active 
labour market spending. Combining expenditure data from the OECD with individual-level 
data from the European Social Survey it uses regression and mediation analyses to explore a 
range of causal pathways from these policies to health inequalities. It finds some evidence 
that active labour market policies reduce inequalities in depressive symptoms by improving 
employment outcomes, while generous cash benefits may improve mental health during 
unemployment. 
Chapter Six develops the approach yet further, by looking at conditionality requirements 
attached to receipt of benefits as well as generosity and activation. Focusing on sanctions and 
work requirements linked with receipt of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families policies in 
the United States, it looks at how variations across states in conditionality practices matter 
for health inequalities. There are indications that stringent conditionality may increase 
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The fundamental objective of this thesis is to explore whether policies which reduce 
unemployment and poverty に or alleviate the health consequences of these social problems 
に also reduce health inequalities. It contributes to a small body of literature which has 
emerged out of evidence of persistent links between social status and health within rich 
countries (Mackenbach, 2006; World Health Organisation, 2008)く Tｴｷゲ けゲ┌H-SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐWげ ﾗa デｴW 
health inequalities literature focuses on whether links between social position and health are 
modifiable by cash benefits policies, the parts of welfare states which protect against the 
economic and social shocks of unemployment, sickness and disability, childrearing or old age.  
The assumption which has driven much of this research has been that the main way that cash 
benefits policies matter for health inequalities is by reducing poverty among recipient groups. 
While this may be a partial explanation, there is reason to believe that the causal links are 
more complex. Contrary to this expectation, empirical research has not consistently found 
that health inequalities are least in countries with the most generous cash benefits policies 
(Mackenbach, 2012). The reasons for this remain unclear, prompting the interest of this 
dissertation. 
Two related arguments are made throughout the thesis. First, it is suggested that our 
understanding of the connections between cash benefits policies and health inequalities is 
under-developed. As such, a central concern is with building stronger and more convincing 
evidence for the ways in which cash benefits and health inequalities are causally related. 
Chapter One describes a series of further causal pathways and evidence is examined for these 
pathways throughout Chapters Four to Six. Second, the thesis argues that to understand the 
causal impact we must consider other characteristics of cash benefits policies, aside from the 
level of generosity. It notes that within contemporary welfare states two other dimensions of 
policy design will be important for health inequalities: activation and conditionality. These 
けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ;ヴW SWaｷﾐWS ｷﾐ Chapter One, leading to a conceptual approach which 
highlights the role of cash benefits policies for health inequalities via generosity, activation 




Structure of Thesis and Research Question 
The broad interest of this thesis is therefore in understanding more about the causal link 
between cash benefits policies and health inequalities. I begin in Chapter One by exploring 
this question theoretically. After situating the thesis within the wider health inequalities 
literature, Chapter One restates the main argument and objectives of the thesis. It provides a 
broad conceptual framework which is refined in Chapter Two. The final part of Chapter One 
critiques the existing literature according to the extent to which it has explored causal 
pathways. Prior empirical findings are summarised and the literature is grouped according to 
four different research designs: welfare regimes, expenditure, institutional and quasi-
experimental. I argue that despite the proliferation of empirical research in this field, there 
remains a great deal of research uncertainty about how cash benefits shape health 
inequalities. 
Chapter Two proceeds to explain how the thesis seeks to provide a defensible contribution to 
knowledge, based on the critique outlined in Chapter One. To do this, a specific research 
question is stated which focuses on the relationship between cash benefits policies and 
educational inequalities in mental health. The question is justified on the grounds that the 
relationship between education and mental health captures the impact of both employment 
status and income, each of which are modifiable by cash benefits policies. A conceptual 
framework is then presented which addresses the research question through the ideas 
developed in Chapter One. The discussion then turns to how the thesis develops, empirically 
and methodologically, on the prior literature. The three empirical chapters (Four, Five and 
Six) each speak to a slightly different body of literature and the most relevant aspects of this 
research are reviewed here. In sum, the central objective of Chapter Two is to justify the 
overriding research question: 
 さWｴ;デ ｷゲ デｴW causal impact of cash benefits policies on educational inequalities in 
ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴいざ  
It should be noted that while the thesis focuses on this specific question, it does so as a 
practical means to address the more fundamental objective of evaluating the causal pathways 
that connect cash benefits and health inequalities. It aims to make contributions to the 
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broader literature on welfare states and health inequalities and the specific research question 
is a means to this end. 
Having laid the foundations for the forthcoming empirical analyses, Chapter Three deals with 
matters of research methodology. It begins by outlining a position on the approach towards 
causality, a central concern throughout the thesis. It then describes the overarching statistical 
approaches used in all three empirical chapters, as well as more specific methodological 
elements which are unique to individual chapters. Datasets and dependent variables are 
discussed at length, while other elements of variable construction are saved for the chapters 
themselves.  
Chapter Four に the first empirical chapter に utilises ; け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴげ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴW 
how inequalities in the prevalence of depressive symptoms vary across welfare regimes, as 
proxies for broad cash benefits policies arrangements. Using recent data from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, the chapter provides new evidence on variations 
across European welfare regimes in the relationship between education and depressive 
symptoms. It W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞が ;ゲ SWaｷﾐWS ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa デｴW W┝デWﾐデ 
to which welfare regimes mitigate the material and psychosocial stress associated with social 
disadvantage. Following the existing literature, it predicts that the Scandinavian regime 
should be most effective at reducing inequalities in depressive symptoms. The chapter ends 
by discussing the possible implications of the findings at some length and this builds in to a 
wider critique of the welfare regime approach. 
With this critique in mind, Chapter Five uses a social expenditure approach which has the 
distinct advantage over the welfare regime approach of allowing us to examine the impact of 
precise areas of cash benefits policies on inequ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴく Iデ aﾗI┌ゲWゲ ﾗﾐ けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗Wげ 
;ﾐS け;Iデｷ┗Wげ ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲが ;ゲ デ┘ﾗ ﾆW┞ IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデゲ ﾗa IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ 
systems. Combining data on labour market spending in European countries with individual-
level data on employment status and mental health from the European Social Survey, it 
investigates not only if these areas of social policy influence educational inequalities in mental 
health but also how. Using a mixture of regression techniques and mediation analysis, it 
explores the impact of labour market policies on inequalities in depressive symptoms through 
a series of pathways described in Chapters One and Two. The overall aim of the chapter is to 
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provide theoretically-driven evidence of how the generosity of cash benefits policies and the 
activation requirements attached to receipt of benefits, matter for health inequalities. 
Chapter Six に the final empirical chapter に ;Sﾗヮデゲ ┘ｴ;デ I SWゲIヴｷHW ;ゲ ; けヮﾗﾉｷI┞-specific 
;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴげく T;ﾆｷﾐｪ デｴW UﾐｷデWS “デ;デWゲ (US) as a case study, it explores the impact of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) policies on inequalities in mental health across the 50 
US states and the District of Columbia. It combines data on TANF generosity, eligibility rules 
and qualifying criteria with individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
Survey に a repeated cross-sectional survey with health, socioeconomic and demographic 
information. It considers the period 2000-2015, using statistical techniques to model the 
effect of changes in TANF policies on health outcomes. The chapter has a particular emphasis 
on the effect of conditionality requirements attached to receipt of cash benefits, using data 
on work requirements, welfare-to-work expenditure and sanctioning rules and exploiting 
cross- and within-state variations in these practices. As with the rest of the thesis, it 
emphasises causal pathways, exploring how these features of cash benefits policies might 
impact on mental health through the pathways described in Chapters One and Two. 
Recognition is given in this chapter and the concluding discussion to how the US welfare 
system, especially in terms of welfare-to-work policies may be qualitatively different to that 
of Europe. With this in mind, conclusions from the chapter centre on the plausibility of the 
findings and their generalisability outside of the US. 
The concluding discussion in Chapter Seven begins by revisiting the research objectives (see 
below) and assesses the extent to which each of these have been met. This produces an 
argument about the empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions of the thesis. 
Within this discussion, three standout empirical findings are stated. These are as follows: 
i) The most generous European welfare regime (Scandinavian) appeared to be most 
effective at relieving psychosocial stress among disadvantaged groups as inequalities 
in depressive symptoms were least in this regime. 
ii) There is some evidence that active labour market policies reduce inequalities in 
depressive symptoms by improving employment outcomes, although this requires 
further corroboration.  
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iii) Stringent conditionality requirements attached to Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families policies may increase inequalities in mental health.  
Reflecting on these contributions, the latter part of the chapter considers the research and 
policy implications of the thesis. It emphasises the differences between the US and European 
welfare systems, which it suggests may account for discrepancies in the findings between 
Chapters Five and Six. Some of these implications are directly linked with research and policy 
in relation to cash benefits and health inequalities. The discussion ends by expanding the 
earlier policy implications to consider more ambitious changes to cash benefits policies which 
may be required to reduce health inequalities. The thesis concludes by restating its primary 
findings and notes the importance of these within the context of future challenges to welfare 
states.  
 
Summary - Research Objectives 
This introduction has highlighted the research importance of this Doctoral thesis. It has 
identified a gap in the extant literature and outlined a research strategy which responds to 
this gap by examining the causal pathways connecting cash benefits with health inequalities. 
The overriding objective of the thesis can therefore be summarised as follows: to enhance 
understanding of the causal pathways that connect welfare states and health inequalities. 
To meet this aim, the thesis uses three different methodological approaches to provide 
empirical evidence around causal pathways. For practical reasons, it is necessary to focus on 
a specific research question to generate this empirical evidence. The question of interest 
throughout Chapters Four to Six is: what is the causal impact of cash benefits policies on 
educational inequalities in mental health? Evidence around this is then used to contribute to 
the wider argument. The introduction has explained the ways in which this is addressed in 
each of the chapters. While there is an overriding objective of the thesis, there are some more 
specific aims as follows: 
1. To expand theoretical understanding about how cash benefits policies shape 
inequalities in mental health. 
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2. To explore the empirical connections between cash benefits policies and inequalities 
in mental health using approaches which are attentive to the causal pathways that 
connect cash benefits with health inequalities.  
3. To critically assess the explanatory power of three methodological approaches に 
welfare regime, social expenditure and policy-specific に for understanding the causal 
pathways that connect cash benefits and inequalities in mental health. 
The discussion returns to these aims in the concluding chapter which reviews the thesis as a 




















Chapter 1. Cash Benefits Policies and Health Inequalities: 
Towards a Conceptual Framework 
 
The introduction stated the overarching argument of the thesis: existing research has paid 
insufficient attention to the causality of the links between cash benefits policies and health 
inequalities. Two more specific criticisms were made: i) research has been limited in its ability 
to tell us about causal pathways and ii) this has been impeded by a lack of specificity about 
which aspects of cash benefits policies are important for health inequalities. This first chapter 
explores these arguments at greater length. It begins by providing some wider theoretical 
context, before reviewing and critiquing the extant literature on the basis of the arguments 
made in the introduction.  
 
Health Inequalities in Wealthy Societies 
 
While this thesis is concerned with how cash benefits policies matter for social inequalities in 
health, it is first necessary to situate this question within the broader health inequalities 
literature. The discussion below starts by defining health inequalities. This then feeds in to a 
wider review of key aspects of the literature which are relevant to this thesis. 
 
Defining Health Inequalities 
To begin, it is worth stating what health inequalities are not. In this thesis, they do not refer 
to health variations: differences in the health of populations which are attributable to age, 
Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴ ｪWﾐWデｷI a;Iデﾗヴゲ ﾗヴ ;ﾐ┞ ﾗデｴWヴ aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa けﾉ┌Iﾆげ ふWｴｷデWｴW;S ;ﾐS D;ｴﾉｪヴWﾐが ヲヰヰヶぶく 
Instead, they refer to socially-generated differences in health between population groups. 
They differ from health variations in so far as there is no obvious natural explanation for their 
existence (ibid.: 2-3). Second, health inequalities are not viewed as merely a subject of 
scientific interest. While scientific methods are used to examine the scale and incidence of 
health gaps between social groups, the analyses in this thesis contribute to an argument 
about the unacceptability of these gaps and the need for social action. The concluding 
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discussion in Chapter Seven considers ambitious reforms to the design of cash benefits 
policies which may contribute to substantial reductions in health inequalities. There is 
therefore a clear moral grounding to the analyses and discussions. The thesis uses the 
デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa けｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲげ ;ﾐS けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ｴW;ﾉデｴげが ┞Wデ ｷデ ヴWﾃWIデゲ デｴW 
SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ﾗaデWﾐ Sヴ;┘ﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐ けｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲげ ;ﾐS けｷﾐWケ┌ｷデｷWゲげ ┘ｴWヴWH┞ デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴ 
implies a normative judgement, while the former is descriptive and avoids moral 
IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ふK;┘;Iｴｷ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヰヶぶく HWヴWが デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa けｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲげ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS 
ゲ┞ﾐﾗﾐ┞ﾏﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ けｷﾐWケ┌ｷデｷWゲげ ふWｴｷデWｴW;S ;ﾐS D;ｴﾉｪヴWﾐが ヲヰヰヶぶく 
In this thesis, health inequalities are therefore conceptualised as both avoidable and unjust. 
YWデ デｴW けa;ｷヴﾐWゲゲげ ﾗa ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷゲ ﾏﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ デｴ;ﾐ ; ゲｷﾏヮﾉW ﾏ;デデWヴ ﾗa デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞く 
In one summary of these debates, Kelly and Graham (2004: 7) note that health inequalities 
can have three meanings: the health of the disadvantaged, health gaps and health gradients. 
Each of these implies a slightly different moral argument. These can be seen to run on a 
Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌┌ﾏ ┘ｴWヴWH┞ デｴW けﾏﾗゲデ ﾃ┌ゲデげ ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏW ﾏﾗ┗Wゲ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞ aヴﾗﾏ ; IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴﾗゲW 
with the worst health (the health of the disadvantaged) to the objective of improving the 
health of the entire population (health gradients) (Kelly and Graham, 2004: 7). The middling 
approach に health gaps に suggests that we should begin by focusing on the health of the most 
disadvantaged and ensure that impヴﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ Wﾐ;HﾉW デｴWﾏ デﾗ けI;デIｴ ┌ヮげ ┘ｷデｴ 
more advantaged groups. This, in turn, will reduce the overall health gap.  
These three normative approaches are similar to the broader distinction which is often drawn 
between absolute and relative health inequalities. Absolute inequalities are concerned with 
the incidence of poor health within the most disadvantaged group, compared with that in the 
more advantaged population (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2006: 7). They imply that efforts 
should focus, first and foremost, on reducing the burden of ill-health within the most 
disadvantaged groups. Relative inequalities, in contrast, are concerned with the differences 
in health risk between more and less advantaged populations (ibid.: 7), thus shining light on 
the scale of health gradients and pointing to wider structural solutions. In this thesis, the focus 
is on relative health inequalities (or health gaps). While a case can be made for focusing on 
the health of the most disadvantaged, it is felt that a strategy which promotes reductions in 
health gaps/gradients across the board is more ambitious and delivers greater fairness to the 
wider population.  
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The definition of health inequalities can therefore be summarised as follows: 
Health inequalities are avoidable, socially-produced differences in health between 
social groups. They are both absolute and relative, where a reduction in the relative 
ｪ;ヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪWS ;ﾐS Sｷゲ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪWS ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ IヴW;デWゲ デｴW けﾏﾗゲデ ﾃ┌ゲデげ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ H┞ 
maximising the opportunity to enjoy good health for all persons. 
 
Explaining Health Inequalities  
The definitional issues highlighted above (equity vs equality, absolute vs relative) stem from 
a literature which has sought to make sense of a vast body of empirical evidence on the 
systematic and enduring nature of health inequalities. Researchers have found evidence for 
social inequalities in health in all countries for which there are data, despite improvements in 
quality of life and the establishment of universal healthcare in many rich countries 
(Mackenbach, 2006; World Health Organisation, 2007). Health gaps exist on the basis of 
income, education, occupation, gender, race, employment and disability status and for 
various measures of both mortality and morbidity. Inequalities exist for all-cause and cause-
specific mortality, as well as infant mortality, life expectancy and healthy life expectancy 
(Avendano et al., 2005; Lantz et al., 1998; Mackenbach et al., 1999, 2003; Singh & Yu, 1995; 
World Health Organisation, 2008). Health inequalities are also well-documented for various 
measures of morbidity including self-assessed general health (Gravelle & Sutton, 2003; Kunst 
et al., 2005; Marmot et al., 1991; Van Doorslaer et al., 1997), specific physical health 
conditions such as diabetes, strokes, and angina/hypertension (Avendano et al., 2005; 
Mackenbach et al., 2000; Marmot et al., 1991) as well as mental health problems such as 
depression (Lorant et al., 2003, 2007). 
Scholars have argued that the consistency of this evidence points towards the existence of 
underlying processes which connect social status with health (Mackenbach, 2012; McCartney 
et al., 2013). Heated debates have ensued about the causes of health inequalities in wealthy 
societies, fuelled by the publication of high-impact research such as Wilkinson ;ﾐS PｷIﾆWデデげゲ 
The Spirit Level (2009), among others (e.g. Acheson, 1998; Marmot, 2010). While it is not 
necessary to summarise these theoretical debates in great detail, it is helpful for the purposes 
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of this discussion to briefly review some key aspects of this literature. As such, the central 
arguments of three broad schools of thought on the aetiology of health inequalities are 
summarised below: neo-materialist, psychosocial and behavioural.  
The broad contention of the neo-materialist approach is that the distribution of material 
goods is the main explanation for the social patterning of health in wealthy societies. In recent 
history, this approach can be traced to the highly influential Black Report (1980) whose 
authors concluded that health inequalities were the result of large segments of the 
population having inadequate resources to meet their basic physiological needs (ibid.: 107). 
This argument was developed by later scholars who emphasised the role of social protection 
and state investment in public services to counteract material hardship and reduce health 
inequalities (Davey-Smith, 1996; Layte, 2012; Lynch, 2000; Lynch et al., 1997). Davey-Smith 
(1996) also integrated life-course theory, emphasising the cumulative impact of material 
deprivation on health inequalities across the lifespan.  
In contrast, the central argument of the second school of thought に psychosocial に is that 
relative social position is the main predictor of health, implying that the causes are linked with 
deeper processes of stratification than those suggested by neo-materialists. Within this 
framework aﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ゲWﾐゲW ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ヴWﾉ;デｷ┗W ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗデｴWヴゲ 
(Runciman, 1966), contributes to their health status. The basic assumption of this approach 
is that social inequality has an impact on how people feel, which can translate in to 
inequalities in a range of chronic conditions, including mental health (Bambra, 2011). 
Supporters of this argument point to evidence that in rich countries health and wellbeing are 
more closely tied with relative rather than absolute income (e.g. Marmot & Wilkinson, 2001), 
implying that it is the social element of income as a marker of status that matters for health. 
A similar argument was developed by Marmot and his team of researchers in the Whitehall 
studies in relation to occupational status1. Wilkinson (1996) solidifies these arguments by 
drawing on anthropological evidence from Sapolsky (1993) which shows that baboons in 
ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ｴ;┗W ﾏﾗヴW ;Iデｷ┗W けaｷｪｴデ ﾗヴ aﾉｷｪｴデげ ｴﾗヴﾏﾗﾐWゲく TｴWゲW ｴﾗヴﾏﾗﾐWゲ I;ﾐ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ 
in a less well-functioning immune system and reduced capacity of the body to maintain good 
health. Wilkinson (1996: 195) suggests that this explains why specific health conditions are 
                                                          
1 The main published articles are: Bosma et al., 1997; Ferrie et al., 2002; Marmot et al., 1991; North et al., 1996. 
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inversely related with social status among humans2. The third school of thought に behavioural 
に suggests that the primary drivers of health inequalities in rich societies are social patterns 
in the tendency to engage in behaviours which are damaging to health such as smoking, poor 
dietary habits or high alcohol consumption. Some scholars emphasise the draining impact of 
social disadvantage on coping resources, which leads to the adoption of unhealthy behaviours 
(Pearlin, 1989; Pearlin et al., 1981). Others suggest, drawing partly on Boudieusian thought, 
thaデ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ aヴﾗﾏ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW けSｷゲデ;ﾐIW aヴﾗﾏ ﾐWIWゲゲｷデ┞げが ┘ｴWヴW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ 
vary in their ability to enjoy a healthy lifestyle with the most disadvantaged being least able 
to do so (Bourdieu, 1984; Cockerham, 2005; Pampel et al., 2010). 
 
Comparative Research and the Health Inequalities Paradox 
The increased availability of cross-national data has opened new opportunities for 
comparative research which has ensured that these theoretical debates remain firmly on the 
research agenda. Comparative approaches have revealed more about the sensitivity of health 
inequalities to variations in the political, economic, social and cultural environment. This, in 
turn, has stimulated further debates about the aetiology of health inequalities.  
For example, in a comparison of socioeconomic inequalities in mortality across 22 European 
countries Mackenbach et al. (2008) found evidence that smoking, excessive alcohol 
consumption and access to healthcare contributed to inequalities in cause-specific mortality. 
This led the authors to conclude that lifestyle and behavioural factors were crucial 
contributors to social inequalities in health in rich societies (Mackenbach et al., 2008: 2479). 
Similar conclusions were reached in a paper by Richter et al. (2009) based on a multilevel 
analysis of inequalities in self-assessed health and health-related behaviours among 
adolescents in 33 European and North American countries. These authors concluded that a 
significant proportion of the social gradient in health could be accounted for by unhealthy 
behaviours, although this varied across countries. In contrast, the findings from a paper by 
Aldabe et al. (2011) pointed towards material and psychosocial explanations for health 
                                                          
2 For example, Wilkinson (1996: 195) notes that social inequalities in cardiovascular disease (and its associated 
mortality) may be attributable to higher blood pressure among lower status groups, which may be a 




inequalities. These authors found that across 28 European countries, material deprivation, 
social exclusion, financial problems and job reward explained most of the differences in self-
assessed health between occupational groups.  
These are just three examples from an extensive body of empirical literature which has 
examined the causality of health inequalities using comparative cross-national methods. Parts 
of this research are reviewed more thoroughly later in the chapter. The main conclusions from 
this literature are summarised in a paper by Mackenbach (2012). Synthesising the findings 
from key health inequalities studies published over the past thirty years, Mackenbach (ibid.: 
762) concludes that epidemiological research has generated a two-part paradox: i) health 
inequalities have not been eradicated despite improvements in quality of life and advances 
in healthcare and ii) comparative research has not found that health inequalities are least in 
countries with generous welfare state policies. While these two paradoxes are related, it is 
the second part which is the central interest of this dissertation. This finding is consistent 
across four different review articles (Bambra, 2011; Brennenstuhl et al., 2012; Mackenbach, 
2012; Muntaner et al., 2011). Researchers argue that this counterintuitive (Mackenbach, 
2012). Countries with generous welfare state policies should reduce inequalities in income 
and living conditions, which should also reduce health inequalities. 
In the next part of this chapter, attention turns to explanations for this research paradox. A 
critique is developed, culminating in a conceptual approach which is further refined in 
Chapter Two. As stated in the introduction, the focus of the thesis is on the relationship 
between one aspect of welfare state policies に cash benefits に and health inequalities. As a 
ヴWﾏｷﾐSWヴが デｴW デWヴﾏ けI;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
protect against the economic and social shocks of unemployment, sickness, childrearing and 
old age. While investment in other public services (e.g. health, education) will have an 
important bearing on social inequalities in health, it is not the main interest of this thesis. In 
this thesis the emphasis is on out-of-work benefits for working age unemployed and workless 
people. Cash benefits are defined in terms of the money paid to these groups during these 




Cash Benefits Policies and Health Inequalities: Explaining the Paradox 
 
In this section, consideration is given to reasons why health inequalities may not be less in 
countries with generous cash benefits policies. It begins by describing the theoretical position 
of Mackenbach (2012) more thoroughly, before outlining some alternative explanations.  
The assumption of Mackenbach (2012) and others (Bambra, 2011; Hurrelmann et al., 2011; 
OげC;ﾏヮﾗ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱヵぶ is that generous cash benefits policies should lessen health inequalities 
by reducing poverty and income inequality. This approach draws mainly on materialist and 
psychosocial theories of the causes of health inequalities, emphasising the role of income for 
health inequalities via multiple channels. For example, more generous cash benefits might 
reduce inequalities in housing and neighbourhood conditions by enabling disadvantaged 
groups to purchase better housing, thus reducing the material health effects of poor housing 
(Dunn, 2000). More generous benefits may also contribute towards less anxiety about 
housing costs, with psychosocial benefits for health. Similarly, higher incomes among out-of-
work populations may reduce food insecurity and fuel poverty among disadvantaged groups. 
This, in turn, may contribute to reductions in social inequalities in health through biological 
and physiological processes (Garthwaite et al., 2015; Liddell & Morris, 2010). Last, generous 
cash benefits might reduce the costs of care work, with important implications for the health 
of disadvantaged groups and, in particular, that of women.  
There is thus a theoretically sound argument for expecting countries with more generous cash 
benefits to have less health inequalities. So why does the empirical evidence not consistently 
support this hypothesis? Mackenbach (2012: 767) concludes that there are two possible 
explanations for this research puzzle. The first is linked with the education systems of 
countries with advanced welfare states. He notes that the northern European countries, in 
particular, have education systems which emphasise upward intergenerational mobility. He 
suggests that the meritocratic nature of these systems (relative to those of less progressive 
welfare states) may have led to social selection, whereby those with the least cognitive 
abilities are at the bottom of the social strata. These same groups may have personal 
characteristics which make them most susceptible to ill-health, thus explaining why health 
inequalities are not less in these countries. The second explanation that he offers is that in 
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countries with progressive welfare policies, health inequalities may be more closely linked 
with health behaviours than elsewhere. He suggests that the reason for this, (echoing the 
argument made by Bambra (2011)) is that these countries tend to be at a more advanced 
stage in their epidemiological development. In these countries, health promotion messages 
may have reached wider swathes of the population. Poor health behaviours may now be 
concentrated among disadvantaged groups, contributing to wider health inequalities. 
While each of these explanations may partially explain the inconsistent empirical findings, this 
thesis argues that there is a more significant conceptual issue with the existing literature. It 
suggests that much of the research to date has centred on if rather than how cash benefits 
matter for health inequalities. As such, there is a lack of understanding about the nature of 
the causal relationship, potentially explaining why it is hard to interpret the current empirical 
evidence. It is suggested that we can understand more about how cash benefits are 
connected with health inequalities in two related ways. First, research should be attentive to 
the range of causal pathways which might connect cash benefits with health inequalities, 
aside from the effect on income during unemployment. These causal pathways are defined 
as empirically measurable connections between cash benefits and health inequalities which 
are examined throughout the empirical chapters (Four to Six). Second, researchers should 
recognise the varied impacts of cash benefits through different design features and should 
examine the range of ways in which they influence health inequalities. These two critiques 
are discussed at greater length below before they are linked more closely with the research 
hypotheses in later chapters. 
 
Generous Cash Benefits and Employment Outcomes: An Alternative Causal Pathway 
It has been noted that most research has begun with the assumption that generous cash 
benefits should reduce health inequalities by alleviating poverty, especially among 
unemployed and workless people. The existing literature has therefore implicitly adopted a 
materialist perspective on the causes of health inequalities (i.e. via income). Yet 
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unemployment can also be damaging to health through psychosocial processes, irrespective 
of income. This is documented in a vast body of literature from social-psychology3.  
It is suggested that although generous cash benefits might reduce poverty during 
unemployment, it is also plausible they will reduce unemployment exit. In turn, this may have 
negative consequences for health through psychosocial processes. While qualitative research 
finds strong commitment to work among recipients of out-of-work benefits (Gebauer & 
Vobruba, 2003; Shildrick et al., 2012), there is an overwhelming body of experimental 
evidence which shows that generous cash benefits can reduce unemployment exit (Carling et 
al., 1996; Katz & Meyer, 1990; Lalive, 2007; Van Ours & Vodopivec, 2006). This may partly be 
HWI;┌ゲW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W ｴｷｪｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗ┘ ┘;ｪWゲ ｴ;┗W ｪヴW;デWヴ け┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ デヴ;ヮゲげ 
whereby the marginal gains of leaving unemployment are low, trapping people in 
unemployment. It is therefore possible that generous out-of-work benefits, combined with 
low-wage employment, might reduce the tendency for people to leave unemployment, with 
negative consequences for health.  
Aゲ ゲ┌Iｴが デｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ ﾉﾗﾗﾆゲ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ;デ デｴW けｷﾐIﾗﾏW WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa ｪWﾐWヴﾗ┌ゲ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ 
at けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげく Iデ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴゲ デ┘ﾗ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏｷｪｴデ IﾗﾐﾐWIデ 
cash benefits generosity with health inequalities and examines these empirically in Chapter 
Five. To be clear, it is not suggested that these adverse employment effects undermine any 
health benefits of generous cash benefits. Rather, it is possible that such detrimental effects 
may occur alongside the positive health effects and that this may explain why generous 
welfare states do not consistently have less health inequalities.  
 
The Impact of Cash benefits via Activation and Conditionality 
The conflicting causal pathways described above may partly account for the inconsistent 
findings of existing research. Yet it is likely that the explanations are more complex still and 
may be linked with other features of cash benefits policies, aside from the level of generosity. 
                                                          
3 See for example Blakely et al., 2003; Jahoda, 1971; Murphy & Athanasou, 1999; Waddell & Burton, 2006: 17-
20; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998. 
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This thesis addresses this directly by examining the effects of cash benefits via two further 
ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげぎ activation and conditionality. These are defined as follows: 
- Activation: The systems of social policy which draw voluntary or mandatory links 
between receipt of cash benefits and labour market reattachment (Dingeldey, 2007; 
Sage, 2015b). In practice, activation policies are a mixture of job search assistance, 
work experience placements, work-focused interviews, training and skills 
development, and public employment services (Sage, 2015: 32-33). Activation 
programmes are targeted mainly at unemployed people but also at other groups that 
have been historically detached from paid employment (e.g. disabled people, single 
parents, older workers).  
 
- Conditionality: The wide-ranging conditions which are placed on cash benefits 
recipients linked with behaviour around work, parenting, alcohol and drug usage or 
even dietary practices4. The focus of this thesis is on work-related conditionality. 
MﾗヴW ヮヴWIｷゲWﾉ┞が デｴW Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ｷゲ ﾗﾐ けIﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa IﾗﾐS┌Iデげ ふｷﾐ デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa 
Clasen & Clegg (2007)). These are the behavioural requirements which are imposed 
on benefit recipients after they have met the initial eligibility criteria, rather than the 
eligibility requirements for receipt of cash benefits per se. 
The main function of labour market activation and conditionality within contemporary cash 
benefits systems is to reduce unemployment and benefit receipt. It is therefore possible that, 
if successful in this aim, countries with intensive activation and conditionality policies may 
have less unemployment, which may in turn reduce health inequalities. This thesis therefore 
W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲ デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa ;Iデｷ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ┘;┞ ;ゲ ｷデ SﾗWゲ 
for cash benefits generosity. However, it is anticipated that more intensive activation and 
                                                          
4 These wider behavioural regulations are particularly noticeable in the context of the United States in the 
conditions attached to receipt of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). At least 15 states now require 
TANF recipients to undertake a drug test as a condition for eligibility (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2017)く MﾗヴWﾗ┗Wヴが ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ゲデ;デWゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ; けa;ﾏｷﾉ┞ I;ヮげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ SWﾐｷWゲ ;ﾐ┞ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐIﾗﾏW ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ デﾗ 
women that have a child whilst enrolled on TANF, thus regulating the sexual behaviour of poor women (Romero 
& Agenor, 2009). Finally, there has been discussion in the US of banning the purchase of junk food with food 
stamps, although no state has so far legislated this. There is also evidence of similar ideas among UK 
policymakers, with the UK government considering denying benefits to obese claimants or those with substance 




conditionality requirements will contribute to less health inequalities through this causal 
ヮ;デｴ┘;┞く TｴWゲW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ;ヴW W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS ｷﾐ Cｴ;ヮデWヴゲ Fｷ┗W ;ﾐS “ｷ┝が ┘ｴWヴW I;ゲｴ 
benefits are operationalised not only in terms of the level of generosity, but also the intensity 
of activation and conditionality. 
It is also possible to identify a second causal pathway connecting activation and conditionality 
with health inequalities: the impact of these cash benefits design features on health during 
unemployment. Both labour market activation and conditionality requirements change the 
experience of unemployment. Cash benefits recipients are required to interact with the state 
in different ways, either through attending training programmes or fulfilling certain job search 
requirements. Conditionality also acts as a threat, whereby recipients are made aware that 
their benefits may be withdrawn if they do not fulfil certain obligations. A minority of studies 
in this field have examined the health effects of activation policies for unemployed people 
(Bambra & Eikemo, 2008; Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Wulfgramm, 2014). However, this research 
is underdeveloped and says little about the contribution of both activation and conditionality 
to health inequalities via this causal pathway. In this thesis, this causal pathway is defined as 
けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげが Sヴ;┘ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa C;ヴデWヴ ;ﾐS Wｴｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ (2016). In this thesis, 
the causal pathway described above (i.e. the impact of policies on health during 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデぶ ｷゲ SWaｷﾐWS ;ゲ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ. Chapters Five and Six investigate the impact 
of activation and conditionality through this causal pathway. 
 
The Differential Impact of Cash Benefits Policies 
The pathways and design features described above demonstrate the range of ways in which 
cash benefits can influence health inequalities. There is one final set of hypothesised 
connections which are examined in Chapter Five of this thesis. These are described as 
けdifferential impactsげく HWヴWが デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｷゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ デｴW I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ ﾗ┌デﾉｷﾐWS ;Hﾗ┗W 
have varied health effects, depending on the individual characteristics of population groups.  
This causal pathway draws on a conceptual approach to the impact of policies on health 
inequalities developed by Diderichsen and Hallqvist (1998) and Diderichsen et al. (2001). It 
starts with the idea that groups with pre-existing disadvantage are more susceptible to poor 
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health during times of hardship (Davey-Smith, 1996; Holland et al., 2000; Wadsworth, 1997; 
Willson et al., 2007). This may be because these groups were exposed to early life health 
disadvantage (e.g. poor nutrition) or because they have less personal resources to draw on to 
cope with adverse situations (Diderichsen et al., 2001). Vulnerable groups may include people 
with low education, weak social networks, poor family ties etc. It is suggested that cash 
benefits policies might have a differential impact on the health of advantaged vs 
disadvantaged groups via the causal pathways described above. For example, generous cash 
benefits might relieve material deprivation more for low vs high educated people, leading to 
greater reductions in health inequalities. Similarly, there may be variable effects of labour 
market activation policies on employment outcomes for more vs less advantaged 
unemployed persons. Chapter Five explores the differential impacts of cash benefits via the 
generosity and activation design features. 
 
Towards a Conceptual Framework 
 
So far, a research problem has been identified and a possible way of advancing knowledge 
has been suggested, based on the examination of specific causal pathways. The reader is 
reminded of these pathways in later chapters where they are linked more directly with 
research hypotheses. Figure 1.1 に taken from Borrell et al. (2015) に represents a simplified 
illustration of how we might conceptualise the relationship between cash benefits policies 
and health inequalities. It shows where cash benefits fit within the wider health inequalities 
literature and therefore provides a useful summary of the discussion in the chapter so far. To 
increase clarity, key areas of interest are circled in green.  
F┌ヴデｴWゲデ デﾗ デｴW ﾉWaデ ;ヴW デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ けSｷゲデ;ﾉげ I;┌ゲWゲ に デｴW けゲﾗIｷﾗWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デげく 
Wｷデｴｷﾐ デｴｷゲが け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげ ふSWaｷﾐWS ｴWヴW ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWfits) is the main variable 
of interest. These policies have a differential impact across population groups via various 
WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴW けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげく Wｷデｴｷﾐ ;ﾐ┞ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ デｴWヴW ;ヴW ; ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐデ 
dimensions of inequality, some of which are shown in Figure 1.1 (social class, gender, age, 
ethnicity, territory). In this thesis the primary interest is in the impact of cash benefits policies 
via social class, although some consideration is given to other forms of social stratification 
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(e.g. gender, age). The crucial aspect of Figure 1.1 in terms of the conceptual arguments made 
ゲﾗ a;ヴ ｷゲ デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ふけ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげぶ ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;ﾐデゲ ﾗa 
ｴW;ﾉデｴ ﾗヴ けﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲげ via けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ゲゲげく 
Figure 1.1 draws attention to five major social determinants of health: employment, care, 
income, housing and environment. The social determinants of health of primary interest in 
this thesis are those which are directly modifiable by cash benefits policies: unemployment 
and income. However, the effects on income will have consequences for some other social 
determinants of health (e.g. housework, housing etc.), as previously described. Tracing the 
chain of causality in Figure 1.1, the primary interest of this thesis is therefore in the link 
between:  
Welfare state policies → social class → employment and working conditions/income 















Figure 1.1. Framework for understanding the relationship between cash 
benefits policies and health inequalities, reprinted from Borrell et al. (2015), 
















The objective of the discussion so far has been to situate the thesis within the wider health 
inequalities literature and the more specific strand of this literature which has focused on the 
role of cash benefits for health equity. The emphasis has centred round the theoretical 
question of how we can understand the link between cash benefits and health inequalities. 
The second part of the chapter contends with another important question に how can we 
research this link? It reviews key contributions to the literature to date and assesses these in 





Translating Theory in To Practice? Empirical Research, Findings and Limitations. 
 
The last section noted some key features of the conceptual approach of this thesis. These 
conceptual principles are put in to practice through various empirical methods in Chapters 
Four to Six. By way of an introduction to this, the remainder of this chapter summarises the 
existing empirical literature on the links between cash benefits and health inequalities and 
critiques this according to the extent to which it addresses the issue of causality. Where the 
last section focused on theoretical limitations of the current literature, the emphasis here is 
in empirical research gaps. Key findings are noted and these inform the hypotheses which are 
stated in later chapters. Four approaches are identified and described below: (i) welfare 
regimes, (ii) institutional, (iii) expenditure and (iv) quasi-experimental, and an argument is 
built about ways in which empirical research can be developed. 
 
The Dominance of the Regime Approach 
Much scholarship in this field has explored links between cash benefits and health inequalities 
using け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏWゲげ ;ゲ ; ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa I;ヮデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW H;ゲｷI Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ 
(henceforth this is described as the regime approach). Welfare regime classifications cluster 
countries according to shared political, economic, socio-cultural and historical characteristics. 
TｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ ;ゲヮWIデ ﾗa デｴW デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ふｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴW┗ｷﾗ┌ゲ ゲWIデｷﾗﾐぶ デｴ;デ デｴW┞ 
capture is the generosity of cash benefits systems. 
The original welfare regime typology is often credited to Esping-Andersen (1990) although 
there have been a number of developments on this work (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Bambra, 
2007b; Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; Powell & Barrientos, 2011). In Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ 
original typology countries are classified according to: how far individuals are able to survive 
free of the market (decommodification), the extent of social hierarchy within a society 
(stratification), and the relative balance of state-market-family-voluntary in the provision of 
welfare (public-private mix). On the basis of these three principles, Esping-Andersen develops 




Table 1.1. Welfare Regime Typology, based on Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Dimension Welfare Regime 
 Liberal Corporatist Social-Democratic 
De-Commodification Low Medium High 
Stratification Medium High Low 
Public-Private Mix Market-oriented Family-oriented Emancipatory 
 
In this schema, Liberal regimes have low de-commodification, medium stratification and a 
market-oriented welfare system. Individuals are largely dependent on the market for their 
welfare, social rights are contained and social assistance is residual (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
27). The Conservative regime has a higher level of decommodification, although social 
hierarchy is more engrained and linked with family and occupational status. Family is crucial 
for social welfare and support networks are encouraged outside of the state or market. Last, 
the Social-Democratic regime has the highest levels of decommodification with generous 
social protection and insurance. Social stratification is low and individual autonomy is 
encouraged, free of the market and family. This is reflected in historically high levels of 
investment in active labour market programmes, a subject which is investigated more directly 
in Chapter Five. Broadly, the Liberal regime consists of the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. UK, 
Ireland, US, Australia), the Conservative regime is represented by the central European 
countries (e.g. Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands) and the Social-Democratic 
regime is comprised of the northern European countries (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Norway). 
While there have been a number of important criticisms of Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ┘ﾗヴﾆが ｷデ ｴ;ゲ 
nevertheless been foundational in social policy research. Welfare regimes have been used to 
a number of different ends; however the interest here is in how social-epidemiologists have 
used Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴゲ5, to explore the impact of cash benefits on 
                                                          
5 Two reviews (Bergqvist et al., 2013; Brennenstuhl et al., 2012) find that there are three common regime 
typologies in the health inequalities field: Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrara (1996) and Huber et al. (2001). 
Ferrera extends Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ to include Southern European countries which are 
distinctive in their reliance on family, as well as their fragmented social welfare systems. The Huber et al. 
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health inequalities. In the broadest sense, the theoretical interest of these studies is in 
whether health inequalities vary according to these principles of decommodification, 
stratification and the public-private mix. It is generally expected that the most highly 
decommodifying and least stratifying welfare regime に Social-Democratic に will be most 
effective at reducing health inequalities (e.g. Bambra & Eikemo, 2008; Eikemo, Bambra, et al., 
2008; Muntaner et al., 2017a). The logic of exploring health inequalities across welfare 
regimes is therefore that: clusters of countries within regimes share in common ways of 
delivering welfare services in a way which shapes and orders social relations (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 23). This, in turn, means that these clusters of countries may have similar 
levels of health inequality. If this expectation is met, then it is implied that cash benefits play 
a role in relation to health inequalities. 
The regime approach has one major strength as a methodology: it allows researchers to 
W┝ヮﾉﾗヴW デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa デｴW WﾐデｷヴW け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ;ヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴWげ (Hurrelmann et al., 2011) of a country 
or set of countries. This is important because the effects of cash benefits on health 
inequalities will often be a result of the combined impact of welfare policies, rather than those 
in just one area (e.g. pensions). The regime approach also provides a strong theoretical 
platform, with hypothetical mechanisms (either decommodification, stratification and the 
public-private mix or others depending on the typology) that offer a rigorous conceptual basis 
for understanding how cash benefits influence health inequalities. Last, the regime approach 
is relatively straightforward to use, requiring only access to cross-national datasets with 
health and socioeconomic data and country identifiers. This may partly explain why there are 
such a proliferation of studies using this approach. 
Three review articles (Bergqvist et al., 2013; Brennenstuhl et al., 2012; Muntaner et al., 2011) 
concluded that the regime approach was by far the most dominant methodological approach 
in this field6. Referring to these reviews and other papers in the field, the following key 
empirical conclusions can be drawn: 
                                                          
approach focuses on prevailing political traditions, classifying regimes in terms of the ideological orientation of 
predominant governing parties.  
 
6 These reviews also cover papers which look at the impact of regimes on average population health; however I 
do not reference these here as they do not fit with the main interest of the thesis. 
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1. Most studies find that health inequalities vary across welfare regimes. The vast 
majority of papers explore inequalities in self-assessed health and limiting 
longstanding illness7 and these studies invariably find statistically significant 
differences between regimes. There is also evidence of regime-based patterns of 
inequality for depression8 and general wellbeing9. One study also found cross-regime 
differences in inequalities in mortality (Popham et al., 2013). The various papers use a 
range of different indicators of inequality: gender, education, income, social class, life 
course socioeconomic position, single mother status, employment status and 
unemployment.     
 
2. Although regimes vary in the size of health inequalities, the evidence is mixed 
regarding which regimes are most effective at reducing health inequalities. Two of the 
three main reviews (Bergqvist et al., 2013; Brennenstuhl et al., 2012) conclude that 
the evidence does not support the hypothesis that health inequalities are smallest in 
the Scandinavian regime and suggest that the literature is too equivocal to draw any 
clear conclusions about the impact of welfare regimes through Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ 
three mechanisms. The third review disputes this claim, suggesting that the Social-
Democratic regime has narrower health inequalities, although this seems to only apply 
for those studies which focus on political tradition (using the Huber et al. (2001) 
typology). Even more puzzling, Bambra (2011; with colleagues 2010) concludes that 
the evidence suggests that health inequalities are in fact smallest in the 
Conservative/Bismarckian regime.  
 
3. Overall, it is perhaps most prudent to trust the conclusions from the two most 
thorough reviews which suggest that the literature is too varied and inconsistent to 
be confident of a clear effect of any one regime compared with another. This 
conclusion makes sense if we consider the degree of variation across studies in: i) 
welfare regime classifications ii) measures of social inequality and iii) health indicators.  
                                                          
7 Avendano et al., 2009; Bambra & Eikemo, 2008; Bambra et al., 2010; Borrell et al., 2009; Dahl et al., 2011; 
Eikemo, Bambra, et al., 2008; Eikemo, Huisman, et al., 2008; Espelt et al., 2008; Sacker et al., 2011; Zambon et 
al., 2006.  
8 Chung et al., 2013; Dragano et al., 2011; Levecque et al., 2011; Van de Velde et al., 2010. 




4. “デ┌SｷWゲ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾐｪ ; けヴWｪｷﾏW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴげ ｴ;┗W ﾏ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デWS デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ ﾗ┌ヴ 
understanding of whether welfare regimes are associated with health inequalities. 
They have told us less about the multiple causal connections between welfare regimes 
and health inequalities, including wider influences outside of cash benefits policies. 
This last point is particularly important. Each of these empirical studies rests on a set of 
implicit assumptions about the underlying explanations for links between welfare regimes 
and health inequalities. However, research has tended to be less precise about why regimes 
are linked with observed health inequalities outcomes. This is particularly problematic with 
the welfare regime approach as regime classifications represent a great deal more than cash 
benefits systems. Welfare regimes are a proxy for a range of social, economic and cultural 
characteristics of countries and regions (Pfau-effinger, 2005). As such, links with health 
inequalities will be more complex than simply the extent to which regimes reduce poverty or 
mitigate against the health effects of unemployment. The approach used in Chapter Four 
modestly develops on the prior literature by using an empirical approach which seeks 
evidence foヴ ; けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ ;ゲ ; ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ the relationship between 
welfare regimes and health inequalities. It does this by using a direct indicator of psychosocial 
stress に depressive symptoms に and exploring variations in inequalities in this measure across 
regimes. 
 
Institutional and Expenditure Approaches 
While the regime approach has been the dominant paradigm, there are two other 
ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;┗W ;ﾉゲﾗ HWWﾐ ヮヴW┗;ﾉWﾐデぎ けｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ ;ﾐS けW┝ヮWﾐSｷデ┌ヴWげく 
These differ from the regime approach primarily in terms of their use of concrete independent 
variables to operationalise cash benefits policies. They are similar (to one another) on these 
grounds. It therefore makes sense to cluster them together for review purposes. Nonetheless, 
these two approaches have slightly different conceptual and methodological underpinnings.  
Underlying the institutional approach is a concern with social citizenship and how different 
aspects of welfare state governance may enhance or undermine citizenship (Dahl & van der 
Wel, 2013: 61). As such, researchers typically use indicators of welfare state design such as 
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levels of benefit replacement, means-testing requirements, duration of entitlements, 
qualifying criteria and conditionality. In contrast, the social expenditure approach defines 
cash benefits policies in terms of welfare effort by using indicators of social expenditure (often 
net of need, i.e. labour market spending divided by the unemployment rate). These measures 
of spending are taken as a proxy for cash benefits generosity or the quality of programmes 
available to recipients. 
Relatively few of the institutional and expenditure studies have taken a health inequalities 
angle. Of those that focus on health inequalities, we can identify nine papers that adopt solely 
an institutional10 approach, and five which use a mix of expenditure and institutional 
indicators11. These have looked at the impact of family policy, pensions, unemployment and 
economic assistance, labour market and total health and social expenditure. They have 
explored inequalities by education, income, single parent and employment status and have 
looked at the following health outcomes: self-assessed health, limiting longstanding illness, 
mortality, life satisfaction and depressive symptoms. As with the regime approach, these 
studies do not consistently show that higher generosity is linked with less health inequalities 
(Bergqvist et al., 2013).  
However, there are important variations across these studies in research design which 
warrant further discussion. Two broad types of design can be identified. The first に and most 
common に uses concrete indicators of cash benefits policies and links these with health 
inequalities outcomes (see left column Independent Variables in Table 1.2). In practical 
terms, the strategy has been to use regression methods to explore the relationships between 
contextual variables (e.g. unemployment replacement rate, % spending on active labour 
market policy) and population health and to compare this effect across different social 
groups. These studies have the advantage of using specific measures of policy expenditure or 
design, thereby allowing a degree of generalisation across large groups of countries. A 
drawback of this approach is that explanations for the causes of health inequalities are often 
framed quiデW ┗;ｪ┌Wﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏゲ (Shahidi, Siddiqi, et al., 2016) or 
                                                          
10 Borrell et al., 2006; Burstrom et al., 2010; Farrants et al., 2016; Fritzell et al., 2007; James et al., 2007; Korda 
et al., 2007; Shahidi, De Moortel, et al., 2016; Shahidi, Siddiqi, et al., 2016; Whitehead et al., 2000. 




デｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW SWゲｷｪﾐ ;ﾐS ｪWﾐWヴﾗゲｷデ┞ ﾗa ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ けaヴ;ﾏW デｴW ﾉｷ┗Wゲ ﾗa デｴW 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WSげ (Wulfgramm, 2014). A summary of strengths and limitations of this approach is 
shown in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2. Institutional and Expenditure Studies Classified According to 
Research Design 
Independent Variables  Population Focus 
Key Characteristics: Independent variables to 
represent areas of policy design or generosity; 
large number of countries; generalisable 
conclusions about impact of policies. 
Key Characteristics: Detailed country-specific 
policy information; often limited to two or three 
countries; no independent variables for policy; 
explores contextual variability in social 
determinants of health 
Example Studies: Shahidi et al. (2016), 
Wulfgramm (2014), Carr and Chung (2014), 
Niedzwiedz et al. (2016). 
Example Studies: Burstrom et al. (2010), Fritzell 
et al. (2007), Whitehead et al. (2000).  
Strengths: Uses independent policy variables to 
increase specificity of causal links; larger pools of 
countries increase generalisability.  
Limitations: Unable to say much about 
mechanisms, less convincing conceptually. 
Sometimes makes strong, unreasonable claims 
about impact of contextual variables without 
including enough controls. 
Strengths: Able to give detailed policy 
background; tells us about the causal pathways 
through which policies may impact on health 
inequalities. 
Limitations: No independent variables, harder to 
be confident of the effect of particular policy 
areas. Less generalisable effect of policy areas, 
although more convincing within the context of 




The second (less common) research design is more descriptive and limits the analysis to a 
smaller number of countries (see column Population Focus in Table 1.2). While reviews 
aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉﾉ┞ SWaｷﾐW デｴWゲW ゲデ┌SｷWゲ ;ゲ けｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ S┌W デﾗ デｴWｷヴ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞デｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ;ﾐS デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ 
framework, elements of the research design could equally be applied to social expenditure 
studies. The key difference between these and the other studies is that they do not use 
concrete indicators of welfare state expenditure or policy design. Instead, they infer about 
the effect of policies based on evidence of health inequalities between specific population 
groups, changes in policy and health outcomes over time, and (crucially) the relation between 
institutional and policy arrangements and the social determinants of health. For example, in 
one of these papers (Burstrom et al., 2010) the authors explore health inequalities between 
lone and couple mothers in three different institutional settings: the UK, Germany and Italy. 
Their analysis has three distinct phases. First, they examine the socio-demographics of lone 
vs couple mothers in the three different countries to see if the processes of stratification differ 
across these institutional contexts. Then, they explore health inequalities between these 
ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ｷﾐ W;Iｴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞く Fｷﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW┞ ﾉﾗﾗﾆ ;デ SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ けW┝ヮﾗゲ┌ヴWゲげ ﾗa 
joblessness and poverty for lone vs couple mothers in the UK, Germany and Italy. 
The second of these two research designs chimes better with the aims of this thesis as it 
investigates both the influence of cash benefits policies on health inequalities and 
hypothesised pathways which explain this relationship. Yet while this research design 
contextualises the effect of cash benefits via the social determinants of health, it does not 
include specific independent variables for cash benefits policies. This thesis frames causality 
in terms of specificity, drawing on aspects of the Bradford-Hill (1965) criteria (discussed in 
Chapter Three). It argues that evidence for causality is stronger if associations are found 
between specific exposure variables and health among likely recipient populations. As such, 
Chapter Five combines elements of both research designs.  
 
The Quasi-Experimental Approach 
The three approaches highlighted above に regime, institutional and expenditure に have been 
by far the most dominant in this research field. Prior to concluding the chapter, it is worth 
briefly mentioning one further quasi-experimental approach that was used in a recent paper 
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by Basu et al. (2016). These authors evaluated the health and health inequalities impact of a 
major change in social welfare policy in the United States に the Personal Responsibility and 
Wﾗヴﾆ Oヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ‘WIﾗﾐIｷﾉｷ;デｷﾗﾐ AIデ ヱΓΓヶく TｴW┞ ﾉﾗﾗﾆWS けHWaﾗヴW ;ﾐS ;aデWヴげ デｴW ヮ;ゲゲ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW 
act and compared the health of the key policy target group に single mothers に with that of a 
control group に couple mothers. They evaluated the health of the policy target group across 
a number of different domains (physical and mental health, health behaviours and healthcare 
access). 
Quasi-experimental designs such as that adopted in the above paper have the obvious 
advantage of telling a more convincing causal story. The key design features which make this 
study strong are it i) explores health between treatment and control groups ii) looks 
longitudinally at health change before and after the policy was introduced and iii) investigates 
a range of possible health effects. There is a greater level of policy description preceding the 
analysis (as with the Population Focus studies described in Table 1.2) than in many other 
papers as the focus is on a specific policy change. Despite these strengths, the wider critique 
of the extant literature also applies here. The authors do not scrutinise the causal pathways 
which might connect policies with health changes. In Chapter Six, I develop on the paper by 
Basu et al. (2016) taking in to consideration these issues. While the approach is not strictly 
quasi-experimental, concrete steps are taken to build on the limitations of Basu et al. in 
relation to the objectives of the thesis. 
 
Summary  
Four approaches to the overarching question have been identified within the extant 
literature: welfare regime, expenditure, institutional and quasi-experimental. It has been 
argued that the first of these に the regime approach に has been dominant, while there is a 
more modest, yet substantial collection of expenditure and institutional studies. One quasi-
experimental study has been identified. The following arguments have been made: 
- Although the regime approach has dominated the extant literature, research has 
tended to be quite descriptive. Given the breadth of historical and cultural features of 
countries and regions that welfare regimes capture, it seems important for future 
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regime-based studies to interrogate the likely connections with health inequalities at 
a greater level of depth. These could be via Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ふヱΓΓヰぶ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ ﾗa 
decommodification, stratification and public-private mix, or those from other welfare 
regime theorists. Chapter Four seeks to do this. 
 
- Despite having different conceptual logics, the institutional and expenditure 
approaches both use independent variables to represent cash benefits policies and 
thus constitute an important development on the regime approach. There are two 
types of research design of these studies: one which links cash benefits policy variables 
with health inequalities and one which infers about the role of policies by looking at 
the health of recipient populations and linking this with the design of policies, changes 
over time in policy design and changes in the prevalence of worklessness and poverty 
among recipient groups. Chapter Five combines elements of each of these approaches 
to provide a different kind of analysis which focuses on causal pathways.  
 
- Last, one paper was identified which adopted a quasi-experimental approach. It was 
argued that such an approach had advantages for unpacking the causality of the link 
between cash benefits and health inequalities, although this could be strengthened 
through reference to the causal pathways described in this chapter. Given this, 
elements of this research design are taken forward in Chapter Six, although the 
chapter has a stronger focus on the causal pathways, as fitting with the wider 
objectives of the thesis. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter One  
Chapter One has explored the theoretical connections between cash benefits and health 
inequalities and outlined an approach which centres on causal pathways and cash benefits 
けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげく Iデ has also summarised the literature which has sought to answer this 
question empirically and critiqued it in light of the preceding theoretical discussion. In the 
next chapter, attention turns to the specific research question of this thesis. It provides a 
conceptual framework and explains how the empirical chapters (Four, Five and Six) seek to 

























Chapter 2. The Research Strategy 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the research question is stated and a rationale is 
given. A conceptual approach is then outlined which applies the theoretical arguments made 
in the last chapter to the research question of this thesis. The remainder of the chapter then 
outlines the more specific empirical aims of the thesis. It describes the causal pathways which 
are examined in Chapters Four to Six and justifies a series of research hypotheses. 
 
The Research Question and Conceptual Approach 
 
The introduction explained that the central aim of this thesis is to examine the causal 
pathways that connect cash benefits policies and health inequalities. This represents a 
response to a gap in the extensive literature on welfare states and health inequalities 
reviewed in Chapter One. While an abundance of evidence is generally advantageous, the 
conclusions of review articles (e.g. Bergqvist et al, 2013) suggest that this may have 
(paradoxically) contributed to greater uncertainty in the research field. Reviews suggest that 
it has become increasingly difficult to draw ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;HﾉW IﾗﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴWﾐ けデｴW ┘Wﾉa;ヴW 
ゲデ;デWげが けｴW;ﾉデｴげ ;ﾐS けｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞げ ;ヴW ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS ｷﾐ ゲ┌Iｴ ┗;ヴｷWS ┘;┞ゲく Fﾗヴ Hﾗデｴ ゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ┗W 
and practical reasons, the focus is therefore on one specific research question: さwhat is the 
causal impact of cash benefits policies on educational inequalities in mental health?ざ The 
reasons for this are outlined in the next section. By focusing on this specific research question, 
it is possible to use empirical methods to generate evidence in support of the wider objective 
of understanding the causal connections between welfare states and health inequalities. 
 
Cash Benefits and Educational Inequalities in Mental Health 
The broadest research hypothesis is that cash benefits policies will matter for educational 
inequalities in mental health because education is an important predictor of health-relevant 
life outcomes (e.g. employment, income), which are affected by cash benefits policies. 
Drawing on life course theories which stress the role of education for the probability of 
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experiencing disadvantage (Dahrendorf, 1979; Weber, 1978), this thesis treats education as 
; けa┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ I;┌ゲWげ ﾗa ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ (Link & Phelan, 1995; Phelan et al., 2010). In the 
words of Mirowsky and Ross (2005: 28) it has permeating, accumulating and self-amplifying 
effects. It has wide ranging benefits (permeates), builds over a lifetime (accumulates) and has 
mutually reinforcing consequences (self-amplifies). 
The conceptual focus is on the significance of education for two health determinants: income 
and employment status (with indirect links to health behaviours). It is hypothesised that cash 
benefits matter for educational inequalities in mental health because education is a strong 
predictor of occupation and employment status, which has implications for health inequalities 
via psychosocial processes connected with esteem, respect and social status (Galobardes et 
al., 2006: 10). Education will also matter for income through its impact on employment status, 
which has a range of consequences for mental health via (primarily) materialist mechanisms. 
Therefore, education is a suitable indicator of stratification for this research project as it 
predicts both employment and income-related outcomes, each of which are modifiable by 
cash benefits policies. There are also practical reasons for focusing on education. It is a 
relatively stable measure of socio-economic position which is finished by most people in early 
adulthood, whereas income, occupation and employment status are changeable throughout 
working lives. Education is also relatively comparable across countries and, unlike income, 
does not suffer from high levels of non-response in survey questionnaires (Galobardes et al., 
2006: 8). 
While there are both theoretical and pragmatic justifications for the research question, there 
are also certain drawbacks. Most significantly, it may be hard to do justice to the complexity 
of the links between education and mental health, which may pose problems for the 
ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪゲく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デｴWヴW ;ヴW ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ HW けﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW-ヴWﾉ;デWSげ 
pathways that connect education and mental health, which are hard to capture using the data 
in this thesis. These differ from those associated with employment and income as they are 
linked with the intrinsic value of education for health, rather than the indirect effect via other 
intermediary variables. Education leads to stronger analytical and cognitive abilities, which 
can enable individuals to disseminate facts and make rational, informed and healthy life 
decisions (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006: 15). As a result, better educated people may adopt 
healthier behaviours because they are quicker to absorb health promotion messages 
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(Galobardes et al., 2006: 8). Relatedly, better educated people may be more likely to trust 
science and new technologies and therefore seek new medicines and therapeutic solutions 
to mental health problems (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006: 15). Those with higher levels of 
education may also use these intellectual resources to negotiate healthcare services to their 
advantage and there is evidence of this in the case of the British National Health Service (Le 
Grand, 1982).  
Yet the issues with causality which this creates are greatest when the relationship between 
cash benefits and educational inequalities in mental health is examined on its own, without 
the support of evidence around how these variables are causally related. The pathways-
focused research strategy used in this thesis strengthens understanding about specific causal 
links relevant to the research question, without discounting the multitude of other factors 
which explain the relationship between education and mental health. It therefore leaves 
space for other pathways (e.g. knowledge-related), while solidifying our understanding of 
those which are directly linked with cash benefits policies. 
Overall, it is argued that while the links between cash benefits, education and mental health 
are complex, this is, on balance, an advantage. It enables the investigation of a range of 
pathways, allowing stronger conclusions to be reached about causal connections between 
cash benefits and health inequalities. 
 
The Conceptual Framework 
Drawing on the arguments above and those made in the previous chapter, the hypothesised 
relationship between cash benefits policies and educational inequalities in mental health is 
shown in Figure 2.1. On the far-ﾉWaデ ﾗa デｴW aｷｪ┌ヴW ;ヴW デｴW デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ﾗa ｷﾐterest: 
generosity, activation and conditionality. These aspects of policy design are shown to have 
direct and indirect impacts on the link between education and mental health through three 
health determinants に income, unemployment and unhealthy behaviours (in green). These 
modify the relationship between education and mental health through materialist, 




Figure 2.1. Conceptual relationship between cash benefits policies and 














To clarify some specific relationships in Figure 2.1: 
- Policies will have a direct causal influence on income and unemployment through the 
デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ふｪWﾐWヴﾗゲｷデ┞っ;Iデｷ┗;デｷﾗn/conditionality) に as indicated by the 
solid blue arrows connecting each of these with income and unemployment. The exact 
ways in which they do this will be variable, based on the causal pathways described in 
Chapter One. These causal links will then be associated with a direct effect on the 
relationship between education and mental health through materialist and 
psychosocial processes.  
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- Policies will each also have an indirect impact through the three design features via 
health behaviours, as denoted by the dotted arrows connecting income and 
unemployment with health behaviours.  
To be more confident of these causal connections, regression methods are used to discount 
alternative explanations wherever possible. The main confounding variables are shown in 
Figure 2.1. TｴW aｷヴゲデ ﾗa デｴWゲW ｷゲ けヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI IﾗﾐデW┝デげが ;ゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デWS H┞ ; Hﾗ┝ 
surrounding the entire framework. Within the analyses that follow controls are included for 
important markers of prosperity and societal wellbeing such as GDP, unemployment rates 
and employment conditions. For the purposes of this research, these economic indicators are 
treated as exogenous to cash benefits systems. In reality, there will be interdependence 
between these economic and policy variables, yet it is necessary to separate them in order to 
satisfactorily address the research question.  
A key aspect of Figure 2.1 is the materialist, psychosocial and behavioural explanations for 
health inequalities which are shown in red. In this thesis, the focus is primarily on the first two 
of these, drawing on neo-materialist and psychosocial explanations for health inequalities 
which were briefly summarised in Chapter One. The materialist approach is defined in terms 
of the impact of cash benefits policies on income and living conditions which can, in turn, have 
an impact on health inequalities. In each chapter, the level of benefits generosity is 
considered an important factor in helping individuals to meet their physiological needs, which 
in turn may have a positive impact on mental health (Davey-Smith, 1996; Layte, 2012; Lynch, 
2000; Lynch et al., 1997). It is hypothesised that since low educated persons will be more 
likely to be in receipt of benefits, this generosity may translate to reductions in inequalities in 
mental health. Chapter Six also considers an alternative materialist connection: via 
employment outcomes. It explores whether activation and conditionality policies reduce the 
prevalence of unemployment among low educated single mothers and if this, in turn, reduces 
material deprivation, with likely consequences for health inequalities.  
In contrast, the psychosocial explanations that are at the centre of this thesis emphasise the 
impact of cash benefits on health inequalities via relative social position. Each of the empirical 
chapters draws implicitly on the arguments advanced by Wilkinson and Marmot (amongst 
others) that health inequalities are the result of differences in social status attached to various 
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dimensions of stratification (i.e. income, occupation, education, employment status). While 
these broader theories form the backbone to the analyses, the focus in the empirical chapters 
is more specifically on the impact of cash benefits on the psychosocial effects of 
unemployment, relative to employment. ChaptWヴゲ Fｷ┗W ;ﾐS “ｷ┝ W;Iｴ W┝;ﾏｷﾐW けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS 
けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲデ;ヴデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヮヴWﾏｷゲW デｴ;デ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ 
damaging to mental health through its impact on stigma, self-esteem and loss of identity 
(Bambra, 2010). The psychosocial model that is relied on throughout most of this thesis is 
therefore indebted to a more specific strand of theory around the psychosocial health effects 
of unemployment (e.g. Jahoda, 1982; Fryer, 1986; Warr, 1987; Ezzy, 1993). The key aspect of 
this extensive literature of relevance to this thesis is that employment is a source of identity, 
while unemployment incurs a loss of identity which can have damaging psychological 
consequences (Marmot, 2010: 69). In sum, the psychosocial model is concerned with the 
impact of relative social standing on health, whilst having a more specific focus on the 
negative impact of unemployment (relative to employment) on self-esteem and health. 
Figure 2.1 also draws attention to the interacting effects of four other variables に age, gender, 
race and disability に with the two main health determinants (unemployment and income). 
These four variables will independently have an impact on income and unemployment and 
will also moderate the impact of these determinants. For example, there is evidence of 
differential effects of unemployment on the mental health of men vs women (Artazcoz et al., 
2004) and the impact of poverty on ill-health can be worse among minority ethnic groups 
(Salway et al., 2007). As with education, these variables represent fundamental sources of 
stratification that contribute to health inequalities. However, within this thesis the main 
interest is in the impact of education on mental health, I therefore control for these other 
variables rather than explore them as substantive moderators in themselves.  
Last, Figure 2.1 shows direct effects of the life course, biological and constitutional factors 
and health behaviours on educational inequalities in mental health. These represent other 
epidemiological theories about the causes of health inequalities which are not directly 
considered here. One important point is about the complications around health behaviours. 
Cash benefits policies may have a indirect impact on health behaviours (via income and 
unemployment). However, health behaviours may also impact on health inequalities through 
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external cultural factors not directly related with cash benefits systems. This is implied in 
Figure 2.1.  
So far, this chapter has introduced the research question and outlined a conceptual 
framework. The remainder of the chapter explains how these conceptual principles are put 
in to practice in the empirical Chapters Four to Six. Chapters Four to Six use methodological 
approaches which have been employed to varying extents within the literature already (as 
reviewed in the second half of Chapter One). The three empirical chapters are different from 
one another and are not intended to connect in any direct methodological sense. The thread 
which ties them together is their shared concern with approaching the causality of the 
relationship between cash benefits policies and health inequalities along the lines described 
in Chapter One. The chapters explore the effects of policies on health inequalities via the 
デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ;ﾐS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ; ゲWヴｷWゲ ﾗa ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲｷ┣WS ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲく  
 
Rationale for Chapter Four: The Welfare Regime Approach 
 
The empirical part of the thesis starts in Chapter Four by adopting a welfare regime approach 
to look at inequalities in mental health. It focuses on a direct indicator of psychosocial stress 
に depressive symptoms に ;ﾐS ┌ゲWゲ デｴｷゲ デﾗ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デW デｴW W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ 
that might connect welfare regimes with health inequalities. 
The chapter fits within a body of literature which has proposed two sets of explanations for 
how regimes are linked with health inequalities: via income or social class. The first of these 
emphasises the redistributive role of welfare regimes, hypothesising that the regime which 
provides the most generous income support to unemployed and workless people に invariably 
the highly decommodifying Social-Democratic regime に will have the least health inequalities 
(e.g. Bambra et al., 2009; Bambra & Eikemo, 2008; Eikemo, Bambra, et al., 2008). These 
income-centred studies imply a material or psychosocial explanation for how welfare regimes 
shape health inequalities, focusing primarily on cash benefit generosity. The precise 
mechanisms are rarely made explicit. However, these studies often emphasise the role of 
welfare regimes in tackling poverty, implying a materialist explanation. They also often draw 
on the literature on income inequality and health inequalities (e.g. Eikemo, Bambra et al. 
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(2008) begin by referencing the Whitehall studies), suggesting a psychosocial explanation 
;Hﾗ┌デ ｴﾗ┘ ｷﾐIﾗﾏW ふ;ゲ ; ﾏ;ヴﾆWヴ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;デ┌ゲぶ ｪWデゲ け┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ゲﾆｷﾐげく 
The second body of work focuses on the impact of welfare regimes through social class 
(Borrell et al., 2009, 2004; De Moortel et al., 2015; Espelt et al., 2008; Muntaner et al., 2017b). 
This literature follows a neo-Marxist school of thought arguing that class relations matter for 
ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏWゲ ﾏﾗSWヴ;デW デｴW ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ 
class relation. Scholars in this field often emphasise underlying mechanisms of exploitation 
and domination, drawing on a conceptual approach developed by Wright (1997, 2005). 
Psychosocial mechanisms linked with job quality and the work environment are integral to 
this approach, as well as wider social relations such as those between the employed and 
unemployed (De Moortel et al., 2015).  
Both approaches lead to the conclusion that the Social-Democratic regime should perform 
best. Nonetheless, the existing evidence does not consistently support this hypothesis (as 
reviewed in Chapter One). This chapter tests this hypothesis in relation to depressive 
symptoms. It is suggested that as a direct indicator of stress, depressive symptoms are likely 
to sit on the causal pathway between welfare regimes and health inequalities and may 
therefore provide stronger evidence for how welfare regimes are connected to health 
inequalities. The variable of depressive symptoms therefore represents both an outcome of 
substantive interest (i.e. an indicator of mental health) and an intermediary variable which 
may connect regｷﾏWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ┘ｷSWヴ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲく Aﾏ;ﾉｪ;ﾏ;デｷﾐｪ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa デｴW けｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ 
;ﾐS けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ゲゲげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲが Cｴ;ヮデWヴ Fﾗ┌ヴ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デWゲ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
focuses on the extent to which welfare regimes reduce: i) the material and psychosocial 
impacts of poverty and income loss and ii) inequalities in class relations between employed 
and unemployed populations.  
The Chapter examines health inequalities across five welfare regimes: Scandinavian, Anglo-
Saxon, Bismarckian, Southern and Eastern. It ┌ゲWゲ FWヴヴWヴ;げゲ ふヱΓΓヶぶ ﾏﾗSｷaｷWS ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Eゲヮｷﾐｪ-
AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏW デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW E;ゲデWヴﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ 
countries. Ferrera focuses on differences across welfare regimes in the organisation of 
welfare systems and the way that welfare is delivered. This leads him to propose a fourfold 
typology, with a similar three-way distinction to Esping-Andersen (1990) between Social-
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Democratic, Conservative and Liberal (Scandinavian, Bismarckian and Anglo-Saxon, 
respectively) regimes, as well as a fourth Southern regime, comprised of the Southern 
European countries. While there are clear similarities with Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴが デｴW 
Ferrera approach tends to focus more on the qualitative elements of welfare state design and 
delivery. For example, Ferrera emphasises the fragmented nature of the Southern welfare 
regime model, which provides generous social protection to those in the core of the labour 
market, while those in irregular occupational positions (which constitute a substantial part of 
the labour force) are weakly subsidised (ibid.ぎ ヱΓぶく Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ゲWﾐゲWが FWヴヴWヴ;げゲ デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデゲ 
a minor, but important, development on Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴく TｴW Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism was intended to provide an alternative to the dominant social 
expenditure approach by focusing on qualitative differences between advanced welfare 
states. Ferrera builds on this by providing a slightly more nuanced account of differences in 
welfare design and delivery (Bonoli, 1997; Bambra, 2007c). This is important for Chapter Four 
as it provides a conceptual platform for analysing welfare state differences between a wider 
range of European countries, including those in Southern Europe. 
To allow the analyses to reach further still, the regime typology of Ferrera (1996) is extended 
to include Eastern European countries, following similar approaches to others (e.g. Eikemo, 
Huisman et al., 2008). There have been few attempts to incorporate the Eastern European 
countries within Esping-AﾐSWヴゲWﾐげゲ Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism although it is 
generally accepted that these countries form a distinct sub-group (Fenger, 2007; Eikemo, 
Huisman et al., 2008) due to their unique post-communist history. The focus of the analysis 
in this Chapter is on the success or otherwise of the Scandinavian regime in reducing 
inequalities in stress, as evidenced by inequalities in depressive symptoms. The Eastern 
European countries are included for the purposes of comparison but these comparisons are 
more cautious than in the case of the other three regimes (Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian and 
Southern) due to substantial historical and cultural differences between the eastern and 






The research hypothesis is as follows: 
The Scandinavian welfare regime will have the least inequalities in depressive 
symptoms due to its ability to reduce social stress among low educated groups via 
materialist and psychosocial mechanisms. 
The stress pathway that is the emphasis of this chapter focuses on the extent to which 
regimes impact on how individuals feel about their social position. Following the arguments 
of Wilkinson, Marmot and others that were summarised in Chapter One, welfare regimes are 
expected to interrupt the connections between social status (as measured by education) and 
health. This process occurs through the impact of regimes on the two key health determinants 
に employment status and income に shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
Rationale for Chapter Five: The Social Expenditure Approach 
 
While Chapter Four makes important contributions, it is necessarily limited in its causal claims 
as welfare regimes capture a range of social and cultural differences between countries, aside 
from cash benefits policies. To develop on this, Chapter Five uses a social expenditure 
approach to look separately at different elements of cash benefits policies. It specifically 
investigates the effect of two major aspects of cash benefits policies spending: active and 
passive labour market policies (LMPs). Passive LMPs represent the ordinary out-of-work cash 
ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW デﾗ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲ ふｷくWく けｪWﾐWヴﾗゲｷデ┞げぶく AIデｷ┗W LMPゲ ;ヴW デｴW ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa 
cash benefits systems which are dedicated to job search and training programmes linked with 
receipt of passive cash benefits (representing a me;ゲ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW け;Iデｷ┗;デｷﾗﾐげ SWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWぶく 
The outcome variable in Chapter Five is a measure of depressive symptoms, described at 
greater length in the next chapter.  
The analysis in the chapter is structured as follows. First, it examines four causal pathways 
which might connect active and passive LMPs with health inequalities: income, process and 
employment effects and differential impacts. The chapter then ends by assessing the full 
health inequalities effect of LMPs in terms of their impact on educational inequalities in 
depressive symptoms. The four causal pathways were described in Chapter One and can be 
briefly summarised as follows: 
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- Income effects: This is the basic causal pathway which has guided much of the existing 
literature, which centres on the role of cash benefits generosity for the mental health 
of unemployed and workless people. It is therefore hypothesised that passive LMPs 
will have a causal impact via income which varies according to the level of cash 
benefits generosity. Income effects are explored, empirically, in terms of the impact 
of passive LMP spending on depressive symptoms among unemployed people.  
 
- Process effects12: This causal pathway is concerned with the effect of active LMPs on 
mental health among unemployed people. These effects are expected to be purely 
psychosocial, linked with the process of participating in an active labour market 
scheme, rather than via income. This theoretical pathway is based on recent social 
policy research that shows mental health benefits of participation in active LMPs, 
relative to open unemployment (Carter & Whitworth, 2016; Coutts et al., 2014; Sage, 
2015a). TｴWゲW けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ;ヴW W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ H┞ ﾉﾗﾗﾆｷﾐｪ ;デ デｴW ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ 
between active LMP spending and depressive symptoms among unemployed people. 
 
- Employment effectsぎ TｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa both active and passive LMPs are 
concerned with the impact of both types of LMPs on the employment outcomes of 
recipients. It is hypothesised that both types of LMPs can shape health inequalities not 
only through their impact on mental health during unemployment, but also through 
their impact on the level of unemployment per se. To explore this, Chapter Five looks 
at the relationship between active and passive LMP spending and the likelihood of an 
individual reporting themselves as unemployed, and the impact of this on depressive 
symptoms. 
 
- Differential impacts: TｴW けSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲげ ﾗa LMPゲ ;ヴW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ 
of LMPs on the mental health of low vs high educated people via the causal pathways 
described above. The chapter first looks at the differential impact of LMPs via 
employment effects. To do this, it restricts the population sample to low educated 
people and observes the relationship between LMPs and the likelihood of an 
                                                          
12 TｴW デWヴﾏ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ｷゲ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘WS aヴﾗﾏ C;ヴデWヴ ;ﾐS Wｴｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ (2016) who hypothesise that active labour 
market programmes may improve mental health and wellbeing for unemployed people. 
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individual reporting themselves as unemployed, and the impact of this on depressive 
symptoms. It then compares the effect among the low educated with the employment 
effect for the population as a whole. It is not possible to directly explore the 
differential impact of LMPs via income and process effects due to methodological 
reasons outlined in the chapter. However, conclusions are drawn about this on the 
basis of an evaluation of the effects of LMPs on the health of unemployed people and 
low educated people. 
 
Research Expectations 
The chapter tests a range of hypotheses about the expected effects of LMPs through each of 
the pathways described above. Below, the evidence is briefly summarised in relation to each 
of the expected outcomes via these pathways and hypotheses are stated. These hypotheses 
are restated in Chapter Five where they are examined empirically. 
It is anticipated that higher passive LMP expenditure will be associated with better mental 
health among unemployed people as generous cash benefits will i) reduce the material, 
psychosocial and behavioural impacts of income loss when moving from employment to 
unemployment and ii) help the unemployed sustain a reasonable standard of living with 
associated material and psychosocial health benefits ふOげC;ﾏヮﾗ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱヵぶ. Causal effects 
are also implied from prior research which suggests that the relationship between passive 
LMPs and better mental health tends to be stronger for unemployed vs employed people 
(Carr & Chung, 2014; Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Wulfgramm, 2011, 2014). Similarly, it is 
expected that unemployed people will have better mental health in countries that spend 
more on active LMPs as active LMPs will have a mitigating impact on the psychosocial 
consequences of unemployment (Jakubow, 2016). This supposition is strongly supported in 
the empirical literature. A review by Coutts et al. (2014) found that, compared with 
unemployment, active LMP participation was associated with a range of positive health 
outcomes: reduced psychological distress and depression, higher self-reported wellbeing, 




The first hypothesis, in relation to income and process effects is therefore as follows: 
Higher spending on passive and active LMPs will be associated with less depressive 
symptoms among the unemployed. 
Existing evidence in relation to the third causal pathway に employment effects に suggests that 
the effects of active and passive LMPs are more complex. Reviews generally find that active 
LMPs have at least a moderate positive effect on unemployment exit rates (Card et al., 2010; 
Kluve, 2010; Layard et al., 2005; Martin & Grubb, 2001). The employment effects of active 
LMPs appear to be especially strong in the medium to longer-term (Card et al., 2010), 
suggesting that active LMPs are important for human capital development. In the short term, 
specific programs such as job-search and regular interviews can increase transitions out of 
unemployment by around 15 to 30 per cent (Martin & Grubb, 2001).  
Yet (as briefly discussed in Chapter One), the evidence around passive LMPs is more 
conflicting. Generous cash benefits, with few work-related requirements, are robustly 
associated with work disincentive effects (Carling et al., 1996; Katz & Meyer, 1990; Lalive, 
2007; Van Ours & Vodopivec, 2006). However, qualitative work generally finds strong work 
commitment among unemployed people (Gebauer & Vobruba, 2003; Shildrick et al., 2012) 
and employment rates are high in countries such as Denmark where there are large 
unemployment traps (Pedersen & Smith, 2002). A further complication is that generous 
benefits might encourage sustained re-entry to the labour market in health-beneficial jobs 
(Gebauer & Vobruba, 2003; Moffitt, 2014). Overall however, the evidence is stronger that, on 
average, generous passive LMPs will be associated with higher unemployment, with negative 
consequences for mental health. This leads to two hypotheses around employment effects: 
Countries with higher active LMP spending will have lower self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore fewer depressive symptoms. 
Countries with higher passive LMP spending will have higher self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore higher depressive symptoms. 
The final causal pathway (differential impacts) focuses on differences across educational 
groups in the three effects described above. In relation to differential employment effects, it 
is hypothesised that generous passive LMPs may have greater disincentive effects for lower 
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educated groups who may be more reliant on the benefit system for their income. However, 
this negative effect may be outweighed by the health benefits of generous benefits during 
unemployment for these same disadvantaged groups. In contrast, it is expected that active 
LMPs will have a stronger impact on low educated people via employment effects. Because 
active LMPs are targeted at low-skilled populations they may be more effective at matching 
lower educated people with jobs. This may therefore translate in to greater mental health 
benefits for these groups. However, quasi-marketised active LMPs can have perverse 
ｷﾐIWﾐデｷ┗Wゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW けIヴW;ﾏｷﾐｪげ ﾗa HWデデWヴ ケ┌;ﾉｷaｷWSっWS┌I;デWS I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲ (Carter & 
Whitworth, 2015). Therefore, the differential impact via employment effects may be 
contingent on the design of active LMP scheme. 
In relation to the differential impact of passive and active LMPs via income and process 
effects, respectively, it is expected that each will have stronger (positive) health effects among 
low educated groups. Generous passive LMPs are expected to have a stronger health- 
beneficial effect for those with less financial resources (such as the low educated). The health 
benefits of active labour market programme participation are also expected to be greatest 
for disadvantaged groups because i) the experience of unemployment is worse for these 
groups and ii) active LMPs are generally targeted at lower skilled populations (Röjdalen et al., 
2005; Sage, 2015b; Wulfgramm, 2011). This therefore leads to the following hypotheses in 
relation to the differential impact of LMPs: 
In countries with generous active LMPs, self-reported unemployment will be 
significantly less among low educated people (relative to others). Consequently, in 
countries with generous active LMPs depressive symptoms will be significantly less 
among low educated people. 
 
Each area of LMP spending will be associated with less depressive symptoms among 
both low educated and unemployed people, suggesting differential income and 
process effects. 
Taking in to consideration the evidence around each of the above causal pathways, Chapter 
Five ends by reflecting on the relationship between LMPs and health inequalities. It 
anticipates that countries that spend more on both forms of LMPs will have less educational 
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inequalities in depressive symptoms, as while there are some complexities in the causal 
connections (as described above), the overall effect of both policy areas seems to be positive. 
The final hypothesis is therefore that: 
Countries that spend more on active and passive LMPs will have fewer educational 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
 
Rationale for Chapter Six: The Policy-Specific Approach 
 
The final empirical chapter also uses specific independent variables to operationalise cash 
benefits policies. However, unlike Chapter Five its central emphasis is on the third aspect of 
cash benefits design: conditionality. To achieve this, the final empirical chapter adopts what 
is described as a けヮﾗﾉｷI┞-ゲヮWIｷaｷIげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴく UﾐﾉｷﾆW ヴWｪｷﾏW ;ﾐS W┝ヮWﾐSｷデ┌ヴW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲが デｴｷゲ 
is not a defined methodology (at least as identified in the main review articles). It is described 
;ゲ けヮﾗﾉｷI┞-ゲヮWIｷaｷIげ ;ゲ デｴW aﾗI┌ゲ ｷゲ ﾗﾐ ﾗﾐW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ に the United States に and one policy area に 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) over a particular time period (2000-2015). 
The research design of Chapter Six has most in common with the quasi-experimental 
approach briefly discussed in Chapter One. It aims to provide more convincing evidence of 
causal links between specific measures of cash benefits and inequalities in mental health. The 
main difference between Chapter Six and the quasi-experimental approach is that Chapter 
Six does not focus on the effect of a specific policy change に デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ けHWaﾗヴW ;ﾐS ;aデWヴげ 
design. However, it has at least two other similarities with the quasi-experimental approach.  
First, it uses subpopulation analysis to focus on the effects of TANF among (likely) recipient 
populations. This is important as the proportion of the US population in receipt of TANF is 
low13, hence we would not expect to see strong health effects on the whole US population. A 
けデヴW;デﾏWﾐデげ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ｷゲ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWS ┘ｷデｴ ; けIﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉげ ┘ｴWヴW デｴW デヴW;デﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ 
would be expected to be disproportionately affected by TANF policies, while the control is 
those with the most similar characteristics that we would not expect to be affected. Recipient 
                                                          
13 For example, in 2015 the total number of TANF or MOE recipients was 4.1 million (Falk, 2016: 7), constituting 
only 1.3 per cent of the total US population for that year (total population = 320.9 million, according to the US 
Census Bureau (2015)). 
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population groups are difficult to define as the characteristics of the TANF caseload have 
changed over time14. However, some characteristics of the TANF caseload have remained 
stable. The vast majority of adult TANF recipients are women (e.g. 85.7 per cent in 2013) and 
in most cases these are single mothers with children (Falk, 2012: 5). Recipients also tend to 
be poor and either unemployed or in low-paid work (ibid.: 8). Hence, to be more confident of 
a causal effect, the chapter narrows the focus to those single mothers with the lowest human 
capital, as defined by low educational attainment. Secondly, Chapter Six uses statistical 
methods to model the health effect of changes over time in policy design within a given state. 
This enables stronger causal inference about the effects of specific policy areas on health 
inequalities, i.e. is a change in a particular policy associated with a change in health outcomes 
for affected groups?  
Three specific aspects of TANF policies are considered: job search requirements, welfare-to-
work spending per capita and sanction severity. While the three variables are related, there 
are nonetheless important conceptual differences between them. The first two represent 
┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲデ;デWゲ け;Iデｷ┗;デWげ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデゲ ﾗヴ encourage and coerce return-to-
work. In contrast, sanctions are an indicator of the severity of the punishment attached to 
failure to meet the conditions of benefit receipt. These conceptual differences may result in 
different health effects, as described below. Between- and within-state variability is explored 
in the health inequalities effects of these TANF policies.  
The structure of the analysis in Chapter Six mirrors that of the previous chapters. It first 
investigates hypothetical causal pathways between TANF policies and health inequalities, 
before examining the full health inequalities effect of TANF policies. Chapter Six focuses on 
デ┘ﾗ ﾗa デｴW I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ aヴﾗﾏ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ Fｷ┗Wぎ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲく Iﾐ デｴW I;ゲW 
of the latter, it looks not only at the impact of cash benefits on employment outcomes, but 
also the impact of these policies on income. This is important as conditionality programmes 
have often been justified on the grounds that they not only improve employment outcomes 
for cash benefits recipients, but also に as a consequence に raise income (Freud, 2007; Mead, 
1997). Yet there is evidence from the US that harsher sanctions have led to more poverty, 
                                                          
14 For example, in 2013 nearly 40 per cent of families receiving TANF cash assistance were child-only units (i.e. 
headed by an adult not in receipt of TANF cash assistance) (Falk, 2016: 9) 
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with potentially negative health implications (Fording et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2004). Therefore, 
Chapter Six adopts the following research strategy to examine the two causal pathways:  
- Process Effects: To explore the けヮrocess effectsげ of activation and conditionality 
requirements attached to receipt of TANF benefits, Chapter Six examines the impact 
of TANF policies on the mental health of unemployed single mothers (the treatment 
population) vs employed single mothers (the control).  
 
- Employment Effects: To explore employment effects linked with activation and 
conditionality requirements attached to receipt of TANF benefits, Chapter Six 
examines the impact of each area of policy design on the odds of reporting 
unemployment for low educated single mothers (the treatment population) vs other 
mothers (the control). It also investigates any further impact of these policies on 
income by examining the relationship between TANF policies and deep poverty15 for 
low educated single mothers (the treatment population) vs other mothers (the 
control).  
Broad hypotheses in relation to the impact of TANF welfare-to-work policies16, sanctions and 
job search requirements are outlined below in relation to these two causal pathways, 
resulting in a hypothesis about the full impact of TANF policies on health inequalities.  
 
Research Expectations 
The evidence which was reviewed in relation to Chapter Five suggested that unemployed 
people benefit from participation in welfare-to-work programmes (Coutts et al., 2014; Sage, 
2015a, 2015b), relative to open unemployment. However, this evidence was mainly in the UK 
and European context and there may be differences between the US and European policy 
                                                          
15 Iﾐ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ “ｷ┝が けSWWヮ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞げ ｷゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS ;ゲ デｴﾗゲW W;ヴﾐｷﾐｪ ﾉWゲゲ デｴ;ﾐ ガヱヰがヰヰヰ ヮWヴ ┞W;ヴく TｴW ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ 
SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW U“ CWﾐゲ┌ゲ B┌ヴW;┌ ｷゲ ヵヰ ヮWヴ IWﾐデ ﾗa ; ｴﾗ┌ゲWｴﾗﾉSげゲ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞ デｴヴWゲhold. This is typically 
around $5-15,000, depending on family size (Center for Poverty Research, 2016). In sensitivity tests, the 
threshold is changed to $15,000. 
 
16 TｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ “ｷ┝ ｷゲ け┘Wﾉa;ヴW-to-┘ﾗヴﾆげ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ;Iデｷ┗W ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆWt 




environment which impact on the extent to which this is the case. The US approach is 
ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デﾗ HW ﾏﾗヴW け┘ﾗヴﾆa;ヴWげ-oriented, placing stricter requirements on 
participants in welfare-to-work programmes to accept work, regardless of skill, quality or pay 
(Anderson, 2014). It is plausible that this may result in programme participation being less 
beneficial to health if it is perceived as disciplinary or a route only to poor-quality jobs. Yet 
there is little existing comparative evidence to show whether this is the case.  
Given this, the hypothesis for this chapter remains the same as Chapter Five: it is expected 
that US states which spend more TANF funds on welfare-to-work policies will tend to have 
better mental health among recipient groups. It is also assumed that states with stricter work 
requirements will tend to have a more positive attitude to the employment prospects of 
unemployed people, resulting in health benefits via psychosocial channels.  
On the contrary, it is anticipated that the threat of sanctions for non-compliance will heighten 
stress among unemployed people. The evidence around this is limited, although there is some 
qualitative research from the UK that suggests that more intense conditionality is associated 
with poor physical and mental health outcomes for the unemployed (Garthwaite et al., 2015; 
Shildrick et al., 2012). Benefit sanctions have also been anecdotally linked with suicides17, 
suggesting that the level of stress induced can be high in some cases. This may particularly be 
the case for groups with other life stresses, such as single mothers who are the key target 
group of TANF policies. This results in the following hypothesis regarding process effects: 
States with high welfare-to-work spending, stricter work requirements and less 
stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental health between unemployed 
single mothers and employed mothers. 
While there may be a negative impact of sanctions on day-to-day stress among unemployed 
people, strong international evidence suggests that they have a short-term positive (average) 
impact on benefit exit, job entry and earnings (Griggs & Evans, 2010). However, this is less 
consistent in the US. In fact, existing evidence suggests that the majority of sanctioned 
recipients leave TANF for no jobs or jobs that pay less than benefits (Fording et al., 2013; Lee 
                                                          
17 The Department for Work and Pensions has conducted 49 Peer Reviews of deaths following benefit sanctions. 
Forty of these were suicides (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2015) although the evidence 
is not conclusive that these were directly linked with sanctions.  
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et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2014). It therefore seems likely that although harsh sanctions will 
reduce benefits caseloads, this will not be through raising employment and instead will lead 
to an increase in the incidence of both unemployment and low income among recipient 
groups.  
On the other hand, econometric evidence (including some from the US) suggests that work 
requirements and welfare-to-work programmes increase unemployment exit, job entry (Card 
et al., 2010; Hullegie & van Ours, 2014; Kluve, 2010; Lammers et al., 2013; Moffitt, 2002) and 
earnings (Bloom & Michalopoulos, 2001; Bloom et al., 2003; Danziger et al., 2002; Moffitt, 
2002; Schoeni & Blank, 2000). One review found that, on average18, states which had work 
requirements increased earnings among recipients by around $400 per year (Bloom & 
Michalopoulos, 2001: 10). On this basis, we can surmise that required job search and higher 
spending on welfare-to-work programmes, will reduce both unemployment and low income 
among recipient groups. This results in two hypotheses around employment effects:  
States with harsh sanctions will have a wider gap in the level of self-reported 
unemployment and deep poverty between low educated single mothers and other 
mothers. 
States with high welfare-to-work spending and strict work requirements will have a 
narrower gap in the level of self-reported unemployment and deep poverty between 
low educated single mothers and other mothers.  
Finally, we can hypothesise an overall effect of TANF policies on inequalities in mental health 
between low educated single mothers and other mothers, based on the above causal 
pathways. In relation to both process and employment effects, it has been suggested that 
ﾏﾗヴW ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷ┗W け;Iデｷ┗;デｷﾗﾐげ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲが ;ゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS H┞ ｴｷｪｴWヴ ┘Wﾉa;ヴW-to-work spending 
and stricter work requirements, will be beneficial to the mental health of recipient groups. In 
contrast, it is expected that states with stricter sanctioning practices will tend to be 
                                                          
18 This is an important qualification. An analysis by James et al. (2005) found substantial heterogeneity in the 
impact of welfare reforms on income, earnings and employment. This is picked up in Chapter Six by looking at 




detrimental to the mental health of recipient groups via both process and employment 
effects. This leads to the final research hypothesis: 
States with more generous welfare-to-work programmes, stricter work requirements 
and less stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental health between low 
educated single mothers and other mothers. 
While the above hypotheses seem reasonable based on existing evidence, the findings in 
Chapter Six are interpreted more widely in terms of the differences between the US and 
European welfare systems. This feeds in to the overall assessment of the evidence from this 
thesis in Chapter Seven. 
 
Summary of Chapter Two 
 
Chapter Two has set the scene for the analyses which follow in Chapters Four, Five and Six. It 
has also presented a conceptual framework which informs the analytical approach adopted 
throughout. It has explained that while the broader aim of the thesis is to contribute to an 
increased understanding about how welfare states and health inequalities are connected, this 
is achieved through a more specific research strategy which explores the impact of cash 
benefits policies on educational inequalities in mental health. Table 2.1 provides an overview 
of the conceptual and empirical focus of each of the chapters, as described in this chapter. It 
ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデが デｴW I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ ;ﾐS WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗa W;Iｴ 
chapter. Drawing on the conceptual discussion so far, Chapter Three presents some general 
principles of the thesis in relation to matters of causality and explains how these ideas are put 
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Chapter 3. Research Design and Methods 
 
The following chapter extends the discussion in Chapter Two by providing detail on the 
statistical approaches of Chapters Four, Five and Six and the regression methods that are used 
throughout. It begins by explaining the research philosophy, design and strategy, focusing on 
the approach towards causality. It then provides detail on the specific datasets and statistical 
methods used in the empirical chapters. 
 
Research Design and Epistemology 
 
Chapter Two introduced the central research question of this thesis: さ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ デｴW causal 
impact of cash benefits policies on ed┌I;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴいざ It outlined a 
conceptual approach, elements of which are applied throughout the empirical chapters. The 
overarching aim is to generalise about the impact of one set of government policies (cash 
benefits) on one set of outcomes (mental health and education). This is then related to the 
broader literature on welfare states policies and health inequalities. Fitting with these aims, 
the research design of this thesis uses quantitative methods to infer about generalizable 
effects of cash benefits policies.  
Specifically, the empirical phase uses secondary data analysis methods to explore the 
relationships between variables which are obtained from a mixture of contextual and 
individual-level datasets. Statistical methods are used to manipulate these data in accordance 
with the specific hypotheses under examination. The approach is cross-sectional, 
comparative and (in Chapters Four and Five) cross-national. I rely on evidence from empirical 
(quantitative) data, yet this is interpreted in relation to a theoretical approach which is 
attentive to the complexity of observed relationships. Emphasis is placed on the degree of 
certainty of the research findings and the extent to which they are robust to different 
methodological decisions, as assessed through a range of sensitivity tests in each chapter. 
One aspect of the research design which is worthy of further consideration is the comparison 
of mental health across countries (in Chapters Four and Five). This is undoubtedly problematic 
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as cultural norms will partly dictate how people define depression and mental wellbeing. They 
will also affect the prevalence of responses; how willing people are to respond and who 
responds (e.g. variation by gender/ethnicity/social class). People have different life 
ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wゲが ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ ;ﾐS SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けデｴW ｪﾗﾗS ﾉｷaWげ and these will vary across countries and 
cultures (Farquhar, 1995; Hyde et al., 2003). The measures of mental health that I use in 
Chapters Four and Five have each been specially designed to maximise cross-national 
comparability (Castro-Costa et al., 2008; Hyde et al., 2003; Prince et al., 1999). In this sense, 
デｴW ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ デｴW けHWゲデ ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW S;デ;げく OデｴWヴ Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐﾉ┞-used health measures に 
such as self-assessed health に also suffer from major issues of cross-national comparability 
(Jylhä Guralnik et al., 1998; Salomon et al., 2004) and there are no perfect measures. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that strong assumptions are made about the measurement 
and comparability of mental health which some may find unsatisfactory. In this thesis, I 
exchange a degree of reductionism for greater generalisability, in line with the interests of 
the research question. 
 
The Approach towards Causality 
One epistemological matter which requires a more lengthy discussion is the approach of the 
thesis towards the issue of causality. It is necessary to present a clear stance on this as the 
central research interest is causal: to understand more about how cash benefits matter for 
social inequalities in mental health.  
The research approach of the empirical chapters draws on three criteria for causation taken 
from an influential paper by Bradford-Hill (1965). The first two of these criterion are 
interrelated. Chapters Four to Six use an approach which suggests that there is stronger 
evidence for causation if a relationship between two variables is strong and consistently 
observed. The plausibility of the research findings are then evaluated in Chapter Seven in 
relation to the strength of the evidence, the extent to which it is consistent across the three 
empirical chapters, and the degree to which it is supported elsewhere in the literature.  
The third aspect of the Bradford-Hill (1965: 297) criteria for causation which informs the 
approach of the empirical chapters is the notion of specificity. The concern here is with 
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whether an association between a given policy and outcome (e.g. employment/mental 
health) is specific to a particular group of individuals for whom we would expect to be affected 
and whether it is not observed for other non-affected groups. This is particularly important in 
Chapters Five and Six where the independent variables are specific areas of cash benefits 
policies measured at the country and state-level. In each case, the analysis centres on the 
impact of cash benefits policies on target populations. In Chapter Five, the focus is on the 
relationship between labour market policies and mental health among unemployed people, 
whilst Chapter Six explores the impact of TANF policies on single mothers, a likely recipient 
group. Evidence for causal pathways is strongest if there is an observed impact among these 
population groups which is significantly different to that in the non-ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデ ふﾗヴ けIﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉげぶ 
populations.  
Related to the above points is the emphasis in the remaining chapters on the interpretation 
of empirical findings in terms of probabilistic rather than deterministic causation (Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000). At no point is it argued that ｇ捲 always causes 検ｇ (Hage & Meeker, 1988). 
Rather, the thesis seeks evidence to increase (or decrease) the likelihood that certain 
explanations can satisfactorily account for the relationships between two variables. The 
possibility of chance is never excluded and I seek to be transparent about this in my 
presentation and interpretation of empirical results. Furthermore, it is acknowledged 
throughout that there may be alternative explanations for the findings and the analysis is 
aヴ;ﾏWS ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲげ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ WaaWIデゲげ. In practical terms, I avoid 
fetishisation of the concept of statistical significance by reporting p values beyond the usual 
cut-off at 0.05 and confidence intervals at certain stages to give a more rounded picture of 
the reliability of estimates (Gardner & Altman, 1986; Greenland et al., 2016). This also leads 
to qualified policy and research recommendations in the concluding chapter.  
While the approach to causation is defensible, there is one aspect of the research design 
which places significant limits on the ability to draw causal inference. In all cases, the empirical 
analysis in this thesis relies on cross-sectional individual-level data. This is problematic as it is 
impossible to disentangle the temporality of the observed relationships, making it hard to be 
confident that the results do not represent reverse causation. For example, people with 
mental health problems may be more likely to become unemployed, which may partly 
account for associations between unemployment and mental health. These problems are 
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most acute in Chapter Five which uses mediation analysis, a statistical approach which 
assumes that the data have a longitudinal structure (Maxwell & Cole, 2007). Although little 
can be done to rectify this limitation, recognition of the (theoretical) time dimension is 
important in itself. As Hage and Meeker (1988: 14) note, if we only have cross-sectional data 
;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ゲデｷﾉﾉ ;ゲﾆ デｴW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa け┘ｴ;デ I;ﾏW aｷヴゲデいげ B┞ ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾗ┌デ 
the empirical chapters and in the concluding discussion, we can at least interpret the cross-
sectional evidence in this light. Furthermore, while longitudinal data provide stronger 
evidence of causality, they do not resolve the fundamental need for explanation. Even if two 
events are longitudinally connected, it remains incumbent on the researcher to provide a 
satisfactory answer as to why this connection is causal (ibid.: 15).   
 
Overarching Statistical Methods 
 
So far, the discussion about causation has centred on the main research interest in デｴW けｴﾗ┘げ 
of the link between cash benefits and inequalities in mental health. The approach to this has 
been described above: statistical methods are adopted which seek to expose the connections 
between specific aspects of cash benefits policies and health inequalities. Another part of the 
ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ｷゲ デｴW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ けaﾗヴ ┘ｴﾗﾏげ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ｴ;┗W デｴW 
greatest influence, i.e. the focus on health inequalities. The effect of policies is split across 
education levels, assuming that effects will be stronger within lower-educated than higher-
educated groups. There are therefore two distinct elements to the approach to causality 
within this thesis which can be conceptualised as mediation ふけｴﾗ┘げぶ ;ﾐS moderation ふけaﾗヴ 
┘ｴﾗﾏげぶく “デ;デｷゲデｷI;l techniques exist to capture both mediation and moderation effects and 
these are employed at various stages throughout Chapters Four to Six. 
Consistent across the three empirical chapters is an interest in the moderating effect of 
education on the relationship between cash benefits policies and mental health. Regression 
methods are used in each chapter and statistical techniques capture the differential effect of 
WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴWゲW ﾏﾗSWﾉゲく ES┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ デヴW;デWS ;ゲ ; けデｴｷヴS ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWげ ┘ｴｷIｴが ｷﾐ デｴW ┘ﾗヴSゲ 
of Baron and Kenny: 
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さぐヮ;ヴデｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ; aﾗI;ﾉ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ｷﾐデﾗ ゲ┌Hｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ デｴ;デ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴ ｷデゲ Sﾗﾏ;ｷﾐゲ ﾗa 
ﾏ;┝ｷﾏ;ﾉ WaaWIデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ｷﾐ ヴWｪ;ヴS デﾗ ; ｪｷ┗Wﾐ SWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWざ (1986: 1173) 
In practice, this involves the inclusion of an interaction term in regression models which splits 
the effect of policies across different educational groups. The approach to moderation can be 
SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｷﾐ けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ WaaWIデゲげ (Wu & Zumbo, 2008). It relies on a 
twofold theory of causation: cash benefits will causally influence health inequalities by i) 
making the low educated less likely to suffer health disadvantage and ii) reducing their 
differential vulnerability to health exposures.  
To examine these connections, a series of regression models are constructed which rely on 
an approximation of one of the two following models: 
(1) Y辿棚 噺  が待套宕 髪  が怠DEM辿棚 髪 が態EDU辿棚 髪  が戴CONTEXT棚 髪 が替POLICY棚 髪 が泰EDU辿棚 茅   が滞POLICY棚 髪  が胎WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚 
 
(2) Pr盤Y弁x辿棚匪 噺 Lo�it盤が待辿棚 髪  が怠DEM辿棚 髪  が態EDU辿棚 髪  が戴CONTEXT珍 髪 が替POLICY棚 髪が泰EDU辿棚 茅    が滞POLICY棚 髪 が胎WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚匪 
In both these models, 件 is an individual within a country or state, 倹┻ Model 1 is a linear 
specification fitted for continuous outcomes and model 2 is a logit model when the outcome 
is dichotomous19. In each case, the interest is in the impact of cash benefits policies (via 
                                                          
19 In Equation 1, the conditional distribution is expressed by 継岫桁】捲岻 髪 香┸ where the values of interest are the 
conditional means of each parameter 盤継岫桁】捲岻匪┻ All values are assumed to follow a normal distribution, as is the 
error term 香 with mean = 0 and variance that is constant across levels. Expected values are continuous and can 
range from -タ to +タ (Hosmer Jr et al., 2013a). 
 
In Equation 2, the conditional value of the outcome variable can be expressed as 検 噺  講岫捲岻 髪 香┸ where 
 講岫捲岻 噺 勅破轍甜破迭猫怠袋勅破轍甜破迭猫 
 
The conditional mean values are assumed to follow a binomial distribution with a probability of 講岫捲岻岷な 伐 講岫捲岻峅 
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2013b). Coefficients are obtained after the logit transformation, where 訣岫捲岻 is continuous and 
can take on any value from 伐タ to 髪タ: 
 訣岫捲岻 噺 ln 峪 講岫捲岻盤な 伐 講岫捲岻匪崋 噺  紅待 髪 紅怠掴 
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education) on one of the following outcomes: mental health, employment or income. 
Therefore, the main parameter of interest is the interaction effect 岫が泰EDU辿棚 茅   が滞POLICY棚岻┻ The models also include a fixed intercept (が待套宕岻 and a series of vectors for socio-
demographic characteristics 岫が怠DEM辿棚岻, education 岫が態EDU辿棚), other contextual factors, e.g. 
GDP, unemployment rates 岫が戴CONTEXT棚岻, cash benefits policies 盤が替POLICY棚匪 and the survey 
wave 岫が胎WAVE岻. Each model also has a random error term (鉛辿棚岻. The specific variables are 
different across chapters and the precise models are outlined within the chapters themselves. 
All analyses were conducted on Stata version 12.  
Regression analysis に the method of estimating the impact of a number of variables on a 
dependent (outcome) variable に assumes that the value of variables is not influenced by any 
others within the model (King et al., 1994). The data structure within each of the chapters 
violates this assumption. Individuals are non-independent within countries (or states in 
Chapter Six) and observations are non-independent across survey waves. In Chapters Four, 
Five and Six, I use a particular method に cluster-robust regression に to account for the non-
independence of predictor variables within the models. In each case, standard errors are 
adjusted to account for the increased statistical uncertainty created by the data structure.  
Cluster-robust regression represents only a minor modification on standard regression 
techniques. Coefficients themselves are not changed, it is merely the error terms which are 
adjusted. The aim of this modelling strategy is to reduce the likelihood of drawing false 
IﾗﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ WaaWIデゲ aヴﾗﾏ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ﾉW┗Wﾉ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ふデｴW けWIﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ a;ﾉﾉ;I┞げぶ (Diez-
Roux, 2009). In cluster-robust regression the standard errors are more Bismarckian, making 
it less likely that we will wrongly report a statistically significant (individual) effect due to 
contextual influences.  
The cluster-robust regression methods used in this thesis represent one of four possible 
modelling strategies identified by Bryan and Jenkins (2016) to deal with data where 
observations are non-independent. It is the main approach as the impact of countries or 
states is not of substantive interest. Instead, countries and states are treated as confounders, 
where the main independent variable of interest is cash benefits policies (however these are 




operationalised). Bryan and Jenkins (ibid.: 5) describe three further methods for reducing bias 
when using data with a multilevel structure: separate regressions for each country, pooled 
regression with country fixed effects and pooled regression with country random effects. 
They each differ from the cluster-robust approach as they specifically model the country 
effects, instead of treating these effects as a nuisance term. Two of these approaches に fixed 
effects and random effects に are used at certain points in Chapter Six, ┘ｴWヴW けゲデ;デWげ ｷゲ デｴW 
level 2 variable. Each of these methods are described at greater length below where I outline 
chapter-specific methods, as well as the datasets used to address the chapter-specific 
research questions.  
 
Dataset and Variables for Chapter Four 
 
The first of the three empirical chapters (Chapter Four) is the most basic in terms of its 
statistical design. It states a number of hypotheses based on the discussion in Chapter Two. 
These are investigated through an empirical approach which focuses on differences across 
welfare regimes in inequalities in the prevalence depressive symptoms, using the cluster-
robust regression techniques described above. A variable is created to represent each welfare 
regime and this is interacted with education to explore inequalities across country clusters in 
depressive symptoms. At various stages in this and later chapters, Average Marginal Effects 
(AMEs) are reported using the MARGINS command on Stata. These provide predicted 
probabilities of a binary outcome, conditional on given values of all other independent 
variables in the equation. These values are not only more intuitive than Odds Ratios or raw 
coefficients, they are also comparable across logit models and can reduce the risk of bias from 
unobserved heterogeneity (Mood, 2010).  
 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
To address the research hypotheses in Chapter Four, data are extracted from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The SHARE dataset is a cross-national 
longitudinal panel dataset which contains micro data on issues around health, living 
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conditions and social networks related to older people (aged 50 and above). While there is a 
ﾉﾗﾐｪｷデ┌Sｷﾐ;ﾉ IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデ デﾗ デｴｷゲ ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞が デｴｷゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ┌ゲWS ｴWヴW ;ﾐS デｴW SWゲｷｪﾐ ｷゲ ヴ;デｴWヴ けヮﾗﾗﾉWS 
cross-ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげく Fﾗ┌ヴ ┘;┗Wゲ ﾗa “HA‘E S;デ; ;ヴW ヮﾗﾗﾉWS ふヲヰヰヴが ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヱ ;ﾐS ヲヰヱンぶ ;ﾐS ; 
dummy variable is included to control for changes over time, as this is not of substantive 
interest. The data are pooled to increase sample sizes, which is especially important given 
that the focus is on a sub-section of the sample (those aged 50-64). The first wave of SHARE 
collected data on approximately 31,000 persons aged 50 or over across 11 European 
countries. After merging the four waves and excluding those under 50 or over 65, Chapter 
Four has an effective sample of 56,177.  
The key advantage of SHARE is that it has been less frequently used than other major datasets 
┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏW けIﾉ┌ゲデWヴげ ﾗa ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ゲデ┌SｷWゲく Iﾐ a;Iデが ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デｴヴWW 
identifiable studies from those described in Chapter One have used SHARE (Avendano et al., 
2009; Dragano et al., 2011; Espelt et al., 2008) and one of these (Avendano et al., 2009) was 
; ｪWﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ; ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ヴWｪｷﾏW ゲデ┌S┞く Tﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWが 
no studies to date have examined inequalities in depressive symptoms across welfare regimes 
using the SHARE dataset and none have used the more recent SHARE waves (2007-2013).  
The main dependent variable is the EURO-D measure of depressive symptoms. The EURO-D 
scale is a composite indicator which is specially designed for older people. It draws, 
conceptually, on five different approaches to the measurement of depression: the Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), the Geriatric Mental State-AGECAT, 
SHORT-CARE, the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (ZSDS) and the Comprehensive 
Psychopathological Rating Scale (CPRS) (Prince et al., 1999). The scale has been cross-
validated and found to be comparable across the SHARE countries (Castro-Costa et al., 2008; 







Table 3.1. Participation of Countries in SHARE across Waves 2004-2013 
Country 2004 2007 2011 2013 
Austria Available Available Available Available 
Germany Available Available Available Available 
Sweden Available Available Available Available 
Netherlands Available Available Available Available 
Spain Available Available Available Available 
Italy Available Available Available Available 
France Available Available Available Available 
Denmark Available Available Available Available 
Greece Available Available Unavailable Unavailable 
Switzerland Available Available Available Available 
Belgium Available Available Available Available 
Czech Rep Unavailable Available Available Available 
Poland Unavailable Available Available Unavailable 
Ireland Unavailable Available Unavailable Unavailable 
Lux Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Available 
Hungary Unavailable Unavailable Available Unavailable 
Portugal Unavailable Unavailable Available Unavailable 
Slovenia Unavailable Unavailable Available Available 
Estonia Unavailable Unavailable Available Available 
 
The SHARE dataset covers much of the European Union, as well as Israel. From 2004, eight 
more countries participated in the survey (Czech Rep., Poland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Portugal and Slovenia). However, the participation of countries varies in each of the waves 
used in Chapter Four. This is shown in Table 3.1, which is adapted from the SHARE Wave 5 
release guide (available for download from http://www.share-project.org/home0/wave-
5.html). In Chapter Four, I include nineteen countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Rep., Poland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Estonia. Only ten of these countries 
have data in each of the four waves and the other nine are available variably across the waves. 
At certain stages, Ireland に which is the only country that represents the Anglo-Saxon welfare 
regime に is excluded due to low sample size and comparisons are only made across the four 
remaining regimes.  
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The SHARE sampling frame also differed across countries, but in each case full probability 
samples were achieved with the best resources available to researchers within the country in 
question20. Data were collected via face-to-face computer-aided personal interviews (CAPI), 
alongside self-completion paper and pencil questionnaires. Proxies were included in cases 
where individuals had died (in the longitudinal component of the survey) or when 
respondents could not answer due to health issues. Response rates in SHARE are relatively 
high compared with other European and US datasets, at approximately 62 per cent in the first 
wave (Börsch-Supan et al., 2013). Weights have been created to cope with non-response, 
although this cannot fully overcome these issues which remain limitations of this dataset. In 
the analysis in Chapter Four, data are weighted using cross-sectional weights that correct for 
differential probabilities of selection and attrition for different population groups. A summary 
of the key strengths and limitations of the SHARE dataset is available in Table 3.2 at the end 
of this chapter. Further details on the variables including descriptive statistics are presented 
in Chapter Four. 
 
Chapter Five: Dataset, Variables and Methods 
 
Chapter Five similarly investigates the connections between cash benefits policies and health 
inequalities, although it focuses on more precise areas of spending に active and passive 
Labour Market Policies (LMP) に rather than welfare regimes. To this end, it uses different 
datasets. It combines individual level data from three waves (2006, 2012 and 2014) of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) with contextual variables from data held by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Eurostat. Chapter Five uses the ESS, 
rather than SHARE to enable causal pathways to be explored using a range of data sources. 
While the age of the populations differs in Chapters Four and Five, this should not make a 
major difference in practice as each are working age adults (albeit older in Chapter Four). Each 
will be equally entitled to active and passive LMPs に the areas of cash benefits policy of 
interest. The use of these two different surveys therefore enables the discussion in Chapter 
                                                          
20 Information on sampling, response rates and weighting SHARE dataset is taken from the Data Resource Profile.  
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Seven to consider causal pathways between cash benefits and health inequalities in the 
European context in light of two different sources of evidence. 
Linking ESS and OECD data makes it possible to investigate how mental health varies as a 
function of individual characteristics (education, age, gender, ethnicity) and policy context 
(LMP spending, family policies, unemployment rates and employment regulation). In this 
chapter, twenty countries are included for which consistent contextual data were available: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Spain. The population of interest is those aged 18-64, responding in any of the three waves 
of the ESS. After dropping all missing data, this yields an effective sample of 61,380. As with 
Chapter Five, detailed information on all variables with descriptive statistics is presented in 
the chapter itself. 
 
Datasets 
The ESS has a number of strengths as a dataset which make it suitable for the purposes of 
analysis in this chapter. First, it has a high degree of cross-country comparability. It has in 
ヮﾉ;IW ゲヮWIｷaｷI ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴWゲ デﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW けﾗヮデｷﾏ;ﾉ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ ｷﾐ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾆW┞ 
variables. These include a detailed project specification which is revised with each new round 
and rigorous sampling techniques in terms of selection, translation of questionnaires and 
ﾏWデｴﾗSゲ ﾗa S;デ; IﾗﾉﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW けヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW ﾗa Wケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗヴ Wケ┌ｷ┗;ﾉWﾐIWげく Eaaﾗヴデゲ ;ヴW 
made to ensure the representativeness of the population and strict sampling criteria are 
adhered to under the guidance of a Sampling Expert Panel. Populations are required to be 
representative of the entire population aged 15 or over (on the basis of citizenship, nationality 
etc.) and face-to-face random probability sampling is used at each stage. Quota sampling is 
banned, as are proxies for non-responding individuals21. Response rates are high across the 
ESS, encouraged by a target response rate of 70 per cent. They nonetheless vary considerably 
across countries, suggesting issues of cross-national comparability. In 2006, responses ranged 
                                                          
21 Information about the samplｷﾐｪ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｷゲ SWデ;ｷﾉWS ｴWヴW ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮ;ｪW けMWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ aヴﾗﾏ PヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ デﾗ Pヴ;IデｷIWぎ 
TｴW PヴﾗﾃWIデ “ヮWIｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/project_specification.html. (First 
accessed June 2016). 
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from 46.0 to 73.2 per cent. In 2012, they ranged from 33.8 to 78.6 per cent and in 2014 from 
31.4 to 74.4 per cent22.  
The ESS contains a validated measure of depressive symptoms に the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression (CES-D) scale, which is the health outcome on which this chapter focuses. 
The CES-D was originally developed by Radoff (1977). As Van de Velde et al. (2010) note, the 
CES-D should not be viewed as a diagnostic tool per se but is rather an indicator of those at 
risk of depression within the population at large. In the ESS, the CES-D is measured on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 24, whereby a higher score represents a greater risk of depression. The 
ゲI;ﾉW ｷゲ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ Wｷｪｴデ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ;ゲﾆ ｴﾗ┘ ﾗaデWﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮ;ゲデ ┘WWﾆ ゲﾗﾏWﾗﾐW ｴ;ゲ aWﾉデぐ;ぶ 
depressed b) like everything they did was an effort c) happy d) that their sleep was restless e) 
that they enjoyed life f) lonely g) they could not get going. Possible responses range from 
けﾐﾗﾐW ﾗヴ ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ ﾐﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW デｷﾏWげ デﾗ け;ﾉﾉ ﾗヴ ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗa デｴW デｷﾏWげ ;ﾐS ゲIﾗヴWゲ ;ヴW I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デWS 
on this basis. Questions c) and e) are inverted so that a higher score represents not happy or 
did not enjoy life. The CES-D variable is treated as continuous. 
Individual-level data from the ESS are merged with contextual data from the OECD and 
Eurostat to investigate the impact of passive and active LMPs. The main independent 
variables of interest に active and passive LMP expenditure are each taken from data held by 
the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion as part of the European 
Commission23. Data held by Eurostat are divided in to nine categories: Public Employment 
Services and publicly-funded services for jobseekers (category 1), other activation 
programmes for the unemployment including training, job rotation and job sharing, 
employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, and 
start-up incentives (categories 2-7) and LMP support for the unemployed, consisting of out-
of-work income support and early retirement benefits (categories 8-9). Each of these 
measures are expressed as a % of GDP. In Chapter Five, total active LMP spending is 
operationalised in terms of the average amount spent by a country on categories 1-7 and total 
passive LMP spending is the amount spent on categories 8-9, following others (e.g. Carr & 
                                                          
22 TｴWゲW S;デ; ;ヴW デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ けFｷWﾉS┘ﾗヴﾆ “┌ﾏﾏ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS DW┗ｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲげぎ 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/deviations_index.html (Accessed June 2016). 
23 For a breakdown of LMP spending across countries see 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00076. 
(Accessed June 2016). 
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Chung, 2014). Alongside these data, information on unemployment benefit replacement 
rates and duration are taken from the OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics held by the 
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs24. Both the OECD and Eurostat 
databases represent the most reliable sources of expenditure and institutional data, widely 
used by others in this field (Carr & Chung, 2014; Clasen et al., 2016; Wulfgramm, 2014) 
 
Stages of the Analysis 
As previously noted, the chapter begins by exploring four causal pathways which are 
hypothesised to connect LMPs with inequalities in mental health: income, process and 
employment effects and differential impacts. The ways in which each of the causal pathways 
are examined statistically are briefly summarised below:  
- Income Effects: To explore evidence for けｷncome effectsげ the sample population are 
restricted to those that report their employment status ;ゲ けcurrently unemployedげ and 
the continuous outcome に depressive symptoms に is regressed on to the variable for 
passive LMP spending. This shows the impact of benefit generosity on depressive 
symptoms among unemployed people.  
 
- Process Effectsぎ TｴW けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa ;Iデｷ┗W LMPゲ ;ヴW W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS ｷﾐ W┝;Iデﾉ┞ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW 
way as income effects, except the independent variable of substantive interest is 
active LMP expenditure. The coefficient therefore represents the impact of active LMP 
spending on depressive symptoms among unemployed people. As a check on the 
results for both income and process effects, the variables for active and passive LMP 
spending are included in statistical models as interaction effects with self-reported 
employment status to show whether the mental health impact is significantly greater 
for unemployed vs employed people. 
 
- Employment Effects: Tﾗ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デW デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa LMPゲが ﾏWSｷ;デｷﾗﾐ 
analysis is used to calculate the indirect effect of LMP spending on depressive 
                                                          
24 Retrieved from: http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesstatistics.htm. (Accessed June 2016). 
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symptoms via self-reported unemployment. More specifically, the chapter looks at 
whether the generosity of passive and active LMP spending is a predictor of the 
likelihood of individuals reporting themselves unemployed, and what impact this has 
on depressive symptoms. 
 
- Differential impact of income, process and employment effects by education level: 
The differential impact of LMPs on low vs high educated people via income and 
process effects is not directly investigated due to limitations in the data25. However, 
tentative conclusions are drawn about this based on whether LMPs have a greater 
impact on depressive symptoms among both low educated and unemployed people. 
For employment effects, it is possible to more directly explore whether LMPs have a 
differential impact on low educated people by i) restricting the sample to include only 
those that are low educated and ii) similarly using mediation analysis to quantify the 
mental health effects via employment status.  
In the final stage of the analysis, I examine the overall relationship between LMPs and 
educational inequalities in depressive symptoms. To do this, the continuous outcome に 
depressive symptoms に is regressed on an interaction term for LMP spending*education. 
Individual and contextual control variables are included.  
 
Mediation Analysis 
TｴW ゲデ;デｷゲデｷI;ﾉ ﾏWデｴﾗSゲ aﾗヴ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴｷﾐｪ デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげが ｷくWく デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa LMPゲ ﾗﾐ 
depressive symptoms through employment outcomes, are complex and require further 
elaboration. To empirically investigate this, the chapter uses mediation analysis に a statistical 
technique which quantifies the effect of mediating variables in regression-based 
relationships. Three questions are asked: 
                                                          
25 At this stage, statistical power is too low to permit analysis of the differential process effects. To satisfactorily 
explore whether there is a greater effect of LMPs on depressive symptoms among low, compared with high 
educated unemployed people, we would require a three-way interaction term for LMP*unemployed*education. 
The sample size of unemployed is only 4,391 and confidence intervals were unreliably wide when an interaction 




1. Do LMPs impact on the odds of someone being unemployed? 
2. Does unemployment impact on depressive symptoms?  
3. How much of the effect of LMPs on depressive symptoms is through unemployment? 
The final question is the central concern, although it is first necessary to address questions 
one and two. In statistical terms, the interest of the third question is in the indirect effect of 
LMPs via unemployment. Mediation analysis enables us to estimate the size of this indirect 
effect.  
To calculate these indirect effects, Chapter Five relies on the statistical technique of 
mediation analysis. A basic conceptual model for mediation effects is shown in Figure 3.1 
taken from a seminal paper by Baron and Kenny (1986). The approach of these authors has 
HWIﾗﾏW ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ デｴW けB;ヴﾗﾐ ;ﾐS KWﾐﾐ┞げ ﾗヴ けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ ゲデWヮゲげ ﾏWデｴﾗS (Hayes, 2009). According 
to this, a mediator (or mediators) explains a relationship between an independent and 
dependent variable. For there to be sufficient evidence of mediation, the Baron and Kenny 
approach requires: i) the overall relationship between an independent and dependent 
variable to be statistically significant ii) an independent variable to exert a statistically 
significant impact on a mediator (through path a) and a mediator to be significantly related 
with an outcome (path b). Evidence for these effects is found when the effect of the residual 
path c) is reduced to zero, after controlling for these mediators in the overall relationship 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986: 1176).  
 




TｴヴWW けWaaWIデゲげ I;ﾐ HW ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS aヴﾗﾏ Fｷｪ┌ヴW ンくヱく TｴW total effect is the impact of the 
independent variable on the outcome through the combination of pathways a), b) and c). The 
effect of the independent variable through the mediator in Figure 3.1 (paths a) and b)) is 
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described as the indirect effect, while any other relationships between an independent and 
outcome variable (path c) are direct effects. Chapter Five accepts the basic logic of Figure 3.1, 
although the mediation analysis differs in a number of important respects from the Baron and 
KWﾐﾐ┞ ﾏWデｴﾗSく Fｷヴゲデが ｷデ SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ヴWケ┌ｷヴW デｴ;デ デｴW けデﾗデ;ﾉ WaaWIデげ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ｴ;ゲ 
a statistically significant relation with the outcome. It draws on the argument of Hayes (2009: 
414) and Collins et al. (1998) that since there will be multiple direct and indirect pathways 
connecting the independent and outcome variables, these may create a non-significant 
overall effect. 
 “WIﾗﾐS ;ﾐS ﾏﾗヴW a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉﾉ┞が ｷﾐゲデW;S ﾗa Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉﾉｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ ﾏWSｷ;デﾗヴゲ デﾗ ゲWW ｷa デｴW┞ けW┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ 
;┘;┞げ デｴW ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ between the independent and outcome variables, the chapter adopts 
a けヮヴﾗS┌Iデ ﾗa IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデゲげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ26 (Alwin & Hauser, 1975; MacKinnon, 2008). This involves 
multiplying together the two coefficients of interest に paths a) and b) in Figure 3.1 に and has 
the advantage over the Baron and Kenny method of generating a specific coefficient for the 
indirect effect. In the mediation analysis a linear rather than logit model is used to calculate 
the relationship between LMP spending and self-reported unemployment. While it is 
                                                          
26 This approach can be understood through reference to the following three equations, adapted from 
Mackinnon et al (2007):  岫件岻 桁 噺 糠怠 髪 c隙 髪 香怠 岫件件岻   桁 噺 糠態 髪 c嫗隙 髪 決警 髪 香態 岫件件件岻   警 噺 糠戴 髪 欠隙 髪  香戴 
 
Iﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデげが 隙 represents the independent variable に active or passive LMP 
expenditure, 桁 represents the outcome に depressive symptoms に and 警 represents the mediating variable に
employment status. Equation 件岻 is the full or total effect of LMPs on depressive symptoms which includes the 
effect via employment and any other pathways. The second equation is then the direct effect of LMPs on 
depressive symptoms, controlling for employment status. In this case 潔嫗represents the impact of LMPs which is 
explained through other pathways which are not linked with employment status.  
The main interest is in the indirect effect of LMPs via self-reported unemployment. This is calculated through 
the product of 決 from part 岫件件岻 and 欠 from equation 岫件件件岻. Coefficient 決 is the effect of the mediator, 
unemployment, on depressive symptoms controlling for the effect of LMPs (潔旺警). Coefficient 欠 is then the effect 
of LMPs on self-reported unemployment (as denoted by the outcome 警).  
The differential impact via employment effects is assessed in the same way, although the sample is separated 
so that total, direct and indirect effects are calculated solely for low educated people. Time and space did not 
permit the statistical comparison of the effect on low vs high educated persons. However, the coefficient for 
low educated people is compared with the average indirect effect via employment status, providing some 
evidence for a differential impact. 
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generally preferable to use logistic models with a binary outcome such as unemployment, this 
requirement can be relaxed when the outcome is not rare (Hellevik, 2009a)27.  
Third, it develops on Baron and Kenny by allowing us to infer about the statistical significance 
of the indirect effect, thus overcoming another criticism of their method (MacKinnon et al., 
2007; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Tﾗ Sﾗ デｴｷゲが ｷデ けHﾗﾗデゲデヴ;ヮゲげ デｴW IﾗﾐaｷSWﾐIW ｷﾐデWヴ┗;ﾉゲく 
Bootstrapping is an established method for reducing uncertainty when multiplying together 
two normally-distributed variables28 and it is standard practice to apply this in mediation-
based analysis in social epidemiology (e.g. Cerin et al., 2009). This approach also prevents the 
fetishisation of statistical significance by directing attention towards confidence intervals 
which say more about the degree of certainty in the estimates (Christenfeld et al., 2004).  
 
Chapter Six: Dataset, Variables and Methods 
 
Where Chapter Five looked closely at the impact of cash benefits via generosity and 
activation, Chapter Six focuses on the health effect of conditionality practices associated with 
receipt of cash benefits. It brings together three major data sources from the United States. 
Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮWヴデ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ;ﾐS SWﾏﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷI Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲ ｷゲ 
taken from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), the largest and most 
consistent health-related data source in the US for the period in question (2000 to 2015). This 
is linked with variables to represent the design of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) policies from two sources: The Welfare Rules Database (Urban Institute) and TANF 
                                                          
27 The main argument against using linear regression techniques for a dichotomous outcome is that such an 
approach violates the assumption of homoscedasticity of classic regression (that the size of the error terms is   
stable across all levels of independent variables (Hellevik, 2009b)). The main problem with this in practice is that 
standard errors can be biased. However, Hellevik uses simulation exercises which show that the difference 
between 喧-values when using either logistic or linear regression techniques with a dichotomous variable are 
small, suggesting that it is of little consequence which method is used. In the mediation analysis, I also use 
cluster-robust standard errors, imposing an additional level of conservatism on the standard errors. 
 
28 Using the BOOTSTRAP command on Stata, I resample from the population 1000 times to generate a 
representation of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect which is less prone to Type I errors (Hayes, 




Financial Data (Office of Family Assistance)29. It uses a broader measure of mental health than 
Chapters Four and Five based on the question in Figure 3.2く TｴW けﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa S;┞ゲげ デｴ;デ 
somebody reports mental ill-health is the main interest in this chapter.  
 
Figure 3.2. Question on Mental Health in the Behavioral Risk Factor 








This variable is less ideal than other indicators, such as the CES-D, which is based on eight 
questions that act as a diagnostic tool. Unlike the CES-D, the variable cannot be used to 
indicate risk of depression. Rather, the question is a summary measure of mental health 
which prompts the respondent to consider specific aspects of their mental wellbeing (stress, 
depression and problems with emotions). It is a subjective indicator based on an individual 
assessment, such as those that ask respondents to rate their life satisfaction or happiness on 
a scale. However, it is the only indicator of mental health available consistently within the 
BRFSS over the period in question. It has also been validated in one systematic review of 
studies related to the BRFSS (Pierannunzi et al., 2013)30. Moreover, it is less problematic to 
                                                          
29 The Welfare Rules Database was accessed from: http://wrd.urban.org/wrd/Query/query.cfm while TANF 
financial and caseload data were obtained from: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports. 
These data were downloaded and used in autumn 2016.  
30 One study cited in this review retested the survey question among 868 respondents from the state of Missouri 
two weeks after initially asking them (Andresen et al., 2003). They found that the retest reliability of this measure 
was very good (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 0.67, 95% CI: 0.63, 0.71), albeit that this declined somewhat 
for older adults. However, this is not a cause for concern in this chapter given that only those below 64 に working 




use this measure here than it might have been in the previous chapters, given that there is 
likely to be less cross-cultural variability in the reporting of mental health across US states 
than European countries.  
 
Datasets 
While the mental health indicator may be less ideal than those available in other American 
datasets (e.g. the National Health Interview Survey), a distinct advantage of the BRFSS is that 
it has state identifiers. This means that unlike these other datasets, we can link individual-
level data from the BRFSS with state-level TANF variables, as well as state-level control 
variables. Sample sizes are also large in the BRFSS which is of great benefit as the chapter 
involves repeated sub-population analyses which reduce the population size. On average, 
more than 400,000 people complete the BRFSS annually. Prior to 2009 it used random digit 
dialling of landlines. This was then extended to include cellular telephones from 2009 
onwards, although these were only included in the annual surveys in 201131. Nonresponse 
can be a greater issue with telephone than face-to-face interviews (Pierannunzi et al., 2013). 
However, the response rates in the BRFSS are relatively good. While the median response 
rate declined from 62 per cent in 1997 to 48 per cent in 2015 (47.2 per cent for cellular 
phones), these compare favourably with other telephone surveys32 and are only fractionally 
lower than those of the European Social Survey (53 per cent in 2015). For reasons outlined in 
Chapter Six, men are excluded from the analysis. After merging all four BRFSS datasets and 
dropping all those of non-working age, this leaves an effective sample of 559,267. 
Data from four waves of the BRFSS に 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 に are merged with TANF data 
from corresponding years in the WRD and TANF financial data held by the OFA. The former of 
these databases is available for each year from 1996 to present. The aim of the WRD is to help 
researchers understand, map and compare states in terms of TANF policies and legislation. 
                                                          
31 In sensitivity tests in Chapter Six, the 2015 wave of the BRFSS is excluded to see whether this had any impact 
on the results. There were no noticeable changes in response rates between 2010 and 2011 following the 
introduction of cellular telephones.  
 
32 See page 4 of the BRFSS 2015 Data Quality Report. The BRFSS has the second best response rates of seven US-
based telephone surveys. 
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Detailed information is organised according to time, state, geographical area and even family 
type and is available for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The dataset is ideal for this 
chapter as it contains a large number of indicators related to TANF policies, with detailed 
qualitative and quantitative data. These include data on benefit generosity, conditionality and 
eligibility, each of which are variable across states and over time. A minority of TANF variables 
of interest were not available in the WRD. This data source is therefore supplemented by 
financial and caseload data held by the OFA, the agency which administers federal grant 
programs such as TANF. These data are similarly freely downloadable to researchers, dating 
back from 1997. With these data it is possible to calculate state per capita spending by 
dividing financial data by caseload data and this is how welfare-to-work spending is calculated 
in Chapter Six. 
 
Fixed and Random Effects Models 
A major advantage of the three data sources used in Chapter Six is that they span a wide time 
period. The time dimension is crucial in this chapter. The research design focuses on 
establishing evidence for causal connections and part of this is through its attention to the 
impact of policy change on the mental health of affected groups. The statistical method used 
デﾗ Sﾗ デｴｷゲ ｷゲ デｴW けaｷ┝WS WaaWIデゲげ ヴWｪヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴき ﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW aﾗ┌ヴ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ 
effects described by Bryan and Jenkins (2016)33. The analysis begins with cluster-robust OLS 
and logistic regression methods, as with the previous chapters. The second stage of the 
analysis then models the effect on mental health of changes in policy design by controlling 
for all time-invariant unobservable state characteristics. To do this, it includes N-1 states as 
dummy covariates (Allison, 2009). This essentially isolates changes in any other state-level 
variables included in the models (e.g. TANF policies). Therefore, provided that other time-
variant confounders are included in the model, then the Beta values for the policy variables 
ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ デｴW WaaWIデ ﾗa Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ｷﾐ デｴWゲW ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ ﾗヴ デｴW け;┗Wヴ;ｪW デヴW;デﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデげ ﾗa ; 
given TANF policy. 
                                                          
33 The fixed effects approach is expressed in statistical terms in the detailed methods section in Chapter Six. 
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By explicitly modelling the effect of change over time, the fixed effects specification can 
デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW ゲデヴﾗﾐｪWヴ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ﾗa I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ﾉｷﾐﾆゲく Iデ Wﾐ;HﾉWゲ ┌ゲ デﾗ ;ゲﾆ デｴW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐぎ さSﾗWゲ ; 
change in policy 捲 ｴ;┗W ; ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ WaaWIデ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴW ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮいざ YWデ ;ゲ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾉﾉ 
statistical methods, fixed effects models have their limitations which warrant consideration. 
First, they rely on the problematic assumption that there will be an immediate impact of 
policies on mental health outcomes. This is a strong supposition; it is quite plausible that there 
will be latency effects of policy changes, although this might vary according to the outcome 
of interest (e.g. changes in conditionality may have a quicker effect on unemployment than 
mental health). Second, while fixed effects models have a low risk of producing biased 
estimates (as they control for all time-invariant unobservable variables), confidence intervals 
for vectors of interest are likely to be wide. This is because between-individual differences are 
always greater than those that occur within-individuals over time (Allison, 2009). This loss of 
efficiency requires us to be more qualified in our conclusions. Thirdly, fixed effects models do 
not solve the problem of reverse causation. Even if they are able to show that a policy change 
is associated with a change in mental health among the recipient population, this does not 
prove that the policy change is causing the health change. Policy changes may instead be the 
result of a worsening or improvement in health among the target population. 
Although we lose some precision in the fixed effects models, in the most part sample sizes 
are large which increases confidence in the results of the analysis. Large samples are generally 
advantageous, although they can increase the probability of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis for small effects of no practical importance (Type I error). This problem is most 
acute if we rely on p values to infer statistical significance, as these move quickly towards zero 
in large samples as standard errors become small (Lin et al., 2013). To deal with this issue in 
the chapter, the following recommendations from Lin et al. (2013) are taken on board: 
1. No consideration is given to p-values in inferring a statistically significant effect of a 
parameter. Instead, the focus is on the width of confidence intervals and the distance 
of upper and lower bounds of confidence intervals from a null effect (either 0 or 1, 
depending on the outcome). 
2. The focus is on the magnitude of effects and this is reported in straightforward terms, 
including marginal probabilities where appropriate. 
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3. A Bismarckian strategy is adopted, where parameters are positioned alongside upper 
or lower bounds of confidence intervals (depending on whether the coefficient is 
ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ﾗヴ ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wぶく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが さデｴW WaaWIデ ゲｷ┣W ｷゲ 紅怠, although it could be as 
high/low as 紅態くざ 
Alongside these general principles for research conduct, as with the previous two chapters, a 
range of sensitivity tests are included to see the impact that different methodological 
SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲく OﾐW ﾗa デｴWゲW デWゲデゲ ｷゲ デｴW ヴ;ﾐSﾗﾏ WaaWIデゲ ﾗヴ けﾏ┌ﾉデｷﾉW┗Wﾉ 
ﾏﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ に the fourth oa Bヴ┞;ﾐ ;ﾐS JWﾐﾆｷﾐゲげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ 
dealing with contextual data34. This is used in sensitivity tests, rather than the main analysis 
because random effects modelling is less useful for telling us about the impact on mental 
health of changes in policies, which is a central concern of the research design in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, the multilevel modelling strategy is useful in Chapter Six as it sheds light on how 
けﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪa┌ﾉげ デｴW TANF ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ;ヴW aﾗヴ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ Iヴﾗゲゲ-state variations in inequalities in 
mental health. Random effects models split the variance between lower and upper levels (in 
this case the individual and state). State effects are specified as error terms and cross-level 
interactions are included for TANF variables, where the effect is split between treatment and 
control groups. This random effects strategy therefore allows us to i) check the accuracy of 
these fixed effects coefficients and ii) investigate the explanatory power of these coefficients 
for cross-state variations in mental health. This latter function therefore strengthens the 
claims that can be made about the impact of TANF variables. 
 
Summary of Chapter Three 
Chapter Three has provided both general and specific details about the empirical approaches 
adopted in Chapters Four to Six. It has outlined a clear stance on the issue of causality. 
Datasets and statistical approaches were described, although variable operationalisation is 
                                                          
34 While in Chapters Four and Five, the number of level two predictors was not large enough to permit multilevel 
modelling (N=19 in Chapter Four, 20 in Chapter Five), Chapter Six has 50 level two variables, which increases to 
195 observations when these data are merged over years. There is disagreement about the exact amount of 
level two observations required for multilevel modelling, although this is generally placed at around thirty, 




ゲ;┗WS aﾗヴ デｴW Iｴ;ヮデWヴゲ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲく Fﾗヴ デｴW ヴW;SWヴげゲ Iﾗﾐ┗WﾐｷWﾐIWが Table 3.2 below summarises 
the key aspects of the datasets and variables used in Chapters Four, Five and Six. It lists all the 
datasets used to extract dependent variables and summarises the strengths and weaknesses 
of each of these datasets. Key information on sample populations, dependent variables and 




Table 3.2. Summary of Datasets and Variables Used in Chapters 
 
                                                          
35 Borsch-Supan et al. (2005: 4) explain the sampling procedure as follows: "probability samples have been carefully drawn in each participating country and interview 
procedures have been harmonized with the help of a joint case management system. The questionnaire has been translated according to a protocol ensuring functional 
equivalence". 







The Survey of Health, 
Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe 
- 2004, 2007 and 
2013. 
Strengths: Contains high-quality comparative data35 on 
depressive symptoms suited to the research questions in 
Chapter Four; Response rates are high, although variable across 
countries 
 
Limitations: Population is restricted to those aged 50-64; Proxy 
interviews are included when respondents are unavailable; 
Datasets are complex and require greater cleaning than other 
comparative surveys. 
Men and women 
aged 50-64 
EURO-D depression 
scale based on a 
composite of survey 
questions designed 
specifically for older 
people 
56,177 




The European Social 




Strengths: Contains procedures to ensure optimal 
comparability; Strong sampling methods used throughout; High 
response rates. 
 
Limitations: Cross-national variations in response rates suggest 
some issues with comparability; Limited data on health 
outcomes. 
 
Men and women 
aged 18-64 
CES-D scale of risk of 
depressive symptoms, 
based on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 24. 
61,380 
Six 
The Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance 
System - 2000, 2005, 
2010 and 2015 
 
 
Strengths: Large sample sizes, based on more than 400,000 
interviews conducted each year; Includes state identifiers to 
enable matching of individual outcome with state-level policy 
data; Contains a large amount of sociodemographic, 
socioeconomic and health-related individual-level data. 
 
Limitations: Telephone-based interviews can be less reliable 
than face-to-face sampling methods; The measure of mental 
health available in the BRFSS is less robust than those in SHARE 
and the ESS. 
 
Women aged 18-64 
Question on number 
of days of poor mental 
health experienced by 





Chapter 4. The Welfare Regime Approach: Social Stress and 
Health Inequalities across European Welfare Regimes 
 
Taking the discussion in Chapter Two as its starting point, this first empirical chapter explores 
how inequalities in depressive symptoms vary across welfare regimes. To begin, it briefly 
revisits the earlier discussion to remind the reader of the objectives of the chapter and its 
contribution to the literature. Hypotheses, methodology and results then follow.  
 
Welfare Regimes and the Social Stress Pathway 
 
Tｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ aﾗI┌ゲWゲ ﾗﾐ けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ;ゲ ; ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ｴﾗ┘ I;ゲｴ 
benefits policies, as operationalised by welfare regimes, have a bearing on health inequalities. 
The dependent variable of depressive symptoms is taken as a proxy for the latent mechanism 
ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ W┝ヮWIデWS デﾗ ┗;ヴ┞ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ヴWｪｷﾏWゲ ｷﾐ ;IIﾗヴS;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴWｷヴ け┘Wﾉa;ヴW 
;ヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴWげ (Hurrelmann et al., 2011).  
The chapter contributes to theoretical debates about how welfare regimes are related with 
health inequalities. There are three major reviews of studies of the literature on welfare 
regimes and health inequalities (Bergqvist et al., 2013; Brennenstuhl et al., 2012; Muntaner 
et al., 2011). In each of these reviews, the authors find that the evidence does not support 
the logical conclusion of welfare regime theory that the Scandinavian regime should perform 
best in terms of health inequalities. This surprise finding has been described by Mackenbach 
(2012) ;ゲ デｴW けｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ヮ;ヴ;Sﾗ┝げぎ デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ ヴWSｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷ┗W ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗデWIデｷ┗W ┘Wﾉa;ヴW 
regime does not seem to enhance the health of the most disadvantaged. It is argued here that 
the inconsistent empirical results may be due to a dependence in the literature on health 
measures that do not explain why regimes might be connected with health inequalities. 
As a modest development on this, the chapter seeks evidence for an explanation linked with 
social stress by exploring variation in educational inequalities in depressive symptoms across 
five European welfare regimes: Bismarckian, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Southern and 
Eastern. Drawing on elements of both the income and social class explanations for how 
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regimes are connected with health inequalities, it considers a けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞く 
To do this, it examines the following research hypothesis: 
The Scandinavian welfare regime will have the least inequalities in depressive 
symptoms due to its ability to reduce social stress among low educated groups via 
materialist and psychosocial mechanisms. 
 
Variable Construction  
The measure of depressive symptoms is based on the EURO-D scale as described in Chapter 
Three. This is a composite of 12 variables from within SHARE (listed in Appendix A, Figure A.1). 
The EURO-D indicator can be treated as either a continuous or binary variable, using 2/3 as a 
cut-off point for clinical depression. It is here kept as continuous to avoid the information loss 
which occurs when continuous measures are dichotomised. In any case, others have found 
that it makes little difference whether this variable is treated as a continuous or binary 
measure (e.g. Wahrendorf et al., 2006) and this was confirmed in sensitivity tests later in the 
chapter. The EURO-D scale harmonises twelve items from five different scales36 which each 
approach depression from a different conceptual perspective. Prince et al. (1999) found that 
there were strong associations between EURO-D and these parent instruments, suggesting 
that the scale captures the essence of each of these measures. 
In SHARE, education is a derived variable, constructed using the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997 measure from the OECD. In Wave 4, ISCED 2011 is 
also available, however since this is not available in earlier waves, the ISCED 97 measure is 
used throughout to allow for cross-wave comparability. The ISCED 97 variable has seven 
educational categories: pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, post-
secondary non-tertiary, first stage tertiary and second stage tertiary. The variable is recoded 
in to a three category ordinal variable for high (tertiary or above), medium (upper 
                                                          
36 These are: Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), Geriatric Mental State-AGECAT, 
SHORT-CARE, Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (ZSDS) and Comprehensive Psychopathological Rating Scale 




secondary/post-secondary) and low (lower secondary or below) education, following 
common practices. 
Finally, the following control variables were included to account for confounding influences 
on the relationships of interest: age, gender, marital status and nationality. Age was centred 
and treated as continuous, gender was a binary variable, as was marital status and this was 
divided between those who were married or in a civil partnership and those that were not. 
Nationality was based on whether someone was or was not born in the country of interview. 
Each of these variables was significantly related with the outcomes of interest. These 
┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ┘WヴW IｴﾗゲWﾐ ;ゲ デｴW┞ ;ヴW IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS けﾐﾗﾐ-ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ a;Iデﾗヴゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｪ;ヮゲく 
The interest of this thesis is in avoidable causes of health inequalities (as explained in Chapter 
One) and, in particular, socially-generated factors. The aim is to discount alternative 
explanations where possible. These variables were the most appropriate from the SHARE 
dataset and hence no others were used.    
 
Statistical Methods and Results  
 
The Chapter uses cluster-robust linear regression models, as described in Chapter Three. First, 
the results from individual regressions are presented for each country and these countries 
are categorised according to welfare regime. This gives a picture of the average differences 
between regimes as well as within-regime variations in health inequalities. To make it easier 
to interpret these results, percentage differences between low and high educated people are 
also presented. Depressive symptoms are regressed on to an interaction between country 
and education level and coefficients and Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) are reported37. The 
second part of the analysis then regresses depressive symptoms on to an interaction between 
                                                          
37 The full equation here is: DEPRESS辿棚 噺 が怠 髪  が態DEM辿棚 髪  が戴EDU辿棚 髪 が戴COUNTRY辿棚 髪  が替EDU辿棚 茅 COUNTRY辿棚 髪 が泰WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚 





welfare regimes and education38. As before, AMEs are presented to show how health 
inequalities vary across welfare regimes.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Frequencies for the SHARE population aged 50-64 across the five welfare regimes in each of 
the waves (2004, 2007, 2011 and 2013) can be seen in Table 4.1. A full breakdown across 
countries is available in Appendix A, Table A.1. The largest of the five welfare regimes is the 
Bismarckian group with a total of 24,082 observations over the four waves. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the Anglo-Saxon cluster consists only of Ireland and is available for only one 
time point (2006) with just 565 people. There are also differences in the amount of available 
data for individual countries within regimes (shown in Table A.1). For example, data for 
Luxembourg were available only in 2013 and in the Southern regime both Greece and 
Portugal have data missing for some of the waves. In the Eastern welfare regime, none of the 
countries were included in 2004 and data were also missing in later waves. In all cases, the 
data are weighted to adjust for differences in country size, following recommended 





                                                          
38 The regression model can be expressed in the following equation: DEPRESS辿棚 噺 が怠 髪  が態DEM辿棚 髪 が戴EDU辿棚 髪  が戴REGIME辿棚 髪  が替EDU辿棚 茅 REGIME辿棚 髪 が泰WAVE 髪  鉛辿棚 
Here, the covariates are identical to those in the previous model, where the main vector of interest is the 
interaction effect for education and welfare regime 紅替.  
 
39 Specifically, I use the calibrated cross-sectional weight for the each of the four waves, following the advice in 
the SHARE release guide version 5-0-0, p. 38 (http://www.share-
project.org/fileadmin/pdf_documentation/SHARE_release_guide_5-0-0.pdf, accessed 19.09.2017). This weight 
is computed for each country separately and reproduces the sample so that it is representative of the national 









0 5 10 15
Depression scale EURO-D - high is depressed
Table 4.1. Frequencies across welfare regimes and waves, population aged 
50-64, SHARE 2004-2013. 
Welfare Regime Year 
 2004 2006 2011 2013 Total (N) 
      
Bismarckian 8,128 2,383 8,117 5,454 24,082 
      
Scandinavian 2,507 1,130 473 2,157 6,267 
      
Anglo-Saxon 0 565 0 0 565 
      
Southern 3,844 1,604 2,762 2,474 10,684 
      
Eastern 0 2,848 8,264 1,305 12,417 
      
Total (N) 15,815 8,843 19,616 11,903 56,177 
 
In Figure 4.1 the distribution of responses to the EURO-D scale is depicted with a histogram 
which shows the highly (positively) skewed nature of the data. A normal curve is imposed on 
the histogram, again showing that the data are heavily loaded toward the lowest end of the 
scale. To check whether this had an impact on the results, the analyses are re-run in a 
sensitivity test using a negative binomial regression model which relaxes the assumption of 
normality in the dependent variable (Land et al., 1996). 
 










Table 4.2 shows that for the two key variables: education and depressive symptoms the 
proportion of missing data was less than 5 per cent. Differences in the percentage missing 
were also examined across countries and welfare regimes, shown in Table A.2 and in all cases 
the missing data were below 5 per cent.  
 






Table 4.3 shows averages (means for continuous variables, percentages for categorical) for 
depressive symptoms and education across the five welfare regimes and, in the final column, 
averages across all these regimes. Depressive symptoms were highest in Eastern countries, 









Variables N (Non-Missing) % Missing 
Depressive Symptoms 54860 2.34 
 
Education 54734 2.57 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics of Core Variables across Welfare Regimes, 
SHARE 2004-2013. 
Notes: 1All Ns are non-missing. 
There was substantial variation across regimes in the representation of low vs. high educated 
people. The Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon welfare regimes had the highest proportion of 
high educated people. High educated people were under-represented in both Southern and 
Eastern regimes and in the Southern regime, low educated people were highly 
overrepresented (64.4 per cent). Weighting helps adjust for this and coefficients are 
presented with confidence intervals which may vary depending on sample size. 
 
Are Inequalities in Depressive Symptoms Smallest in the Scandinavian Regime? 
We now explore whether there is evidence that the relationship between education and 
depressive symptoms varies across countries and welfare regimes. The key findings from a 
series of adjusted regression models are presented as marginal predicted probabilities in 
Table 4.5. This shows differences in estimated CES-D scores across countries and welfare 
regimes (coefficients in Appendix A, Table A.3). Estimations are reported for low vs high 
educated and the percentage difference between these scores is reported in the column 
furthest to the right. On average, the highest educated have an estimated EURO-D score of 
1.9 (95% CI: 1.8-2.0), compared with 2.6 (95% CI: 2.5-2.8) for those with low education. This 
translates to a 26.7 per cent difference between low and high educated persons. 
 
 Welfare Regime 




Saxon Southern Eastern All 
Depressive Symptoms  
(EURO-D) (N=54,8601)       
    Mean Score 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.3 
       
Education (N=54,734)       
    % Low 28.8 22.9 33.4 64.4 29.4 35.3 
    % Medium 44.6 38.5 20.4 22.9 54.9 41.7 
    % High 26.6 38.6 46.2 12.7 15.7 23.0 
       




Table 4.4. Estimated Depressive Symptoms (EURO-D) across Countries and 
Welfare Regimes, SHARE 2004-2013 (n=51,610) 
  Education Relative 
difference 
between 
high vs low 
educated (%) 
Welfare Regime Country Low High 
  
Estimated 
CES-D 95% CI 
Estimated 
CES-D 95% CI 
Bismarckian Austria 2.1 (1.7  2.5) 1.6 (1.5  1.6) 24.0 
 Germany 2.6 (2.1  3.1) 1.8 (1.6  2.0) 29.5 
 Netherlands 2.2 (2.2  2.3) 1.8 (1.7  1.9) 19.6 
 France 3.0 (2.8  3.1) 2.4 (2.3  2.5) 19.6 
 Switzerland 2.3 (2.0  2.6) 1.8 (1.6  2.0) 22.7 
 Belgium 2.8 (2.6  2.9) 2.2 (2.1  2.3) 19.9 
 Luxembourg 2.9 (2.8  3.0) 1.7 (1.5  1.8) 42.1 
       
Scandinavian Sweden 2.1 (2.0  2.1) 1.8 (1.7  1.9) 13.1 
 Denmark 2.2 (2.0  2.4) 1.7 (1.6  1.8) 24.1 
       
Anglo-Saxon Ireland 2.4 (2.3  2.6) 2.1 (2.0  2.2) 15.2 
       
Southern Spain 2.6 (2.1  3.0) 1.8 (1.5  2.0) 31.4 
 Italy 2.7 (2.5  2.9) 1.9 (1.5  2.3) 30.5 
 Portugal 3.3 (3.3  3.4) 2.5 (2.4  2.5) 26.2 
 Greece 2.3 (2.2  2.5) 1.5 (1.3  1.6) 36.4 
       
Eastern Czech Rep. 2.4 (2.1  2.6) 1.7 (1.6  1.8) 27.4 
 Poland 3.8 (3.7  4.0) 3.2 (3.1  3.3) 16.2 
 Hungary 4.0 (3.9  4.0) 1.8 (1.7  1.8) 55.8 
 Slovenia 2.4 (2.3  2.5) 1.6 (1.6  1.7) 31.4 
 Estonia 3.3 (3.2  3.4) 2.3 (2.2  2.4) 30.8 
Average  2.6 (2.5  2.8) 1.9 (1.8  2.0) 26.7 
Notes: Predicted values for EURO-D are based on country*education interaction effects from an OLS 
regression model, controlling for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, wave. Coefficients for 
countries and controls available in Appendix A, Table A.3. 
 
Two sets of figures are of interest: the mental health of the low educated and the relative 
percentage differences between low and high educated across countries and welfare 
regimes. The former is a general indicator of how well welfare states protect against the 
health consequences of social disadvantage, while the latter refers to a wider indicator of 
fairness in health outcomes. Sweden performs the best on both counts across all countries 
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(EURO-D of low educated = 2.1, 13 per cent difference) and Hungary performs worst (EURO-
D of low educated = 4.0, 56 per cent difference). The low educated have the worst mental 
health (>3 on CES-D) in Portugal, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. The percentage gap between 
the low and high educated was greatest (>30 per cent) in Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia. There are therefore initial indications that the Southern and 
Eastern countries perform worst for health inequalities, although this is not conclusive at this 
stage. To explore this more concretely, welfare regime averages are shown in Figure 4.5 based 
on the welfare regime*education effect (coefficients available in Appendix A, Table A.4). We 
can see that the lowest educated in the Scandinavian regime have the lowest predicted (and 
hence best) value for depressive symptoms (2.1), followed by Anglo-Saxon (2.5), Southern 
(2.6), Bismarckian (2.7), and Eastern (3.2) welfare regimes.  
Figure 4.5 is also helpful to get a clearer picture of the magnitude of the gaps between the 
low and high educated in the five different regimes. It clearly shows that, while inverse 
inequalities exist across all regimes, they are narrowest in the Scandinavian regime. 
Differences in the magnitude of inequalities between the Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon and 
Southern regimes appear to be minor, if at all. Inequalities in depressive symptoms appear to 
be widest in the Eastern regime and the lowest educated fare the worst. However, confidence 































Figure 4.2. Welfare Regime Differences in Educational Inequalities in 











Notes: Predicted values for EURO-D are based on welfare regime*education interaction effects from 
an OLS regression model, controlling for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, wave. R-Squared from 
the full model = 0.075.  Full coefficients available in Appendix A, Table A.4. 
 
Overall, these results quite clearly support the overarching research hypothesis. The 
Scandinavian regime performed best, then there was no clear variation between Bismarckian, 
Anglo-Saxon and Southern welfare states. Coefficients from the regression indicated that the 
Eastern regime had the widest inequalities albeit that confidence intervals were wide. 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
To check the robustness of these analyses, the EURO-D variable was recoded to create a 
binary measure of those with a score of 3 or more on the scale. Inequalities were then 
similarly examined across welfare regimes. The results for this were near-identical as when 
the variable was kept continuous. A marginal plot is shown in Appendix A, Figure A.2 which is 
almost the same as Figure 4.5 based on a logistic regression with the full controls. This 
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confirms that it is of little consequence whether the variable is operationalised as a 
continuous or binary measure. As a further test on the EURO-D indicator, the linear regression 
analysis was re-run using negative binomial models. These relax the assumption of normality 
in the dependent variable which is clearly violated in the ordinary regression models (as 
shown in Figure 4.1). Figure A.3 is similarly almost identical to Figure 4.2, although confidence 




The analysis in this chapter found that inequalities in depressive symptoms were least among 
older working-age people in the Scandinavian regime. The Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian and 
Southern regimes were relatively similar, while inequalities were largest in the Eastern 
regime. Oﾐ デｴｷゲ H;ゲｷゲが ┘W I;ﾐ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SW デｴ;デ デｴW ヮヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa Hﾗデｴ けｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ ;ﾐS けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ゲゲげ 
perspectives are upheld. There is some evidence for a けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞, whereby the 
most redistributive regime with the least class-based inequalities, is most effective at 
reducing stress among disadvantaged groups. However, this is only one interpretation of the 
findings and the latter part of this discussion considers other explanations. 
This chapter expands the evidence on the relationship between welfare regimes and 
ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ SWヮヴWゲゲｷ┗W ゲ┞ﾏヮデﾗﾏゲ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ﾗﾉSWヴ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐゲく Tﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ knowledge, 
there has been only one study that has used the SHARE dataset to look at links between 
education and depressive symptoms across Europe (Avendano et al., 2009). However, this 
paper is now quite dated (they use only SHARE 2004 and 2007) and is not explicitly regime-
based. Similarly, while there are a significant number of health inequalities studies adopting 
a welfare regime approach, relatively few of these have looked at inequalities in depressive 
symptoms. 
This chapter also contributes an innovative conceptual approach by focusing on empirical 
evidence which might explain how welfare regimes and health inequalities are connected. It 
hypothesised that the Scandinavian regime would perform best of the five in terms of health 
ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS デｴｷゲ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ┘;ゲ ┌ヮｴWﾉSく Oa デｴW デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐefits 
policies described in Chapter One に activation, generosity and conditionality に it seems that 
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the regime which combines high levels of benefit generosity (i.e. decommodification), with 
historically high levels of investment in active labour market programmes (Sianesi, 2001), also 
has the least inequalities in depressive symptoms. The impact of specific policies via these 
two design features に activation and generosity に is investigated more directly in Chapter Five. 
 
Implications of the Findings 
The overall implication of this chapter is that more highly decommodifying cash benefits 
systems are more effective at reducing inequalities in stress, as evidenced by fewer 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. While the evidence from these results seems to fit with 
the expectations of welfare regime theory, we cannot unequivocally conclude that the results 
show an effect of welfare regimes. In this chapter and in the wider literature, welfare regimes 
are taken as a proxy for cash benefit systems に unemployment, sickness and pensions. In 
reality, however, they capture a great deal more. As such, the welfare regime approach 
cannot tell us about the pure effect of cash benefits as the categorisation is simply too broad. 
It is plausible that regime classifications capture part of the effect of cash benefit systems, 
however this cannot be divorced from other important factors. In recognition of this, some 
further explanations for the findings are presented below: 
- Wealth and Inequality: Sweden and Denmark have some of the highest levels of GDP 
per capita in Europe and income inequality is also low in these countries (Eurostat, 
2016). Anxiety and mental distress may be lower if the population is financially secure. 
This explanation is not entirely convincing however, as although Sweden and Denmark 
are wealthy, they rank similarly to the Bismarckian countries in terms of GDP per 
capita, yet had less inequalities than these countries. 
 
- Employment conditions: In this chapter, welfare regimes were considered proxies for 
cash benefit systems; however welfare regimes may also capture differences in 
working conditions which may be better in the Scandinavian regime for wider swathes 
of the population, placing less strain on disadvantaged groups. Social status may also 
be less hierarchically tied to occupation, meaning that the lower educated have better 




- Work/life balance: The extent to which countries emphasise work/life balance both 
culturally and in concrete policy terms, is likely to be important for mental health. Part 
of this is about childcare provision and female labour force participation and indeed 
there are those that criticise Esping-Andersen for gender-blindness around the extent 
to which regimes enable women to be autonomous (Bambra, 2007a; Lewis, 1992). 
There is also a cultural element which applies for both genders around the importance 
that countries attach to paid work. For example, some employers in Sweden have 
recently introduced a six-hour working day, reflecting a wider cultural emphasis on 
work/life balance (Crompton & Lyonette, 2006; Sheffield, 2016). Time poverty can be 
a source of major stress and disadvantaged groups tend to be at higher risk. The 
narrower inequalities in depressive symptoms in the Scandinavian countries may 
therefore partly represent lower stress linked to better work-life balance. 
 
- Health and social care: TｴW けI;ヴWげ ゲｷSW ﾗa デｴW ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デW ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デｴW IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ focus of 
welfare regime theory (nor this thesis), yet the extent to which deprived populations 
have access to good quality health and social care will have a major bearing on health 
inequalities. There has been relatively little work on healthcare and welfare regimes. 
One analysis by Bambra (2005) placed Sweden and Denmark in the highest category 
of healthcare decommodification as measured by the public/private mix of health 
provision, access and coverage of health systems. However, this is now quite dated 
and each of these countries have pursued further healthcare privatisation since the 
publication of this article (Beckman & Anell, 2013; Olesen, 2010). Theoretically, higher 
decommodification will result in more equitable access to health care, which in turn 
could reduce health inequalities. Evidence is lacking to support this hypothesis and 
that which is available suggests that the impact of universal vs. private forms of 
healthcare on health inequalities is often specific to the context in which it is 
implemented (McKee, 2002).  
 
 
- Artefactual: Aside from these explanations, we cannot discount the possibility that the 
results are artefactual. If there is greater cultural emphasis on mental wellbeing in the 
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Scandinavian regime then social desirability bias could lead respondents to report 
better mental health. While one paper asserted that the EURO-D indicator had good 
internal validity, the authors also conclude that they cannot be confident that 
さI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWS SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲざ ｷﾐ aWWﾉｷﾐｪゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ﾏﾗﾗS ;ﾐS ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｷﾉﾉ-health do 
not explain cross-national differences (Castro-Costa et al., 2008: 28). It may be the 
case that those in the Scandinavian countries have a more optimistic disposition and 
that this is common across education groups, explaining narrower inequalities and 
better mental health overall. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The alternative explanations highlighted above raise an important definitional and conceptual 
issue in relation to welfare regimes. Clearly, it is an oversimplification to equate regimes with 
cash benefits policies when in reality they cover a much wider range of factors. This does not 
mean that cash benefits policies are irrelevant, rather that they may be only one part of the 
W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐく Iﾐ a;Iデが デｴW けI;┌ゲW ﾗa デｴW I;┌ゲWげ ｷゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ HW ; ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ 
of political, social, cultural and historical factors which interact to produce certain 
arrangements which are more or less conducive to health equity. The next chapter uses an 
approach which enables a more direct investigation of causal pathways between cash 





Chapter 5. The Social Expenditure Approach: Labour Market 
Policies and Inequalities in Depressive Symptoms 
 
In the previous chapter, the emphasis was on hypothetical stress-related pathways 
connecting welfare regimes with inequalities in depressive symptoms. Yet the analytical 
approach enabled only broad conclusions to be drawn about the role of cash benefits within 
this complex causal relationship, due to the inherent imprecision of the welfare regime 
approach. To develop on this, the following chapter adopts a social expenditure approach, 
using independent variables for active and passive labour market policies (LMPs) to 
investigate the causal pathways that might connect policies with health inequalities.  
 
Labour Market Policies: Hypothesised Causal Pathways 
 
Labour market policies targeted at unemployed people have been the focus of much research 
in this field, implicitly or otherwise (Bergqvist et al., 2013). Two broad categories of LMP are 
identifiable in the literature: active and passive. The former consists of any policy intervention 
which helps unemployed people back to work (training programs, job search support etc.), 
while the latter are cash benefit programs which help the unemployed maintain a decent 
standard of living outside of the labour market.  
Chapter Two outlined four ways in which LMPs might matter for health inequalities, drawing 
on broader causal pathways described in Chapter One. The first of these was income effects, 
as conceptualised in terms of the modifying effect of passive LMPs on the health effects of 
unemployment through their impact on income during unemployment. The second was the 
process effects associated with active LMPs. This causal pathway refers to the health effects 
of participation in an active LMP which might modify the health impact of unemployment. 
The third causal pathway was employment effects and this was defined in terms of the impact 
of both active and passive LMPs on employment outcomes of recipients, and the resulting 
health inequalities effects. Finally, it was argued that cash benefits could have differential 
impacts through these three causal pathways if the health effect varied across educational 
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groups. Chapter Two reviewed the evidence for both active and passive LMPs around each of 
these pathways. Overall, the existing evidence can be summarised as follows: 
• Both active and passive LMPs are likely to reduce health inequalities by mitigating 
against the effects of unemployment on mental health. Although the impact of 
passive LMP spending may level off after a certain point, in general we can expect 
generous cash benefits which reduce poverty, financial insecurity and social 
inequality to be beneficial to the mental health of the unemployed. By extension, 
they will reduce wider social inequalities in mental health. 
 
• While there are strong grounds to expect active LMPs to reduce unemployment, 
the evidence for passive LMPs is less unequivocally positive. Research tends to 
suggest that, after a certain point, generous passive LMPs may inadvertently 
exacerbate unemployment. This may contribute to wider health inequalities in 
countries with particularly generous passive LMPs. 
 
• Both types of LMP spending are likely to have a differential impact on the mental 
ｴW;ﾉデｴ ﾗa ﾉﾗ┘ WS┌I;デWS ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲ ふけｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ ;ﾐS けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ WaaWIデゲぶ ;ゲ 
these disadvantaged groups will have less resources to draw on to cushion against 
the health effects of unemployment. However, there was less evidence that either 
policy area differentially improves employment outcomes for low educated 
people. It only seems likely that active LMPs will have a stronger effect on the 
employment prospects of low educated people. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
The research strategy in this chapter has two broad stages. First, it examines the evidence for 
the causal pathways described above. It then reflects on the overall health inequalities effects 
of active and passive LMPs and interprets these findings in light of the results from the first 
part of the chapter. The research hypotheses were stated in Chapter Two but the reader is 
reminded of them below.  
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H1:  Higher spending on passive and active LMPs will be associated with less 
depressive symptoms among the unemployed. 
H2:  a. Countries with higher active LMP spending will have lower self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore fewer depressive symptoms. 
b. Countries with higher passive LMP spending will have higher self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore higher depressive symptoms. 
H3:  a. In countries with generous active LMPs, self-reported unemployment will 
be significantly less among low educated people (relative to others). 
Consequently, in countries with generous active LMPs depressive symptoms 
will be significantly less among low educated people. 
b. Each area of LMP spending will be associated with less depressive symptoms 
among both low educated and unemployed people, suggesting differential 
income and process effects. 
H4:  Countries that spend more on active and passive LMPs will have fewer 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
 
Hypothesis 1 refers to income and process effects. Hypotheses 2a and b are concerned with 
the employment effects, while in hypotheses 3a and b the differential impacts are examined 
through employment effects (3a) and income/process effects (3b). Hypothesis 4 is not a 
causal pathway but rather relates to the full effect of LMPs on health inequalities. The 
overriding expectation is that higher spending on both policy areas will be associated with 
less educational inequalities in depressive symptoms. This is based on an overall assessment 
of the impact of these policy areas via the pathways described above.  
 
Variables and Data 
To address each of these research hypotheses various analyses are conducted using three 
waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) which measured depressive symptoms through a 
range of survey questions (2006, 2012 and 2014). The three waves are combined to increase 
statistical power which is particularly important as the sample is reduced at a number of 
points. In the ESS, education is operationalised in the same manner as in SHARE and other 
comparative datasets using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). 
TｴﾗゲW ┘ｷデｴ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ゲWIﾗﾐS;ヴ┞ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ HWﾉﾗ┘ ;ヴW IﾗSWS ;ゲ けﾉﾗ┘げき ヮﾗゲデ-secondary non-
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F8a CARD 49 Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have 
  been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply. PROMPT Which others? 
 
  CODE ALL THAT APPLY 
 
in paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, 
working for your family business)      01 
 
in education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation    02 
 
unemployed and actively looking for a job      03 
 
unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job    04 
 
permanently sick or disabled        05 
 
retired           06 
 
in community or military service58        07 
 
doing housework, looking after children or other persons     08 
 
(other)           09 
(Don’t know)         88 
デWヴデｷ;ヴ┞ ﾗヴ ┌ヮヮWヴ ゲWIﾗﾐS;ヴ┞ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ヴW IﾗSWS ;ゲ けﾏWSｷ┌ﾏげ ┘ｴｷﾉゲデ デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W 
IﾗﾏヮﾉWデWS デWヴデｷ;ヴ┞ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ヴW IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デﾗ ｴ;┗W ; けｴｷｪｴげ ﾉWvel of education. The other 
key variable is labour market status. This is based on the original question in the ESS shown 
in Figure 5.1. 
 













To explore income and process effects, the sample is restricted to include only those that 
answered that they were unemployed (categories 03 or 04) in the above question. While 
active and passive LMPs will be relevant to some other groups (e.g. single parents/sick and 
disabled people), these groups will be affected by a range of other policies. Given the interest 
in causal pathways it makes sense to focus on those whose lives will be most directly shaped 
by these policy areas. The employment status variable is widely used in comparative research 
in this field (e.g. Bambra & Eikemo, 2008; Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Shahidi, Siddiqi, et al., 
2016), however there may be comparability issues which introduce an additional element of 
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uncertainty. For example, in some countries individuals may be more likely to report 
theﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ ;ゲ けヮWヴﾏ;ﾐWﾐデﾉ┞ ゲｷIﾆ ﾗヴ Sｷゲ;HﾉWSげ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ け┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WSげく Tｴｷゲ ﾉｷﾏｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ 
unavoidable given the research interests of the chapter, yet the research findings should be 
interpreted with this in mind. Additional analyses confirmed that there were strong 
correlations between country-level unemployment rates and self-reported unemployment in 
the ESS, making it defensible to use this variable. 
A number of sociodemographic control variables are included: age, age squared, gender, 
marital status (married or not) and country of birth (whether or not born in country of 
interview). These variables were used for the same reason as Chapter Four: to discount 
;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W けﾐﾗﾐ-ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉげ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴWヴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWく A control variable is also included to hold 
constant the effect of changes over time, as this is not of direct interest. This variable 
separates ESS 2006 from 2012/14, thus controlling for the impact of the financial crisis in 
2008.  
Individual-level data from the ESS are combined with contextual variables derived from data 
held by the OECD and Eurostat as described in Chapter Three. The main independent variables 
are total active and passive LMP Expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Following others (Carr 
& Chung, 2014; Hudson & Kühner, 2009; Vis, 2007), these raw expenditures are multiplied by 
100 and then divided by the standardised unemployment rate to produce estimates of the 
percentage of GDP spent on LMPs per 1 per cent standardised unemployment. This improves 
the validity of these expenditure variables as LMP spending tends to increase in line with 
unemployment and this strategy helps standardise the variables net of cross-national 
differences in unemployment rates40く Aﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ｷゲ SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ デｴW けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
W┝ヮWﾐSｷデ┌ヴW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴげが ｷデ ﾐﾗﾐWデｴWﾉWゲゲ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲWゲ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
expenditure data. A number of sensitivity tests are therefore conducted using different 
measures of passive and active LMPs and the results for these are presented at the end of the 
chapter. The process through which these sensitivity variables were operationalised is also 
described in this section (under the chapter sub-ｴW;Sｷﾐｪ け“Wﾐゲｷデｷ┗ｷデ┞ TWゲデゲげぶく   
                                                          
40 While this is the standard procedure for using these variables, further sensitivity checks are conducted where 
the LMP variables are not standardised by the level of unemployment. Instead, unemployment rates are 
included as a control variable in the regression models.  
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In each stage of the analysis, country-level control variables are included in order to discount 
alternative explanations for the effect of LMPs. The most important of these is government 
spending on family policies. A variable is created which represents the average per cent GDP 
each country spends on cash or in-kind benefits and this is matched with each year of the ESS 
(2006, 2012 and 2014). This is likely to be an important factor outside of LMPs which will have 
a bearing on (primarily) female labour market prospects and mental health. Prior research 
generally finds that mental health is better in countries which support women in the labour 
market through generous family policies41. The variable for family policy expenditure is kept 
as a raw coefficient and unlike LMP spending it is not population-standardised. This is because 
the population in receipt of family policy is likely to be diverse and less easily isolated than 
that for LMPs. We can therefore be less confident of the validity of this variable as higher 
spending may indicate higher demand, rather than greater welfare effort.  
Contextual controls are also included for GDP per capita (US$ at fixed Purchasing Power Parity 
2005) and labour market conditions as measured by an index of strictness of employment 
regulation. Each may independently affect mental health and labour market prospects. For 
employment regulation and family policy the most recent available data were for 2013 and 
these are merged with 2014 data from the ESS. All contextual variables are displayed in Table 
5.1 and are separated according to whether they are predictors of substantive interest 
(independent), controls, or used in sensitivity tests. In all the analyses that follow, contextual 







                                                          
41 See for example, Burstrom et al., 2010; Fritzell et al., 2012; Van de Velde, Bambra, Van der Bracht, Eikemo, & 




Table 5.1. Summary of Contextual Variables used in Analysis 
 
Notes: 1 Spending per 1% unemployed (%GDP*100/Unemployment Rate) 2 US$, constant prices, fixed 




Having merged and cleaned these data, the first part of the analysis explores income and 
process effects, associated with passive and active LMPs, respectively. To do this, the ESS 
sample are restricted to those that report themselves as unemployed in either 2006, 2012 or 
2014 and the impact of passive, then active LMPs on depressive symptoms is explored among 
this group42. To check whether these effects are significantly different from the average 
                                                          
42 To do this, three linear regression models are fitted (using the REGRESS command in Stata) each of which uses 
the cluster-robust regression methods described in Chapter Three. The first model introduces an intercept and 
vectors for socio-demographic characteristics, education, passive LMPs and policy control variables に GDP, 
employment regulation and family policy. Model 2 then examines the effect for active LMP spending, while 
Model 3 includes variables for both passive and active LMP spending. 
 
The final model is as follows: 





Active LMPs1 Eurostat - DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
Passive LMP1 Eurostat - DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
  
Control  
GDP Per Capita2 OECD Statistics 
Employment Protection index OECD Statistics 
Family Policy3 OECD Social Expenditure Database 
  
Sensitivity  
Short Term Replacement Rates OECD Benefits and Wages Database 
Long Term Replacement Rates OECD Benefits and Wages Database 
Benefit duration OECD Benefits and Wages Database 
Active LMPs (PES)1 Eurostat - DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 




population effect, models are fitted that include the whole population and an interaction 
term with LMPs and employment status43.  
TｴW ﾐW┝デ ゲデ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWゲ デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa 
LMPs (i.e. the impact of LMPs on depressive symptoms via unemployment). Two aspects of 
the analysis are presented in the main body of the chapter (with other parts in the Appendix). 
First, results are reported from logit models that predict the likelihood of someone reporting 
their employment status as unemployed, depending on the level of LMP spending44. Here, 
Odds Ratios are reported where a value <1 = a lower risk of unemployment and a value >1 = 
a higher risk45. In the case of the policy variables that are measured continuously, Odds Ratios 
refer to the change in the odds of an individual reporting unemployment with each one unit 
standard deviation change in policy generosity. Second, the chapter presents results from the 
mediation analysis (total, indirect and direct effects). To calculate the indirect effect of LMPs 
through self-ヴWヮﾗヴデWS ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ デｴW けヮヴﾗS┌Iデ ﾗa IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデゲげ ﾏWデｴﾗS ｷゲ ┌ゲWS ふ;ゲ 
described in Chapter Three).  
TｴW aﾗ┌ヴデｴ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デWS ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ｷゲ デｴW けSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲげ ﾗa LMPゲ H┞ 
education level via the three above effects. First, consideration is given to the differential 
                                                          
ぐ┘ｴWヴW デｴW data has a structure of i 噺 な ┼ n individuals nested in j 噺 な ┼ N countries. The outcome is a 
continuous measure of depressive symptoms (DEPRESS辿棚岻 and the model includes an intercept (が待套宕岻, a vector 
for socio-demographic characteristics 岫が怠DEM辿棚岻, education 岫が態EDU辿棚岻, passive LMP spending 岫が戴PLMP棚岻┸ active 
LMP spending 岫が替ALMP棚岻, policy controls 岫が泰POLICY棚岻 and survey wave (が滞WAVE). The model also contains an 
error term (鉛辿棚岻┻ 
 
43 The model here is as above, except it applies to the entire working age population and includes two further 
interaction effects 盤が滞EMP辿棚 茅 が胎PLMP棚匪 and (が腿EMP辿棚 茅 が苔ALMP棚岻. These (respectively) denote the differential 
effect of passive and active LMPs on depressive symptoms for employed vs unemployed persons. 
 
44 Here, the LOGISTIC function on Stata is used to calculate the probability of unemployment as: 
 Pr盤UNEMP 噺 な弁x辿棚匪 噺 �淡┅痴岫な 髪 �淡┅痴岻 噺 lo�it岫x┅が岻 
 
The full model is expressed below where both LMP variables are included in the logit regression: 
 Pr盤UNEMP 噺 な弁x辿棚匪 噺 Lo�it岫が待套宕 髪  が怠DEM辿棚 髪 が態EDU辿棚 髪 が戴PLMP棚 髪 が替ALMP 髪 が泰POLICY棚 髪 が滞WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚岻 
ぐ┘ｴWヴW デｴW ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏW ｷゲ デｴW ヮヴﾗH;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ ;ゲ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ふUNEMP岻. 
45 Odds Ratios are calculated in Stata as: 
椎迭【岫怠貸椎迭岻椎鉄【岫怠貸椎鉄岻  ┻ 
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impacts of LMPs via employment. To do this, the sample is first restricted to those that are 
ﾉﾗ┘ WS┌I;デWSく TｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ;ヴW デｴWﾐ I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デWS ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾏWSｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ｷﾐ デｴW 
same way as before. The final parameters of interest are therefore the total, direct and 
indirect effect of LMPs via employment effects, for low educated people. There is no direct 
statistical method for calculating the differential impacts of income or process effects. To 
properly examine this statistically would require a three-way interaction term between 
LMPs*education*employment status. However, this cannot be achieved due to issues of low 
statistical power46. Yet it is possible to draw some conclusions about this by exploring both 
the effect of LMPs on depressive symptoms among low educated people and the effect 
among unemployed people. Therefore, the final stage in the analysis examines the 
relationship between LMPs and educational inequalities in depressive symptoms and 
compares this with the impact on unemployed people, (as shown in the income and process 
effects, above). To do this, a linear regression model is fitted where the outcome に depressive 
symptoms に is regressed on to two interaction terms: education*passive LMP spending and 
education*active LMP spending47.   
This last stage in the analysis also allows us to draw conclusions about the full effects of LMPs 
on health inequalities and to interpret this in light of the evidence around the four causal 
pathways described above. The results around LMPs and educational inequalities in 
depressive symptoms are therefore scrutinised in terms of the fourth research hypothesis 
                                                          
46 Within the total sample there are 1,596 low educated vs 682 high educated unemployed people. It would not 
then be possible to split these groups in to 41 different categories as would be the requirement with the active 
and passive LMP variables and draw any statistically meaningful conclusions from this. 
 
47 Model 1 includes covariates for passive and active LMP spending, alongside individual and contextual control 
variables. Models 2 and 3 include interaction terms for education and passive and active LMP spending, 
respectively. Model 4 controls for both interaction effects at the same time. Last, model 5 controls for all 
covariates, both LMP interaction effects, alongside an interaction effect for GDP and education. This final vector 
is brought in to check that the differential effect of these policy variables is not simply a reflection of societal 
wealth. The final model (5) is as follows, where 鉛辿棚 represents a random error term.  
 DEPRESS辿棚 噺  が待套宕 髪 が怠DEM辿棚 髪 が態EDU辿棚 髪 が戴PLMP棚 髪  が替ALMP棚 髪 が泰POLICY棚 髪 が滞EDU辿棚 茅 が胎PLMP棚髪  が腿EDU辿棚 茅 が苔ALMP棚 髪 が怠待EDU辿棚 茅 が怠怠GDP棚 髪 が怠態WAVE 髪  鉛辿棚 
 
ぐ┘ｴWヴW ;ﾉﾉ variables are as before in the previous model except two interaction terms for education and passive 
LMPs 岫が滞EDU辿棚 茅 が胎PLMP棚岻 and education and active LMPs 岫が腿EDU辿棚 茅 が苔ALMP棚岻 and an interaction for 
education and GDP (が怠待EDU辿棚 茅 が怠怠GDP棚岻┻ 
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ふゲデ;デWS ｷﾐ け‘WゲW;ヴIｴ DWゲｷｪﾐ ;ﾐS MWデｴﾗSゲげぶ ;ﾐS デｴW Iｴ;ヮデWヴ WﾐSゲ H┞ ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW Iausality 




In Table 5.2, frequencies for all participating countries are displayed. The total sample size 
was 61,380 with 43 observations at the country level. Each country had observations in at 
least two years, with the exception of Great Britain, Hungary and Italy. Italy was 
underrepresented with only 726 observations. Sample sizes were nonetheless large enough 
in Italy to permit inclusion of this country in the analysis. 
Table 5.2. Countries in ESS waves 2006, 2012, 2014 
Country 2006 2012 2014 Total 
Austria 1,934 0 1,338 3,272 
Belgium 1,357 1,405 1,329 4,091 
Czech Rep. 0 1,514 1,653 3,167 
Germany 2,170 2,156 2,197 6,523 
Denmark 1,161 1,194 1,093 3,448 
Estonia 0 1,698 1,464 3,162 
Spain 1,439 1,469 0 2,908 
Finland 1,388 1,573 1,438 4,399 
France 0 1,393 1,383 2,776 
Great Britain 1,729 0 0 1,729 
Hungary 0 1,571 0 1,571 
Ireland 1,295 2,046 0 3,341 
Italy 0 726 0 726 
Netherlands 0 1,332 1,370 2,702 
Norway 1,395 1,267 1,072 3,734 
Poland 1,345 1,479 1,236 4,060 
Portugal 0 1,470 804 2,274 
Sweden 0 1,340 1,245 2,585 
Slovenia 1,099 947 0 2,046 
Slovakia 1,420 1,446 0 2,866 
Total 17,732 26,026 17,622 61,380 
 
In Table 5.3, proportions, averages and Ns are reported for the three key individual-level 
variables: depressive symptoms, education and employment status. In each case, missing 
data were below 2 per cent. The mean CES-D score was 5.35 and this was mostly clustered 
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around the lower end of the scale (with a standard deviation of 3.93). The distribution of CES-
D is shown in a histogram in Figure 5.2. As with EURO-D in the previous chapter, we can 
similarly see a strong positive skew to the CES-D variable, reflecting the fact that most 
respondents report reasonably good mental health. Table 5.3 also shows the representation 
of the three education groups in the sample. The low educated were the smallest group, 
although they still constituted one-fifth of the sample. The dummy variable for unemployed 
is also shown in Table 5.3 with those unemployed in any of the three years representing 7.7 
per cent of the sample (approximately 4,700 people). 
 
Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Variables 
Variable Statistics 
Depressive Symptoms  
Mean 5.4 
Standard Deviation 3.9 
N (Non-Missing) 60156 
  
Education  
% Low 20.6 
% Medium 53.0 
% High 25.9 
N (Non-Missing) 61068 
  
Employment Status  
% Not Unemployed 92.3 
% Unemployed 7.7 
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Descriptive statistics for the five contextual variables which were used in the main parts of 
the analysis are shown in Table 5.4. The values for each of these across countries are displayed 
in Appendix B, Table B1. Mean active LMP spending was lower than passive LMPs (9.8 vs 14.3 
per cent GDP per 1 per cent unemployed, respectively). This may be the legacy of a more 
デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗Wげ aﾗI┌ゲ ｷﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞が ┘ｴｷﾉW ｷﾐ ﾏﾗゲデ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ ;Iデｷ┗W LMPゲ ;ヴW ; 
more recent phenomenon. It also will reflect the fact that it is expensive to support 
unemployed persons to meet the costs of living. Nevertheless, for both kinds of LMPs there 
was considerable variation in the levels of spending across European countries. For both kinds 
of LMP there was complete data for all countries in all years (43 observations).  
The mean and spread of the three control variables is also shown in Table 5.4. For 
employment regulation, there tended to be less variation than for LMPs. Gross Domestic 
Product per capita varied to a greater extent across countries in the sample. One value was 
missing for family policy に Poland in 2014. While there appears to be less variation in family 
policies than for the LMP variables this is because family policy spending values are expressed 
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as raw (per cent GDP) data rather than spending per 1 per cent unemployed, as described 
earlier.  
 Table 5.4. Descriptive Statistics for Contextual Variables 
 
Notes: 1Percentage of GDP*100/Standardised Unemployment Rate (% GDP per 1% Unemployed) 2 Per 
Capita, constant PPPs and prices, OECD base year 2010 3 %GDP on cash and in-kind family benefits, 4 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection Index. 
 
In the forthcoming regression analyses, controls are included for both areas of LMP spending 
within the same models. This helps divorce the effects of one aspect of LMP spending from 
the other. This is important as it may be that countries that spend more on one form of LMP 
tend to also spend more on the other and it might therefore be difficult to explore one net of 
the other. Figure 5.3 explores whether this is the case, descriptively, through plotting the 
correlation between average (2006, 2012 and 2014) levels of passive and active LMP 
expenditure. The graph shows a strong positive correlation between both areas of spending; 
however, this may be partly driven by Denmark which is an outlier with very high active and 
passive spending. Other countries such as Norway and Sweden spend a considerable amount 
on active LMPs but a comparatively lower amount on passive LMPs. In contrast, the central 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany and France) have more generous passive 
LMPs, while their active spending is around average.  
Overall, this graph confirms that there is a general tendency for countries to spend higher 
amounts on both forms of LMP. However, the picture is more complex and the exact 
configuration of active vs passive spending varies across countries, linked to historical welfare 
traditions within countries. There are times when this close correlation leads to issues of 
confounding. Yet overall there is sufficient variation in active/passive spending across 











Mean 9.8 14.3 36401.1 2.4 2.3 
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Active LMP Spending per 1% Unemployed
Figure 5.3. Relationship between Active and Passive Labour Market 














Income and Process Effects of Labour Market Policies 
The first stage of the analysis looks at the impact on health of LMPs via income and process 
effects by examining the effect of passive and active LMPs on depressive symptoms among 
unemployed people. Specifically, it investigates the following research hypothesis: 
H1:  Higher spending on passive and active LMPs will be associated with less 
depressive symptoms among the unemployed. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that passive LMPs have a negative and (reasonably) substantial impact on 
depressive symptoms among unemployed people48 (in model 3: 紅 噺  伐ど┻ねぱ┸ 喧 噺 ど┻どな). This 
                                                          
48 This and all subsequent regression models control for socio-demographics (age, age squared, gender, whether 
or not born in the country, marital status, education), policy variables (family policy, employment regulation and 
GDP) and the survey wave. All variables were associated with the outcome at p<0.01. Full coefficients are shown 
in the tables in Appendix B. 
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is the case in model 1, when controlling for individual and contextual confounders and holds 
in model 3, when both active and passive LMP spending are included in the same model. 
Moreover, passive LMP spending seems to be a stronger predictor of depressive symptoms 
among the unemployed than GDP. In fact, the effect of GDP seems to be explained by passive 
LMP spending as the coefficient reduces substantially between models 2 and 3 (紅 噺 伐ど┻のの and 伐ど┻ぬに┸ respectively) and the 喧 value for GDP rises from ど┻どの to 0.23. This provides 
evidence of a causal pathway in support of the first research hypothesis and implies that the 
level of income and income security available to the unemployed is an important moderator 
of the negative health effects of unemployment.  
 
Table 5.5. Impact of Labour Market Policies on Depressive Symptoms among 














NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models 1-3 control for age, age squared, gender, marital status, whether or not 
born in country, year. 
 
Variable M1 M2 M3 
    
Education    
  High (ref.) 0 0 0 
    Medium 0.56* 0.60* 0.56* 
    Low 1.49** 1.49** 1.50** 
    
Labour Market Policies    
  Passive -0.45**  -0.48** 
  Active   -0.11 0.10 
    
Other Context    
  Family Policy 0.06 0.15 0.03 
  GDP -0.29 -0.55+ -0.32 
  Employment Reg. 0.20* 0.21* 0.18+ 
    
n 4343 4343 4343 
N 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.07 
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In contrast, active LMP spending is not related with depressive symptoms among the 
unemployed at any acceptable levels of significance 岫喧 伴 ど┻のど in models 2 and 3). This finding 
is somewhat at odds with much of the wider literature that shows strong mental health 
benefits of active LMPs, compared with open unemployment (reviewed in Chapter Two). 
Instead, it suggests that active LMPs are not causally-related with mental health among on 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ヮWﾗヮﾉW ふｷくWく デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデげぶく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ｷデ ｷゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ 
plausible that this finding reflects a methodological limitation. Research generally finds that 
mental health effects of participation in an active labour market programme are highly 
variable depending on the quality of the programme. As others commentators note (Clasen 
et al., 2016), aggregate measures of active LMP spending do not capture this variability. In 
other words, the measure of active LMP spending used here may be simply too crude to 
uncover health effects associated with participation in labour market activation programmes. 
This is a limitation throughout the chapter, reflecting a wider issue in the social expenditure 
literature. Sensitivity tests at the end of the chapter use alternative measures of active LMP 
spending which try to overcome this. 
Overall, the findings from Table 5.5 provide reasonable evidence in favour of a causal pathway 
connecting passive LMPs with health inequalities ┗ｷ; けｷﾐIﾗﾏW WaaWIデゲげ, while there appears to 
be no W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ effectげ of active LMPs. There are also indications from Table 5.5 
that countries with tighter employment regulations may have worse mental health among 
the unemployed, possibly because more regulated labour markets have higher 
unemployment. However, this effect is relatively weak and carries some statistical 
uncertainty (紅 噺 ど┻なぱ┸ 喧 噺 ど┻どひ in mod�l ぬ岻.  
The key finding around passive LMP spending is further supported in supplementary analysis, 
the full results of which are available in Appendix B, Table B2. Here, the modelling strategy is 
identical to that in Table 5.5, with the important difference that the analysis included the 
whole sample population and was based on an interaction between LMPs and employment 
status. In Table B2, model 3 which interacted both active and passive LMP spending with 
employment status, as well as GDP, the interaction effect of passive LMPs and unemployed 
was significant (喧 噺 ど┻どの岻 while the p-values for both other interaction effects were too high 
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effect was stronger among unemployed relative to employed people. Marginal predicted 
probabilities for this effect are shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4. the Impact of Passive LMP Spending on Depressive Symptoms for  











Notes: Based on the interaction effect for Passive LMP*Employment Status in Appendix B, Table B.2, 
model 3. Controls for all individual and contextual covariates and interactions between active 
LMPs*employment status and GDP*employment status. 
 
The above figure shows a clear difference in the effect of passive LMPs between employed 
and unemployed people. The slope is steeper for unemployed than employed people, where 
in the least generous countries the mental health gap between employed and unemployed is 
approximately 1.75 points on the CES-D scale, compared to less than 1 point in the most 
generous countries. This stage in the analysis therefore lends further support to the idea that 
passive LMP spending matters for depressive symptoms among the unemployed, while active 





This section examines the second causal pathway, evaluating whether LMPs have an impact 
on employment outcomes, with consequences for depressive symptoms. Specifically, it 
considers hypotheses 2a and b: 
H2:  a. Countries with higher active LMP spending will have lower self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore fewer depressive symptoms. 
b. Countries with higher passive LMP spending will have higher self-reported 
unemployment, and therefore higher depressive symptoms. 
 
There are three steps to this part of the analysis. First, I examine the relationship between 
country-level expenditure on LMPs and self-reported unemployment, where the latter is a 
binary outcome based on whether someone reports their employment status as unemployed 
or not. Second, I explore the relationship between self-reported unemployment and 
depressive symptoms. Third, I multiply the coefficients from these two stages of the analysis 
in order to quantify the relationship between LMP expenditure and depressive symptoms via 
self-reported unemployment. 
Table 5.6 uses logistic regression techniques to explore the relationship between LMP 
spending and self-reported unemployment. Model 1 shows the effect of passive LMPs, model 
2 introduces the variable for active LMPs and model 3 includes both variables in the same 
model. In each case, individual and policy confounders are included. Odds ratios are reported 
throughout, where a value > 1 represents higher odds of unemployment and a value <1 is 








Table 5.6. Relationship between country-level LMP Expenditure and self-
reported Unemployment, Odds Ratios 
Variable M1 M2 M3 
Education (ref: High)    
  Medium 1.52** 1.51** 1.51** 
  Low 2.99** 2.97** 2.90** 
    
Policy    
  Passive LMP 1.06  1.27** 
  Active LMP  0.68* 0.59** 
  Family Policy 1.00 1.11 1.19* 
  Employment Regulation 0.75** 0.98 0.90 
  GDP 0.99 1.09 1.12 
    
N 57817 57817 57817 
N 41 41 41 
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models 1-3 control for age, age squared, gender, marital status, whether or not 
born in country, year. 
 
Model 1 shows that country-level expenditure on passive LMPs does not have a statistically 
significant impact on the odds of someone reporting themselves as unemployed (Odds 
Ratio┺ な┻どは┸ 喧 噺 ど┻のど岻. In contrast, model 2 shows that one standard deviation increase in 
active LMP spending is associated with a 31 per cent49 lower odds of someone reporting 
themselves as unemployed (p <0.05). In the final model, the odds ratio for active LMPs 
decreases, suggesting that one standard deviation increase in spending is associated with 41 
per cent lower odds of unemployment (p=0.00), after controlling for these other areas of 
expenditure. However, higher spending on both passive LMPs and family policies seems also 
to be associated with higher unemployment in this model. This strongly suggests a 
suppression effect as the effect of active LMP spending rises, where it should otherwise fall 
with the inclusion of confounders (MacKinnon et al., 2000). This is perhaps unsurprising given 
the strong correlation between active and passive LMP spending shown in Figure 5.3. Overall, 
                                                          




given this possible confounding we can be only reasonably confident of these results. 
Countries that spend more on active LMPs have less unemployment although this relationship 
changes when we account for country-level expenditure on passive LMPs.  
To understand whether these findings translate in to effects on depressive symptoms, it is 
first necessary to explore the relationship in the ESS between self-reported unemployment 
and depressive symptoms. There is abundant evidence that unemployment is detrimental to 
mental health (cf. Paul & Moser, 2009). To check that this holds in the ESS, models are fitted 
which regress depressive symptoms on self-reported unemployment, controlling for the 
effect of LMPs. Results from these regressions are shown in Appendix B, Table B3. This table 
shows that unemployed people have an average score of approximately 1.26 more on the 
scale of depressive symptoms than employed people, controlling for all other individual and 
contextual variables. Therefore, despite some possible methodological issues with the 
relationship between active LMPs and self-reported unemployment, these first two stages of 
the analysis provide sufficient evidence to expect LMPs to exert an influence on depressive 
symptoms through their effects on employment status.  
To examine this, Table 5.7 reports the key findings ﾗa ; けヮヴﾗS┌Iデゲ ﾗa IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデゲげ ﾏWSｷ;デｷﾗﾐ 
analysis. Coefficients with bootstrapped confidence intervals are presented for indirect, 
direct and total effects of LMPs on depressive symptoms, where the key parameter of interest 
is the indirect effects. The indirect effects are the products of coefficients for the impact of: i) 
active and passive LMPs on self-reported unemployment (Table 5.6, model 3) and ii) self-
reported unemployed on depressive symptoms. For every one standard deviation rise in 
active LMP spending, individuals report 0.04 less depressive symptoms as a result of 
reductions in unemployment (紅 噺 伐ど┻どぬば┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐 ど┻どばど┸ 伐ど┻どどね岻 although the upper 
bound of the bootstrapped confidence interval is close enough to zero to suggest that this 
effect may be small. Conversely, individuals in countries with higher spending on passive LMPs 
report more depressive symptoms, due to a higher incidence of unemployment in these 
countries, although this effect is even weaker than that of active LMPs and even more likely 




Table 5.7. Mediated effect of LMPs on depressive symptoms via self-reported 
unemployment, Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals. 
Type of Labour 
Market Policy Effect 試 (95% CI) 
Active 
Indirect Effect via level of 
Unemployment 岫珊産岻 -0.037* (-0.070, -0.004)1 
 Direct Effect net of Unemployment 岫算岻 0.078   (-0.225, 0.381) 
 Total Effect 岫珊産 髪 算岻 0.041 (-0.261, 0.342) 
Passive 
Indirect Effect via level of 
Unemployment 岫珊産岻 0.016* (0.001, 0.031) 
 Direct Effect net of Unemployment 岫算岻 -0.198* (-0.378, -0.021) 
 Total Effect 岫珊産 髪 算岻 -0.183* (-0.360, -0.006) 
 
NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. All coefficients control for all individual and contextual covariates. 1Confidence 
Intervals are bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates with 1000 repetitions. 
 
It is also worth looking at the direct and total effects to understand more about the 
mechanisms involved. The direct effect for passive LMPs shows that the negative relationship 
between passive LMP spending and depressive symptoms becomes less when we account for 
the indirect effect of passive LMPs via employment status. Interestingly, the direct effect of 
passive LMPs に that which is through other non-employment related pathways に is substantial 
(紅 噺  伐ど┻なひぱ┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐 ど┻ぬばぱ┸ 伐ど┻どにな岻┸ although there remains uncertainty around the 
magnitude of this effect. Some of this effect may represent non-employment related 
connections between passive LMPs and depressive symptoms, potentially including the 
income effects identified in the last section. 
The total effect in Table 5.7 of active LMP spending suggests that on average higher spending 
is non-significantly related with depressive symptoms, as shown by a wide bootstrapped 
confidence interval which contains zero 岫紅 噺 ど┻どねな┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐 ど┻にはな┸ ど┻ぬねに岻. Conversely, 
countries that spend more on passive LMPs have significantly less depressive symptoms, 
although the Upper Bound of the confidence interval similarly suggests this is a weak, 
potentially non-significant effect (紅 噺  伐ど┻なぱぬ┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐 ど┻ぬはど┸ 伐ど┻どどは岻. Reassuringly, 
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these findings are corroborated in later analysis of the overall impact of LMPs on educational 
inequalities in depressive symptoms (see Table 5.10). 
In sum, there is some evidence that countries that spend more on active LMPs have less 
depressive symptoms as a result of employment effects (as suggested by a negative 
relationship between active LMP spending and self-reported unemployment). On the other 
hand, there were indications that individuals in countries that spent more on passive LMPs 
had worse mental health as a result of higher self-reported unemployment in these countries. 
There is therefore weak empirical support for hypotheses 2a and b. In all cases, the size of 
these effects were small and the bias-corrected confidence intervals were often wide and 
close to zero, indicating that we should be cautious in our interpretation of these findings. 
Moreover, there were signs of suppression effects when employment status was regressed 
on to LMP expenditure in Table 5.6, urging further caution in our reading of these results. 
 
The differential impact of LMPs by education level 
The next part of this chapter evaluates the differential impact of LMPs via the three causal 
pathways described above for low educated people, as explained in the first part of this 
chapter. Specifically, it assesses the evidence for the following hypotheses: 
H3: a. In countries with generous active LMPs, self-reported unemployment will be 
significantly less among low educated people (relative to others). 
Consequently, in countries with generous active LMPs depressive symptoms 
will be significantly less among low educated people. 
 
b. Each area of LMP spending will be associated with less depressive symptoms 
among both low educated and unemployed people, suggesting differential 
income and process effects. 
 
This is explored empirically in the way outlined in the methods section. First, we observe 
whether there is a relationship between the amount that countries spend on active and 
passive LMPs and the likelihood that someone reports themselves as unemployed and 
whether this is different for low educated people (using an interaction of LMP*education). If 
the effect of LMP spending on unemployment varies by education, we can similarly expect a 
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varying effect on depressive symptoms. To be more confident of this differential impact, the 
ESS sample population are restricted to those that are low educated and the same mediation 
analysis is conducted50 as in the previous section.  
The three models in Table 5.8 explore (respectively) the relationship between passive, active 
and passive/active/family policies and self-reported unemployment by education level (low, 
medium, high). An interaction between family policy and education was included in the final 
model as the average effect of family policies was statistically significant and substantial in 
models 1 and 2. In the first two models there are significant differences across education 
groups in the relationship between active and passive LMP spending and unemployment, 
however in model 3 the effect of active LMPs among the low educated becomes weaker (紅 噺ど┻ぱぱ) and the interaction becomes non-significant 岫喧 噺 ど┻のは岻. In model 3, educational 
differences in the effects of the policy variables seem to be accounted for by passive LMPs 
and family policies, both of which are significant at p<0.05. As with before, there seems to be 













                                                          
50 The only difference here is that to account for the smaller sample size the bootstrapped confidence intervals 
are based on 2000 rather than 1000 replications.  
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Table 5.8. Relationship between LMP expenditure and Self-Reported 
Unemployment by Education Level, Odds Ratios. 
Variable M1 M2 M3 
Education (ref: High)    
  Medium 1.48** 1.45** 1.47** 
  Low 2.87** 2.73** 2.78** 
    
Policy    
  Employment Regulation 1.13 1.12 1.12 
  GDP 0.90 0.89 0.90 
  Family Policy 1.21* 1.21* 1.08 
    High Ed.*Family (ref.)   - 
    Med Ed.*Family   1.19** 
    Low Ed.*Family   1.10 
Education*LMPs    
  Passive LMP 1.51** 1.25** 1.49** 
  High*Passive (ref.)1    
    Med*Passive 0.80**  0.78** 
    Low *Passive 0.78**  0.83+ 
  Active LMP 0.60** 0.68* 0.63* 
  High*Active (ref.)2 
   
    Med*Active  0.91 0.99 
    Low*Active  0.81* 0.88 
N 57817 57817 57817 
N 41 41 41 
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models 1-3 control for age, age squared, gender, marital status, whether or not 
born in country, year. 1Interaction is significant at p<0.05 in all models. 2Interaction is significant at 
p<0.05 in model 2, non-significant (p=0.52) in model 3. 
 
The interactions from Table 5.8, model 3 for passive, then active LMPs are shown as marginal 
values in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, respectively. Both figures show (average) trends for all 
education groups that reflect those in model 3, Table 5.6, i.e. countries that spend more on 
passive LMPs have higher self-reported unemployment, while those with more generous 
active LMPs have less. While in Figure 5.5 low educated people have a higher predicted 
probability of unemployment on average, there does not appear to be a statistically 
significant difference between low vs high educated people in the effects of passive LMP 
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a whole, the difference between low vs high educated people was small and only significant 
at the p<0.10 level. 
 













 Notes: Marginal values based on Interaction of Passive LMP*Education in Model 3, Table 5.8. 
 
In contrast, Figure 5.6 shows that the risk of unemployment declines dramatically as countries 
increase their spending on active LMPs. Unlike with passive spending, this effect seems to be 
greatest among the low educated where there is (approximately) a 20 per cent difference in 
the probability of low educated people reporting themselves as unemployed in the most 
compared with the least generous countries. However, these differences across education 
groups carry more error in Figure 5.6, as shown by the wider confidence intervals. Also, the 
effect size is larger than we might plausibly expect, potentially cautioning that there may be 
methodological issues with this finding. There are a number of issues with the active LMP 
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more of these issues may be impacting on the reliability of these results. The robustness of 
these results is examined further in sensitivity tests at the end of the chapter. 
 











Notes: Marginal values based on Odds Ratio for Active LMP*Education in Model 3, Table 5.8. 
 
To see whether these differential employment effects translate in to differential health 
WaaWIデゲが ┘W ヴWヮﾉｷI;デW デｴW けヮヴﾗS┌Iデゲ ﾗa IﾗWaaｷIｷWﾐデゲげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ┌ゲWS in Table 5.7 with a sub-
sample of the data: only those that are low educated (n=12,629). This provides an indication 
of the differential impact of LMPs via unemployment for low educated people. However, 
conclusions are drawn cautiously as time and space did not permit an analysis of whether the 
effect was significantly greater for low vs high educated people.  
The results are displayed in Table 5.9. The analysis suggests that countries that spend more 
on active LMPs have a stronger effect on the employment outcomes of low educated people 
(i.e. by making this group less likely to be unemployed), resulting in greater reductions in 
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depressive symptoms among this group (紅 噺  伐ど┻どはに┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐ど┻ななな┸ 伐ど┻どにぱ岻. This effect 
is greater than the average population effect shown in Table 5.7, suggesting that countries 
with higher active LMP spending have a greater health effect via employment outcomes for 
low educated people. In Table 5.9, the upper-bound of the bootstrapped confidence interval 
for the active LMP indirect effect is also further away from zero (-0.03), making us more 
confident that this is a true population-wide effect, albeit small.  
Conversely, there is evidence that low educated respondents in countries with more generous 
passive LMPs are more likely to be unemployed and suffer unemployment-related depressive 
symptoms, than the rest of the population. This is evidenced through the stronger positive 
relationship between passive LMPs and depressive symptoms via unemployment 岫紅 噺ど┻どにの岻, compared with that in Table 5.7 (紅 噺 ど┻どなぱ岻, although again the confidence interval 
suggests that this effect may be small or non-significantly different from zero 















Table 5.9. Mediated Effect of LMPs on Depressive Symptoms via Self-
Reported Unemployment for Low Educated Respondents (N=12,629) 
Type of Labour 
Market Policy Effect Low Educated 試 (95% CI) 
Active Indirect Effect via level of Unemployment 岫珊産岻 -0.062** (-0.111, -0.028)1 
 Direct Effect net of Unemployment 岫算岻 -0.075 (-0.465, 0.329) 
 Total Effect 岫珊産 髪 算岻 -0.137 (-0.540, 0.249) 
Passive Indirect Effect via level of Unemployment 岫珊産岻 0.025* (0.005, 0.053) 
 Direct Effect net of Unemployment 岫算岻 -0.043 (-0.379, 0.172) 
 Total Effect 岫珊産 髪 算岻 -0.018 (-0.343, 0.195) 
 
Notes: Data taken from European Social Survey 2006, 2012, 2014. All models include all individual, 
contextual and policy control variables.  1Confidence Intervals are bias-corrected bootstrapped 
Wゲデｷﾏ;デWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ヲヰヰヰ ヴWヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐゲく ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ ヮаヰくヰヵが ゅゅ ヮаヰくヰヱく 
 
TｴW けデﾗデ;ﾉ WaaWIデげ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデゲ デｴW ｷﾏpact of LMPs on depressive symptoms via education. While 
both coefficients were negative, for both active and passive LMPs confidence intervals were 
wide and contained zero. There is therefore no indication that countries with more generous 
LMPs have less depressive symptoms among low educated people. This is explored further in 
the last part of the chapter. 
Overall, there is some evidence in favour of hypothesis 3a: low educated individuals in 
countries that spent more on active LMPs tended to be less likely to report themselves as 
unemployed and consequently reported less depressive symptoms. The opposite was true for 
low educated individuals in countries that spent more on passive LMPs, although this effect 
carried a greater degree of error. Yet these conclusions are drawn cautiously for two reasons: 
i) the earlier analysis suggested that there may be some methodological problems with 
exploring the relationship between active LMPs and self-reported unemployment and ii) it 
was not possible to explore whether there were statistically significant differences in the 




Finally, evidence is assessed in relation to the differential impact of LMPs via income and 
ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲく Iﾐ T;HﾉW ヵくヵが W┗ｷSWﾐIW ┘;ゲ aﾗ┌ﾐS aﾗヴ ;ﾐ けｷﾐIﾗﾏW WaaWIデげぎ ｷﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ デｴ;デ 
spent more on passive LMPs, unemployed people tended to report less depressive symptoms 
(紅 噺 -0.48**ぶく YWデ デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ ; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデげ ﾗa ;Iデｷ┗W LMPゲ ふ紅 噺 ど┻など). For 
suggestive evidence of a differential impact of LMPs through these two pathways, we would 
expect countries that spent more on passive and active LMPs to have fewer depressive 
symptoms among both unemployed and low educated people. To examine the second of 
these relationships, Table 5.10 reports results from a regression model which explores the 
impact of LMPs via education. 
Model 1 is the average effect of both areas of LMP expenditure on depressive symptoms, for 
both low- and high-educated people. It shows that greater passive LMP spending is negatively 
correlated with lower depressive symptoms in the population at large, although this effect is 
considerably less than that of GDP. Active LMP spending is very weakly positively correlated 
with depressive symptoms, although this is at a level far beyond statistical significance 
(p=0.70). Models 2- 5 are of more direct interest as they investigate the impact of LMPs via 
education. These three models interact passive (M2), then active (M3) labour market 
spending with education, include both interactions in the same model (M4) and include both 












Table 5.10. Impact of Labour Market Policies on Educational Inequalities in 
Depressive Symptoms (CES-D)51. 
 
NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Models 1-5 control for age, age squared, gender, marital status, whether or not 
born in country, year.  1 Interaction in model 5 is non-significant. 
 
In models 2 to 4, passive LMPs did not have a differential impact on low or medium educated 
people. Yet the effect of active LMPs was significantly greater among low and medium, 
relative to high educated people. However, when the GDP*education interaction was 
included in model 5, the effect of active LMPs became non-significant, suggesting that this 
effect was explained by GDP. In model 5, the coefficient for active LMP*low educated was 
                                                          
51 A full table with all control variables is available in Appendix B, Table B4. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
      
Education (ref: High)      
  Medium 0.55** 0.55** 0.56** 0.56** 0.57** 
  Low 1.32** 1.32** 1.32** 1.30** 1.31** 
      
Policy controls      
  Family Policy -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  Employment Reg. 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
  GDP Per Capita -0.55** -0.54** -0.54** -0.55** -0.43** 
  High Ed.*GDP (ref.)1      
     Med Ed.*GDP     -0.15+ 
     Low Ed.*GDP     -0.18 
      
LMPs      
  Passive LMP -0.19* -0.12 -0.18* -0.22** -0.21* 
  High Ed. *Passive (ref.)1 
   
  
    Med*Passive  -0.11  -0.01 -0.01 
    Low*Passive  -0.05  0.17 0.16 
  Active LMP 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.20ゆ 0.11 
  High Ed.*Active (ref.)1 
 
    
    Med*Active    -0.15* -0.15** -0.04 
    Low*Active   -0.20* -0.32** -0.20 
N (individuals) 57038 57038 57038 57038 57038 
N (country-waves) 41 41 41 41 41 
R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
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negative, albeit beyond conventional standards of significance (in model 5 紅 噺 伐ど┻にど┸ 喧 噺ど┻なに岻. However, there continues to be a statistically significant (negative) effect of passive 
LMPs, yet this seems to be concentrated among high educated people 岫紅 噺  伐ど┻にな┸ 喧 噺ど┻どな in mod�l ぬ岻┻ This unusual finding is discussed further in the next section.  
Hence, there is no clear evidence that LMPs have a differential impact on low educated 
unemployed people (via income or process effects). While passive LMPs had a significantly 
greater impact on depressive symptoms among unemployed compared with employed 
people, this was not the case for low vs high educated people. There was even less evidence 
of a differential impact via process effects (i.e. the effect on mental health for currently 
unemployed people) as active LMPs did not have a significantly greater effect on the mental 
health of either low educated or unemployed people. Further investigation of these pathways 
is required, using more direct methods to provide more convincing evidence of causality. 
 
The Impact of Labour Market Policies on Inequalities in Depressive Symptoms 
The final part of this chapter reflects at greater length on the results in Table 5.10. This thesis 
has treated education as an underlying indicator of social status. Therefore, the results from 
this table can be underゲデﾗﾗS ;ゲ デｴW けﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデげ ﾗa LMPゲ ﾗﾐ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲく A aﾗ┌ヴデｴ 
research hypothesis was proposed in relation to this: 
H4:  Countries that spend more on active and passive LMPs will have fewer 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
The analysis in Table 5.10 does not support this hypothesis. However, it seems likely that this 
is a methodological, rather than substantive finding. Table 5.10 suggests that it is hard to 
statistically divorce the effects of LMPs from that of societal wealth more broadly. This is 
perhaps unsurprising as GDP is likely to be a proxy for all manner of health-relevant factors 
including LMPs but also housing and other aspects of standard of living as well as the quality 
of health and public services more generally. This may also be an issue with the welfare 
regime approach used in Chapter Four and represents a significant methodological challenge 
for researchers in this field. It is problematic as publication bias and in particular the desire of 
researchers to demonstrate statistically significant results may have led to a tendency to 
exaggerate the influence of policies on health inequalities. For example, in a paper that used 
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the same data and similar methods, Niedzwiedz et al. (2016) present the relationship 
between active LMPs and educational inequalities in depressive symptoms without 
accounting for the effect of GDP. These authors show a strong effect of active LMPs on health 
inequalities which does not hold in the analysis here after including the GDP*education 
control. 
Further methodological complications are also suggested in Table 5.10 through the surprise 
finding that in all five models, passive LMP expenditure was significantly (negatively) related 
with depressive symptoms among high educated people. This counterintuitive finding held 
despite the inclusion of a range of individual and contextual control variables. There is no 
obvious explanation for this relationship, yet it seems plausible that this represents 
confounding at the country-level which has not been accounted for by the control variables 
used in this chapter. To increase confidence in the effect of policy variables, Chapter Six uses 
a statistical approach which controls for all contextual variation, thereby improving on the 




To test the sensitivity of the results to the measures of LMP spending used in this chapter, the 
main analyses are re-run using three alternatives to passive LMP spending and two 
alternatives to active LMPs. Expenditure on active LMPs is divided in to two constituent parts 
に Public Employment Services (PES) and non-PES. The PES elements of active LMPs are state-
subsidised employment programmes, while non-PES programmes entail job search 
assistance, training and employment incentives. Reviews find that non-PES programmes tend 
to be more effective at reducing unemployment, compared with PES (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 
2010)52, hence it makes sense to divide active LMPs in to these two constituent parts. These 
are operationalised in the same way as active and passive LMP spending53 and the two 
                                                          
52 This may not necessarily represent an impact of public vs private per se but may rather reflect differences in 
the design of incentive structures within specific countries. 
 





variables are included in the same models, alongside a control for total passive LMP spending. 
As an additional check, the analysis was re-run without standardising the active and passive 
LMP variables on unemployment rates. Instead, the LMP variables were kept as raw measures 
of spending and the unemployment rate was included as a control variable. None of the 
results differed a great deal with this alternative operationalisation54.  
The three alternatives to passive LMPs are: short and long-term benefit replacement rate and 
benefit duration55. All three indicators have been shown to have a bearing on employment-
related outcomes and may also have an effect on mental health during unemployment 
(Caliendo et al., 2013; Katz & Meyer, 1990; Lalive, 2007; Lalive et al., 2006; Van Ours & 
Vodopivec, 2006). The variable for long-term replacement rates represents net income 
replacement over sixty months of unemployment, averaged across both single persons and 
families. Short-term replacement rates refer to net income replacement in the initial period 
of unemployment following any waiting period and are averaged across six family types56 57. 
Benefit duration refers to the number of weeks that a person is entitled to claim 
unemployment benefit. Following the procedure adopted by Wulfgramm (2014), values are 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum duration of 48 weeks across the OECD countries.  
Table 5.11 examines the relationship between these five alternative variables and depressive 
symptoms among unemployed people (けｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ ;ﾐS けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ WaaWIデゲ). Coefficients in this 
table refer to the average impact of each variable when the ESS sample was restricted only to 
those that reported themselves as unemployed, with the usual controls. As with Table 5.5, 
only passive LMPs seem to have an effect on depressive symptoms among this group and this 
                                                          
54 These results are not displayed here or in the Appendix. However, they are available on request. 
 
55 Each of these variables are taken from the OECD Benefits and Wages Database. Unlike the expenditure data 
there is no need to condition these three measures of passive LMPs on unemployment rates, however a control 
is nonetheless included for unemployment rate where it was not in earlier models. As the three passive variables 
(short, long term replacement rates and benefit duration) are conceptually similar, they are examined in 
separate models and the coefficients refer to the effect of each of these variables without controlling for the 
effect of the other two. 
59 Specifically this is an average for: a family with no children with a single person or a one or two earner married 
couple head of household or a family with two children with a single parent or one or two earner married couple 
as the head of the household. In each case the family are assumed to earn 100% of the average wage. Children 
are assumed to be aged four to six and childcare costs or benefits are excluded. 
 
57 For both types of benefit, the recipient is assumed to qualify for other housing or social assistance. 
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is true only of the variable for long-term replacement rates. The effect is negative and of a 
similar magnitude to that of passive LMP spending, suggesting that more generous long-term 
replacement rates reduce depressive symptoms among the unemployed (although the 
coefficients for both short-term replacement and duration were also negative). None of the 
other variables meet acceptable levels of statistical significance. Separate regression models 
did not find that the effect of long-term replacement rates differed substantially or 
significantly (紅 噺 伐ど┻どの┸ 喧 噺 ど┻ひど岻 between employed and unemployed people when the 
same procedure was completed using an interaction term between long-term replacement 
rates and employment status (see Appendix B, Table B.5). This may be because passive LMP 
spending is a stronger indicator of the total effort of welfare states in relation to cash benefits 
for the unemployed. 
 
 Table 5.11 Relationship between Sensitivity Variables and Depressive 







Notes: The models from which these coefficients are taken are equivalent to those in Model 3, Table 
5.5. Each controls for all individual and contextual covariates. See Appendix B, Table B.5 for the full 
regression output with employment status interaction effects ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ ヮаヰくヰヵが ゅゅ ヮаヰくヰヱく 
 
The coefficients in Table 5.12 represent the indirect effect of each variable on depressive 
symptoms via self-reported unemployment, using the same modelling procedure as in Table 
5.Α ふけWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげぶ. Appendix B, Table B.6 presents regression results for the 
relationship between each of these alternative sensitivity variables and self-reported 
unemployment. In countries with more generous short-term replacement rates and longer 





Passive Short-term RRs -0.22 
 Long-term RRs -0.56* 
 Duration -0.17 
Active PES 0.18 
 Non-PES -0.07 
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periods of benefit duration respondents were more likely to report themselves as 
unemployed, while in countries that spent more on PES or non-PES active LMPs respondents 
were less likely to be unemployed. As with Table 5.7, Table 5.12 presents Beta estimates for 
the indirect effect of each of these alternative variables on depressive symptoms, via self-
reported unemployment, with bootstrapped bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.  
The results from here were largely in line with the earlier findings. Both PES and non-PES 
variables were negatively related with depressive symptoms, suggesting に as with the results 
for active LMPs in Table 5.7 に that higher spending on each of these forms of labour market 
activation reduces unemployment, with associated benefits for mental health. However, in 
both cases the confidence intervals were relatively wide and the upper-limits of the 
confidence intervals were close to zero, suggesting that these effects may be a result of 
chance. Slightly at odds with Table 5.7, none of the alternative variables for passive LMPs 
were significantly associated with depressive symptoms through unemployment. However, 
the earlier finding with passive LMP spending was also only at borderline significance as the 
confidence interval was close to zero. 
 
Table 5.12 Indirect Effect of Sensitivity Variables on Depressive Symptoms via 







Notes: The indirect effects are calculated as the product of the linear effect of each variable on 
unemployment (糠岻 and the effect of unemployment on depressive symptoms (紅岻. In each case, 
individual and contextual control variables are included. 1This is a bias-corrected bootstrapped 
confidence interval, based on 1000 replications. ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ ヮаヰくヰヵが ゅゅ ヮаヰくヰヱく 
 
LMP Area Variable 
Indirect Effect 岫試岻 95% CI1 
Passive Short-term RRs 0.003 (-0.020, 0.018) 
 Long-term RRs 0.005 (-0.010, 0.021) 
 Duration 0.005 (-0.010, 0.021) 
Active PES -0.021* (-0.039, -0.003) 
 Non-PES -0.024ゆ (-0.052, 0.004) 
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The five sensitivity variables are also examined in relation to the final causal pathway 
ふけSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲげぶく T;HﾉW ヵくヱン shows the relationship, for low educated people, between 
each policy variable and depressive symptoms via self-reported unemployment. In Appendix 
B, Table B.7 shows the differential impact of each policy variable on self-reported 
unemployment by education level. Table 5.13 shows that once again, there is no clear effect 
of passive LMPs. However, it shows that low educated people in countries with generous PES 
and non-PES programmes had less depressive symptoms, as a result of lower unemployment. 
The negative coefficient for non-PES spending is greater than in Table 5.12. The confidence 
interval for this coefficient also differs to a greater extent from zero (紅 噺ど┻どどね┸ ひのガ 系荊 Upp�r Bound 噺 伐ど┻どなば), although it remains relatively wide. This may imply 
that the non-PES elements of active LMP spending are more important for improving the 
labour market outcomes に and subsequent mental health に of low-educated people. This 
would support the findings of reviews (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). However, given the 
width of the confidence interval and potential methodological issues when exploring the 
relationship between active LMPs and unemployment, this finding is stated cautiously. 
 
 
Table 5.13. Indirect Effect of Sensitivity Variables on Depressive Symptoms 
via Self-Reported Unemployment for Low Educated Respondents (N= 
11,749). 
 
Notes: The indirect effects are calculated as the product of the linear effect of each variable on 
unemployment (糠岻 and the effect of unemployment on depressive symptoms (紅岻. In each case, 
individual and contextual control variables are included. 1This is a bias-corrected bootstrapped 
confidence interval, based on 2000 replications. ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ ヮаヰくヰヵが ゅゅ ヮаヰくヰヱく 
 
LMP Area Variable Indirect Effect 95% CI1 
Passive Short-term RRs 0.004 (-0.029,  0.030) 
 Long-term RRs -0.007 (-0.025, 0.041) 
 Duration -0.007 (-0.025, 0.041) 
Active PES -0.021 ( -0.059, 0.002) 
 Non-PES -0.050** (-0.100, -0.017) 
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The final stage in the analysis considers the differential impact of these sensitivity variables 
┗ｷ; けｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ ;ﾐS けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ WaaWIデゲく OﾐIW ;ｪ;ｷﾐが ﾉﾗ┘ ゲデ;デｷゲデｷI;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ヮヴW┗WﾐデWS デｴW ｷﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ 
of a three-way interaction effect. Yet it is possible to explore the relationship between these 
sensitivity variables and depressive symptoms among both low educated and unemployed 
people. Evidence was found in Table 5.11 that long-term replacement rates significantly 
reduced depressive symptoms among unemployed people. Table 5.14 explores this effect for 
low educated people.  
It shows the differential impact of each policy variable on depressive symptoms for low, 
relative to high educated people. Each model controls for all other individual and contextual 
covariates as well as an interaction between GDP and education. A full table with all 
coefficients is available in Appendix B, Table B.8. All of the interaction effects were non-
significant by conventional standards (i.e. p>0.10) and while certain coefficients pointed in 
expected directions (e.g. 紅 for long term RRs = -0.14, non-PES = -0.10) the evidence was not 
strong enough to conclude that any of these variables were related with educational 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. Hence, there is no conclusive evidence for differential 
けｷﾐIﾗﾏWげ ﾗヴ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ WaaWIデゲく NWｷデｴWヴ ｷゲ ｷデ デｴW I;ゲW デｴ;デ デｴWゲW ゲWﾐゲｷデｷ┗ｷデ┞ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ┘WヴW 
significantly related with educational inequalities in depressive symptoms (i.e. the full health 
inequalities effect).  
Table 5.14. Relationship between Sensitivity Variables and educational 






Notes: The models from which these coefficients were taken are equivalent to Model 5, Table 5.10.  
Full coefficients available in Appendix B, Table B.8. 1 Each model controls for active LMP spending and 
GDP*education. 2 Each model controls for passive LMP spending and GDP*education. All models 
control for individual covariates, family policy, employment regulation and unemployment rate. ゆ 
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
LMP Area Variable 
Effect on Low 
Educated Relative 
to High 岫試岻 










Interpretation of Results 
 
This chapter has explored if and how cash benefits policies which are targeted at unemployed 
people matter for health inequalities. Using a social expenditure approach, it has explored 
four hypothesised connections between LMPs and health inequalities: income, process and 
employment effects and differential impacts. Five key findings from the analysis are 
summarised and interpreted below: 
 
Passive Labour Market Policies may reduce health inequalities by improving the health of 
Unemployed People. 
The first stage of the analysis explored the けｷﾐIﾗﾏW effectゲげ of passive cash benefits, as 
measured by the effect on depressive symptoms for unemployed people. It found that for 
those currently unemployed, a one standard deviation rise in passive LMP spending was 
associated with a substantial (-0.52**) and highly significant (p<0.01) decline in depressive 
symptoms, even with controls. Separate models also showed that this effect was significantly 
greater than that among the employed population. In contrast, there was no evidence of a 
けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデげぎ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ デｴ;デ ゲヮWﾐデ ﾏﾗヴW ﾗﾐ active LMPs did not have less depressive 
symptoms among unemployed people. This suggested that the generosity of cash benefits 
matters the most for depressive symptoms among the unemployed and (as revealed in 
sensitivity tests), the security associated with generous longer-term benefits. It seems 
plausible that as the previous discussion noted, it is the type of active LMPs, which matter for 
depressive symptoms during unemployment. Reviews find that the health benefits of active 
LMP participation are highly variable according to the type of programme and the context in 
which it is implemented (Coutts et al., 2014)58. The rather vague measure of active LMP 
spending used here may not have been able to capture this qualitative variation. 
                                                          
58 Evidence reviewed by these authors suggested that active LMPs which focused on training and personal 
development tended to have the greatest impact on depression and other desirable outcomes (Vinokur et al., 
1995, 2000). In contrast, those which were less personalised or seen as an inadequate alternative to work were 





Generous Active Labour Market Policies may reduce unemployment, with less associated 
depressive symptoms. 
The third causal pathway which this chapter explored was the impact of LMPs on depressive 
ゲ┞ﾏヮデﾗﾏゲ ┗ｷ; デｴWｷヴ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏWゲ ふけWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげぶく It was found 
that respondents in countries that spent more on active LMPs were significantly less likely to 
report themselves as unemployed, compared with those with less generous labour market 
activation programmes. A mediation analysis confirmed that these effects translated in to a 
reduction in depressive symptoms (紅 for indirect effect 噺  伐ど┻どぬば┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ 伐ど┻どばど┸ 伐ど┻どどね岻. These findings were supported in sensitivity tests where the active LMP 
measure was broken down in to two components に PES and non-PES. However, there was 
some methodological uncertainty around this finding: the effect of active LMPs was greater 
than expected and there was some evidence of suppression effects. It can therefore be 
cautiously concluded that while active LMP spending may not have been associated with less 
depressive symptoms among unemployed people, respondents in countries that spent more 
on active LMPs were still less likely to report themselves as unemployed, and as a result had 
better mental health. While this is somewhat unsurprising given the strong negative 
relationship between unemployment and mental health, it is an important finding 
nonetheless given that most recent discussion in the social policy literature has focused on 
the けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ effectsげ of active LMPs (i.e. the health benefits of active LMP participation 
relative to open unemployment)  (Carter & Whitworth, 2016; Coutts, 2010; Sage, 2015b). The 
analysis in this chapter suggests that the most substantial mental health effect of active LMP 
spending is through reducing unemployment, rather than making unemployment itself more 
bearable.  
 
There is weak evidence that countries with more generous passive LMPs have higher self-
reported unemployment with negative health consequences, however this is outweighed by 
the health benefits associated with income replacement during unemployment. 
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The indirect effect of passive LMPs on depressive symptoms via employment outcomes was 
weakly positive (紅 噺 ど┻どなは┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻どどな┸ ど┻どぬな岻. Nonetheless, this was overshadowed by 
the strong negative relationship between passive LMP generosity and depressive symptoms 
among unemployed people. The weak detrimental health effect of passive LMPs via self-
reported unemployment moderated the overall negative relationship between passive LMP 
expenditure and depressive symptoms59. As such, the main policy implication is that the 
overall health benefits of passive LMP spending outweigh any negative effects linked with 
employment disincentives. This does not support paternalistic arguments that have been 
prominent in policy discussions in recent years to justify cutbacks in benefits (Freud, 2007; 
Waddell & Burton, 2006). Instead, it implies that the mental health benefits of passive LMPs 
outweigh any adverse impacts due to moral hazard.  
 
Active Labour Market Policies may differentially reduce unemployment among low 
educated people, which also reduces educational inequalities in depressive symptoms 
WｴWﾐ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デｷﾐｪ デｴW aｷﾐ;ﾉ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ ふけSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲげぶ デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデｷ┗W 
evidence that low educated respondents benefited more in employment terms from 
generous active LMPs. This in turn meant that low educated people reported less depressive 
symptoms in these countries. This finding was supported in sensitivity tests, although it 
seemed only to matter for the non-PES elements of active LMP expenditure. This makes sense 
as research tends to find that these areas of spending are most effective at reducing 
unemployment (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). Once again, there was some uncertainty 
around these findings which requires us to be qualified in our conclusions. In particular, active 
LMPs had an unusually strong impact on unemployment for low educated people, suggesting 
a possible methodological problem. 
 
                                                          
59 The が value for the total effect of passive LMP spending in the whole population was -0.157. The indirect effect 
through unemployment was 0.014. The total effect was reduced from -0.170 (direct) to -0.157 when accounting 
for the employment effect. 
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There is insufficient evidence for a (statistical) relationship between Labour Market Policies 
and Educational Inequalities in Depressive Symptoms.  
The final hypothesis was that countries that spent more on both active and passive LMPs 
would have smaller gaps between low and high educated people in depressive symptoms. 
However, there was no robust evidence of this. To this authorげs knowledge, only one other 
paper has directly investigated this and these authors only did so with active LMPs 
(Niedzwiedz et al., 2016). These authors found a strong negative relationship, where greater 
spending was associated with less depressive symptoms among the low educated. However, 
these authors did not control for the effects of GDP for low vs high educated people. In Table 
5.10 the effect of GDP was substantial and differed significantly across education groups and 
it fully explained the statistically significant relationship between active LMPs and educational 
inequalities in depressive symptoms (between models 4 and 5). The issue is that while there 
may be a relationship between LMP spending and health inequalities it is difficult to divorce 
this effect (statistically) from a wider impact of societal wealth. The interest of researchers in 
this field is in whether welfare state policies have an impact over and above a more general 
effect of societal affluence. Low statistical power at the country-level makes it difficult to 
separate out the effect of policy from a more general wealth effect. Chapter Six has a larger 
amount of level 2 data, somewhat overcoming this problem. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
The contribution of these findings to the thesis as a whole has been to show how a social 
expenditure approach can be used to explore, empirically, the causal pathways between 
specific areas of cash benefits policy spending and health inequalities. While the previous 
chapter relied on one proxy for psychosocial stress for evidence of causal connections, it has 
been possible here to use empirical methods to unpack how two design features associated 
with cash benefits policies に generosity and activation に matter for health inequalities. It was 
not possible for this chapter to examine the effects of the third programme feature に 
conditionality に as reliable data does not yet exist for Europe. In contrast, Chapter Six is able 
to make more concrete claims about the impact of conditionality due to the availability of 
such data in relation to anti-poverty policies in the United States. 
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Chapter 6. A Policy-Specific Approach: The Relationship 
between TANF Conditionality and Inequalities in Mental Health 
 
This chapter evaluates the impact of cash benefits via the third design feature described in 
Chapters One and Two に conditionality. Adopting a policy-specific approach, this chapter 
examines the relationship between Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) policies 
に the main form of poverty relief in the United States (US) に and health inequalities. Unlike 
the previous two chapters which were cross-national, the focus here is on within-country 
variation. The chapter first gives some background to TANF policies and uses this as a platform 
to introduce the academic literature and research hypotheses. As with the previous chapters, 
it begins by exploring causal pathways. It then ends be examining the overall relationship 
between TANF and health inequalities. 
 
NF Policies and Work-Related Conditionality 
 
Tｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ;Sﾗヮデゲ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ ; けヮﾗﾉｷI┞-ゲヮWIｷaｷIげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴく Iデ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW HWｪｷﾐゲ H┞ 
giving some background on the main policy area of interest に Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). In particular, the discussion centres on the introduction of the policy in 1996 
and the tightening of requirements around work-related conditionality which followed. 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families replaced Aid for Dependent Families with Children 
(AFDC) in 1996 through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
ふP‘WO‘Aぶが ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ Cﾉｷﾐデﾗﾐげゲ ヮﾉWSｪW デﾗ さWﾐS ┘Wﾉa;ヴW ;ゲ ┘W ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ｷデざく TｴW 
introduction of TANF was accompanied by new rules imposed by the federal government for 
states to increase conditionality and place time limits on the receipt of cash benefit, amongst 
other changes. This marked a departure with the entitlement-based AFDC that carried few 
conditions, provided that claimants met the eligibility requirements (Page & Larner, 1997).  
While the shift from AFDC to TANF was a major change in US public policy, it was part of a 
wider trend of welfare reform in the Clinton administration. Between 1993 and 1995 a large 
number of pilot welfare-to-work programmes were in operation across the states and over 
this period around 75 per cent of claimants were enrolled on such a scheme (Caputo, 2011). 
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As a legislative precursor to PRWORA, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 began the 
process of redesigning AFDC to make it time-limited and transitional, while requiring 
claimants to search for and accept employment (Gibbons, 1994). The 1994 Welfare Indicators 
Act also required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to begin monitoring the scale 
of けwelfare dependenceげ in the US, a symbolic move to demonstrate the political commitment 
to reforming these policy areas (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994).  
The PRWORA and subsequent passage of TANF was nonetheless a major historical moment 
in US welfare policy with implications for the lives of many Americans. New rules attached to 
receipt of TANF services and cash assistance were introduced in three key domains: duration, 
eligibility and work-related participation. For families with an adult recipient, maximum 
duration of entitlement to cash assistance was set at 60 months, although states could exceed 
this for up to 20 per cent of their caseload based on hardship (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2015: 3). States were mostly allowed to set their own eligibility requirements. 
However, federal law barred the provision of TANF funds (including child care, transportation 
and job training as well as cash assistance) to most legal immigrants who had been in the US 
for less than five years (ibid.: 4). This extended to a large proportion of poor children with 
non-citizen parents (ibid.: 4). The PRWORA also gave states the option of requiring drug tests 
aﾗヴ ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデゲが ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾐｪ Cﾉｷﾐデﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW DWﾏﾗIヴ;デｷI P;ヴデ┞げゲ ゲWﾉa-professed hard-line stance 
on drugs and drug-related crime (Falk, 2016: 2). Moreover, TANF eligibility was no longer 
automatically linked to Medicaid, where AFDC eligibility had been. However, this was less of 
a major change in practice as states were still required to provide Medicaid to families that 
met the 1996 AFDC eligibility guidelines (Schott & Mann, 1998). 
A central aspect of the PRWORA reform was the requirements that were placed on states for 
recipients to engage in work-related activities, with the necessary imposition of sanctions for 
non-compliance. Three federal requirements were placed on states to apply to all work-
eligible TANF recipients: Employability Assessments, Work within Two Years and Sanctions for 
Failure to Comply with Work Requirements (Falk, 2012). For each adult or teen recipient, the 
ヱΓΓヶ ﾉ;┘ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS ゲデ;デWゲ デﾗ ;ゲゲWゲゲ デｴWｷヴ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲが Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS け┘ﾗヴﾆ-ヴW;SｷﾐWゲゲげ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ Γヰ 
days of a claim being made. As part of this, states had the option of developing an けIndividual 
Responsibility Planげ to help monitor goals and obligations with the recipient (Falk, 2012: 18). 
TｴW けWﾗヴﾆ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ T┘ﾗ YW;ヴゲげ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS ゲデ;デWゲ デﾗ Wﾐｪ;ｪW ;ﾉﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾆ-eligible recipients 
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in work-related activities within two years. Sanctions were to be applied for any family 
member that did not participate in work-ヴWﾉ;デWS ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ けｪﾗﾗS I;┌ゲWげく “デ;デWゲ ┘WヴW 
ｪｷ┗Wﾐ SｷゲIヴWデｷﾗﾐ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ┘ｴ;デ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWS けｪﾗﾗS I;┌ゲWげ ;ﾐS the severity of sanctions (ibid.: 
18).  
Alongside these qualitative shifts in the conditionality attached to TANF policies, the federal 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWS ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲ デﾗ ﾏﾗﾐｷデﾗヴ け┘ﾗヴﾆ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴ;デWゲげく 
Twelve activities could count towards these targets (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
2015): 
1. Unsubsidised employment 
2. Subsidised private-sector employment 
3. Subsidised public-sector employment 
4. Work experience 
5. On-the-job training 
6. Job search and job readiness assistance 
7. Community service programs 
8. Vocational education training (up to 12 months) 
9. Providing child care services to an individual participating in a community service 
program 
10. Job skills training directly related to employment 
11. Education directly related to employment 
12. Satisfactory secondary school or course of study attendance leading to a GED60 
 
Families excluded from these requirements were those without work-eligible individuals61, 
single parents caring for a child under the age of one (state optional), those participating in a 
tribal TANF programme (state optional), and those currently sanctioned (Falk, 2012: 29). 
IﾐIWﾐデｷ┗Wゲ ┘WヴW ;ﾉゲﾗ Hヴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ｷﾐ デﾗ デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ けI;ゲWﾉﾗ;S ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ IヴWSｷデゲげ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
                                                          
60 The GED is an acronym which stands for the General Educational Development Tests. These tests are wide-
ranging and amount to a qualification similar to a high school level of study. See 
https://www.gedtestingservice.com/testers/faqs-test-taker#GED_stand_for (accessed 26/09/2017) for further 
information.  
 
61 Individuals that are not eligible are non-parent caretakers that are non-recipients, noncitizen parents that are 
ineligible, parents that are carers for disabled family members and (with state discretion) adults receiving 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and parents that became eligible 
for SSI over that fiscal year (Falk, 2012).  
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lowered targets for work participation rates and were offered to states that were successful 
in reducing their cash assistance rolls.  
 
The Research Landscape 
While the PRWORA imposed certain rules on states for the use of federal funds, it also 
devolved greater autonomy around sanctions, work-related activities and other behavioural 
requirements. Moreover, the funding relationship between the federal and state 
governments changed. The federal government now provided block grants to states 
irrespective of the number of recipients, where previously it had matched state funds for each 
AFDC ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデく TｴW ゲｷ┣W ﾗa W;Iｴ ゲデ;デWげゲ ｪヴ;ﾐデ ┘;ゲ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWS ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ヴWIWﾐデ aWSWヴ;ﾉ 
spending, which essentially ended automatic entitlement on the basis of need (Page & Larner, 
1997). At the same time, states were expected to match federal funding through the 
けM;ｷﾐデWﾐ;ﾐIW ﾗa Eaaﾗヴデげ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデが ┘ｴｷIｴ ヴWヮﾉ;IWS デｴe previous state match under AFDC. 
These changes greatly increased the variability of TANF policies across states (see, for 
example, De Jong et al., 2006; Meyers et al., 2001).62 This led to new research efforts by 
scholars of US social policy to develop formal typologies of states in terms of their TANF 
practices. For example, Meyers et al. (2001) characterised TANF policies in terms of adequacy 
(level of benefits participants received, eligibility requirements), inclusion (amount of take-up 
among eligible population) and commitment (range and quality of assistance, behavioural 
requirements), placing states on a continuum of meagreness to generosity (ibid.: 474). In 
another paper, Soss et al. (2001) similarly classified states on such a continuum but instead 
┌ゲWS ; ゲ┌ﾏﾏ;ヴ┞ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ﾗa けヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ゲW┗Wヴｷデ┞げ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲぎ デｷﾏW ﾉｷﾏｷデゲ ｷﾐ 
which to find work, lifetime limits on receipt of cash assistance, family caps, and the harshness 
of sanctions. Similarly, McKernan et al. (2004) identified five clusters of states that varied 
across three policy domains: time limits on receipt of cash assistance, work requirements and 
                                                          
62 While there were increases in variability across US states, even prior to the passage of the PRWORA there 
were significant variations across states in the practice of delivering AFDC to needy populations. For example, 
Meyers and colleagues (2001) found that, in 1994, there were considerable cross-state differences in: the ratio 
of annual expenditure on AFDC to participants (around a $5,000 difference between most and least generous 
states), the numbers of programme participants relative to needy individuals (this difference ranged from 24 to 
93 per cent) and in the behavioural requirements that states placed on recipients. 
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financial incentives to find work. Using factor analysis, they proposed a less hierarchical 
けﾉWﾐｷWﾐデ デﾗ ゲデヴｷﾐｪWﾐデげ I;デWｪﾗヴｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐが ｷﾐゲデW;S Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴW Sｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ ﾗa approaches adopted 
by states. These contributions, among others (see Fender et al., 2002 for a full review), 
represent awareness among scholars of US social policy of the need to operationalise TANF 
policies in a way which can be of practical use to researchers. Yet this literature is limited and 
now quite dated. In particular, there is very little published work on the recent context of 
TANF and the longer-term consequences of the PRWORA and shift in conditionality practices.  
This chapter updates and expands this evidence. It provides the first in-depth analysis of 
variation across states and over time (2000-2015) in the development of sanctions, job search 
and welfare-to-work policies. The main purpose of this is to use these data to understand 
more about the impacts of TANF policies on health inequalities. Only two identifiable studies 
have provided any evidence around the impact of TANF policies on health inequalities  (Basu 
et al., 2016; Bitler et al., 2005). Each of these focused on the passage of the PRWORA, using a 
quasi-experimental methodology. A third paper (Beckfield & Bambra, 2016) looked at the 
ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デW ｪWﾐWヴﾗゲｷデ┞げが ;ゲ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWS H┞ ┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデが ヮWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ 
and sickness benefits spending (using the Scruggs dataset of comparative welfare 
entitlements (Scruggs et al., 2014)), and (average) life expectancy. These authors did not 
therefore have a health inequalities focus. The key conclusions of these three papers can be 
summarised as follows:  
- Basu et al. (2016) found adverse effects of the PRWORA on binge drinking and access 
to medical and preventative health care among single mothers, the main affected 
group. For mental health, the results were less consistent and a significant effect was 
only found when the authors used a synthetic control method which weighted the 
control group to reflect the pre-intervention characteristics of the treatment group 
(single mothers)63. In a subgroup analysis, the authors found that unemployed single 
mothers experienced an additional 5 per cent decrease in the probability of having a 
full month of good mental health relative to employed mothers, suggesting that the 
effect may have been strongest among the unemployed.  
                                                          
63 In this model, single mothers experienced a 5 per cent point decrease (95% CI: -4.0, -6.0) in the probability of 
having a full month of good mental health. In the standard difference-in-difference-in-differences model there 




- Using the same health measures to assess health inequalities between single and 
married mothers between 1990 and 2000, Bitler et al. (2005) also found stronger 
results for health care coverage and utilisation than health status. They used two 
measures of welfare reform に year when TANF was implemented (1997/8) and if and 
when a state had an AFDC waiver に and neither measure was significantly associated 
with changes in mental health. 
 
- Beckfield and Bambra (2016) aﾗ┌ﾐS デｴ;デ け┘Wﾉa;ヴW ゲデ;デW ｪWﾐWヴﾗゲｷデ┞げ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWS ; 
significant portion of changes in life expectancy in the US over a forty-year period 
(1970-2010), suggesting a causal effect of welfare state generosity. After creating a 
counterfactual scenario where the US had generosity at the average level of the other 
OECD countries (rather than considerably lower than average as it did), these authors 
found that this jump in generosity would have been associated with an average of four 
years increased life expectancy.  
Although all three papers had strengths (i.e. strong statistical designs, subpopulation 
analyses), they were each limited in certain ways in their ability to draw causal inference 
about the effects of TANF policies. Basu et al. (2016) looked only at the average effect of 
PRWORA across states. Yet the exact timing of enactment of TANF policies varied between 
states, as did the severity/leniency of policies. It is therefore hard to be confident that this 
けHWaﾗヴW ;ﾐS ;aデWヴげ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデゲ ; デヴ┌W I;┌ゲal effect. The paper by Bitler et al. (2005) is 
stronger in this regard as the authors included two state-level variables. Yet neither study 
included any variables which capture the detail of policy design, such as sanctioning rates or 
work requirements. As such, they mask a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the causal 
effects of TANF and the mechanisms that might connect policies with health inequalities.   
The paper by Beckfield and Bambra (2016) is slightly different. These authors did not focus 
specifically on the PRWORA. Instead they looked at broad relationships between cash benefits 
generosity and life expectancy within the United States over an extended period of time. The 
methodology was strong in this paper. The authors used a fixed effects regression approach 
with lagged covariates to counteract the risk of endogeneity bias, alongside a number of other 
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methods to ensure the robustness of the analysis64. The findings are therefore reasonably 
convincing as evidence for a causal effect of the generosity of cash benefits in the US, although 
(as with the other papers) they are unable to tell us about the impact of other characteristics 
of TANF policies. The outcome に average life expectancy に also masks a considerable amount 
of individual-level variation (as the authors acknowledge on p.37). In order to strengthen 
understanding of causal links it is necessary to look at other health outcomes and inequalities 
in these outcomes, fitting with the interest of this thesis.  
This chapter develops on these studies in a number of concrete ways. Unlike Basu et al. 
ふヲヰヱヶぶが デｴW ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ W┝ヮWヴｷﾏWﾐデ;ﾉく TｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ けHWaﾗヴW ;ﾐS ;aデWヴげき デｴW SWゲｷｪﾐ ｷゲ ヴWヮW;デWS 
cross-sectional and looks simply at the effect of TANF policies at different points in time. 
However, other steps are taken to improve the ability to investigate causal pathways : 
- First, the chapter uses specific independent variables to operationalise TANF policies. 
In itself, this allows stronger claims to be made about the impact of TANF than these 
previous studies as it shows the specific effect of policies. These policies are measured 
using federal data and differ across states and over time. State-level controls (GDP, 
unemployment rates, political/citizen ideology) are included to increase confidence 
that the effects of TANF policies are not spuriously attributed to other cross-state 
differences.  
 
- Second, data pertaining to TANF policies are taken from four years (2000, 2005, 2010 
and 2015) enabling the cross-sectional analysis to be supplemented by a research 
strategy which models the effect on health of changes in TANF policies. Fixed effects 
regression (explained at length in Chapter Three) is used to control for all time-
invariant state differences so that any effect of TANF policies refers to the change in 
policies between two time points.  
 
- Third, this chapter uses subpopulation analysis (as described in Chapter Two) to tell a 
more convincing story of the effect of TANF policies. Drawing on the Bradford-Hill 
                                                          
64 Specifically, the authors included autocorrelation-corrected standard errors to account for the correlation 
between life expectancies in different years. They also used a Blinder-Oaxaca regression decomposition 
procedure to estimate a counterfactual scenario of generous US social policy provision (explained on p.33 of the 
article), providing stronger evidence around the contribution of welfare generosity to life expectancy. 
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(1965) principle of specificity, it focuses on the population most likely to be affected 
by the policy. For reasons outlined in Chapter Two, the primary focus is on low 
educated single mothers and health outcomes for this group are compared against 
those for all other mothers. At one stage in the analysis, the chapter looks at 
unemployed single mothers, comparing the mental health of this group with that of 
employed single mothers. 
Before discussing the methodology and research hypotheses at greater length, it is worth 
noting that while this chapter makes direct empirical contributions to our understanding of 
the impacts of TANF, I also argue that it expands the wider literature on welfare states and 
health inequalities and, in so doing, addresses the research aims of this thesis. As described 
in Chapter Two, it investigates the same causal pathways as Chapter Five (employment and 
process effects), yet it does so in a markedly different welfare state context. As such, it is 
crucial that the findings are interpreted appropriately in light of contextual differences 
between US and European labour market activation policies. Further discussion of these 
differences and how they may result in different health outcomes is provided in the closing 
parts of this chapter. 
 
Variable Operationalisation and Research Hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families policies are operationalised using 
data from the Welfare Rules Database (WRD) and Federal TANF and State Maintenance of 
Effort (MOE) Financial Data, held by the Office of Family Assistance (OFA). These datasets 
were briefly described in Chapter Three. The three key variables are job search requirements, 
welfare-to-work spending and sanctions. TｴWゲW I;ヮデ┌ヴW デ┘ﾗ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ に 
activation (welfare-to-work) and conditionality (job search and sanctions). Job search 
requirements are constructed using a binary variable based on whether or not states require 
job search at application as a condition of eligibility, taken from the WRD. Welfare-to-work 
spending is taken from the TANF financial data. Welfare-to-work spending is a per capita 
measure calculated through dividing the total amount that each state spent in a fiscal year on 
けゲ┌HゲｷSｷゲWS Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげが けWS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪげ ;ﾐS け;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲげ H┞ デｴW 
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average number of TANF recipients within the same fiscal year. As with the European data, 
the only available information on welfare-to-work programmes across the US is in terms of 
per capita expenditure. A full description of these three categories of welfare-to-work 
spending is provided in Figure 6.1. 
 
 Figure 6.1. Areas of Welfare-to-Work programmes covered by financial data. 
Source: Federal TANF and State MOE Financial Data, Office of Family 
Assistance 
 
State-level sanctioning practices are captured in data derived from the WRD which is divided 
in to two sections: initial and most severe sanction (see Appendix C, Figure C.1 for an example 
of the table from the WRD 2015). For each of these, information is available on the amount 
of benefit deducted and the length of the sanction. There have been a number of attempts 
to classify sanctions according to the criteria within the WRD and the final operationalisation 
Subsidized Employment: payments to employers or third parties to help cover the costs of employee 
┘;ｪWゲが HWﾐWaｷデゲが ゲ┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐが ﾗヴ デヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪき Iﾗゲデゲ aﾗヴ ゲ┌HゲｷSｷ┣ｷﾐｪ ; ヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデげゲ ┘;ｪW デﾗ 
compensate an employer for training costs; and expenditures for subsidized employment targeted for 
youth. Does not include expenditures related to payments to or on behalf of participants in community 
service and work experience activities that are within the definition of assistance. 
Education and Training: education and training activities, including secondary education (including 
alternative programs); adult education, high school diploma-equivalent (such as GED) and ESL classes; 
education directly related to employment; job skills training; education provided as vocational 
educational training or career and technical education; and post-secondary education.  Does not 
include costs of early care and education or after-school or summer enrichment programs for children 
and youth in elementary, middle school, or high school.   
Additional Work Activities: work activities that have not been reported in employment subsidies or 
education and training.  Includes costs related to providing work experience and community service 
activities, job search assistance and job readiness, related services (such as employment counseling, 
coaching, job development, information and referral, and outreach to business and non-profit 
community groups).  
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used here was based on a combination of these approaches. Helpful summaries of this 
literature are available in Grogger and Karoly (2009) and Stahl (2008). There has been some 
disagreement among scholars around what constitutes a reasonable classification and my 
own operationalisation was based on a series of decisions after consulting this literature. This 
is discussed at greater length in Appendix C ふｷﾐ デｴW ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ けDWデ;ｷﾉ ;Hﾗ┌デ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
“;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ PﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげぶく TｴW aｷﾐ;ﾉ operationalisation of sanctioning policies which is applied for 
each state and for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 is as follows: 
- 1. Most Lenient: Initial partial sanction, no progression to entire benefit sanction 
- 2. Lenient: Initial partial sanction less than 33 per cent of full entitlement, delayed full 
sanction 
- 3. Stringent: Initial partial sanction over 33 per cent, delayed full sanctions 
- 4. Most Stringent: Initial entire sanction or case closure 
The sanctions variable is treated as ordinal. However, However, all states with sanctions in 
categories 2 and 3 were dropped from the empirical analysis and attention is focused on the 
difference between けmost lenientげ and けmost stringentげ states as there is the least ambiguity 
between these categories.  
As the focus of this chapter is on activation programmes and conditionality requirements 
attached to receipt of TANF cash benefits, a control is included for maximum monthly benefits 
and this is shown in the tables in the main analysis. State-level controls are also incorporated 
for GDP per capita, political and citizen ideology and at certain stages in the analysis65, 
unemployment rates. Maximum monthly benefits are an average monthly benefit for a family 
of three with no income, taken from the WRD. These values are conditioned on Purchasing 
Power Parities (PPPs) across the US states to account for differences in the cost of living. Gross 
Domestic Product per capita and unemployment rates were retrieved from the US Bureaus 
of Economic Affairs and Labor Statistics, respectively. Gross Domestic Product is included in 
every model to account for the influence of between-state differences in wealth which may 
matter for unemployment, income and mental health.  
                                                          
65 Specifically, this control was included in every stage, except when self-reported unemployment was regressed 




Two variables are also included to account for cultural and political differences across states: 
political and citizen ideology. These variables were originally designed by Berry et al. (1998) 
and remain widely used in political science and elsewhere to capture state-level differences 
in political ideology66. The values are based on scores from interest group ratings of politicians 
and are placed on a scale from 0 to 100, where a higher score represents a more Anglo-Saxon 
political orientation and lower is more Bismarckianく TｴW けIｷデｷ┣Wﾐげ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ 
a gauge of the political leanings of citizens within a state by identifying the ideological 
positions of incumbents and challengers. This score therefore provides a mean indicator of 
the voting electorate on a Bismarckian to Anglo-Saxon continuum indicating the degree of 
individualism within a state, which is likely to matter for mental health and the level of poverty 
and unemployment. Alongside this, Berry et al. (1998) calculate a measure of the mean 
ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾉW;ﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa WﾉWIデWS ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉゲく Tｴｷゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴ ﾗa けヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉげ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｷゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW 
the wider policies that states introduce such as those around abortion, gay and immigrant 
rights. This too will have an influence on mental health which may confound the effects of 
TANF. 
 
Dependent and Individual-Level Control Variables 
The TANF data are merged using state and wave identifiers with individual level data from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). There are three dependent variables used 
in the course of the analysis: 
- Mental Ill-Health 
- Employment Status 
- Income 
Chapter Three described the measure of mental ill-health used in this chapter. This is a 
continuous indicator of the number of days of mental ill-health that someone experienced in 
a given month. The exact wording of this was displayed in Chapter Three, Figure 3.2. The 
variable is kept as continuous, following the approach of Basu et al. (2016) where a higher 
                                                          




number indicates worse mental health, i.e. 0 represents 0 days of mental ill-health and 30 
represents a full month. The second key independent variable に used at various stages in the 
analysis に is employment status. This was based on the following question from the BRFSS:  
さAヴW ┞ﾗ┌ I┌ヴヴWﾐデﾉ┞ぎ Employed for wages, Self-employed, Out of work for more than 1 
year, Out of work for less than 1 year, Homemaker, Student, Retired, Unable to work, 
Refusedざく  
A dummy variable was constructed ┘ｴWヴW デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ ┘WヴW けﾗ┌デ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾆ aﾗヴ ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ﾗﾐW 
┞W;ヴげ ;ﾐS けﾗ┌デ ﾗa ┘ﾗヴﾆ aﾗヴ ﾉWゲゲ デｴ;ﾐ ﾗﾐW ┞W;ヴげ ┘WヴW IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS ;ﾐS Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWS ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ;ﾉﾉ those 
けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS aﾗヴ ┘;ｪWゲげ ﾗヴ けゲWﾉa-Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WSげく There were no changes in the wording of the 
question across the four years of the survey.  
The third dependent variable に income に was used at one point in the analysis to investigate 
the impact of TANF policies on poverty. To examine this, a dummy was similarly created for 
those that reported themselves as having an annual income of less than $10,000. While we 
might expect the proportion within this category to rise due to inflation, it actually remained 
relatively stable at around 5 per cent of the sample each year. Figure 6.2 shows how 
information on income was gathered in the BRFSS in 2000. The question was worded in such 
a way as to maximise response rates by asking respondents which category their income fell 
in to, rather than their exact income level. In sensitivity tests, this was replaced with those 
that reported an income of $15,000 or lower. There were no changes in the measurement of 










Is your annual household income from all sources (Read as Appropriate) (If respondent refuses at any income 
level, code refused 
 
a. Less than $25,000 If "no," ask e; if "yes," ask b  ($20,000 to less than $25,000) 0 4  
b. Less than $20,000 If "no," code a; if "yes," ask c ($15,000 to less than $20,000) 0 3 
c. Less than $15,000 If "no," code b; if "yes," ask d ($10,000 to less than $15,000) 0 2 
d. Less than $10,000 If "no," code c 0 1 
e. Less than $35,000 If "no," ask f ($25,000 to less than $35,000) 0 5 
f. Less than $50,000 If "no," ask g ($35,000 to less than $50,000) 0 6 
g. Less than $75,000 If "no," code h ($50,000 to $75,000) 0 7 
h. $75,000 or more 0 8 
 
Don't know/Not sure 7 7 
Refused 9 9  
(Do not read these 
Responses) 










The missing data for income are displayed in Table 6.1 for all working-age female respondents 
across 2000-ヲヰヱヵ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW ｪWﾐWヴ;デWS ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ﾗa けﾉWゲゲ デｴ;ﾐ ガヱヰがヰヰヰげく Iデ ゲｴﾗ┘ゲ デｴ;デ デｴW 
missing across all waves was approximately 13 per cent, with a reasonably even split between 
those デｴ;デ けrefusWSげ and ┘WヴW けnot sureげ. TｴW I;デWｪﾗヴ┞ ﾗa けOデｴWヴ Mｷゲゲｷﾐｪげ ヴﾗゲW デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾗ┌デ デｴW 
period. It is unclear why this is; however this is unlikely to have a major impact on the findings 
given that all missing data were dropped. Further analysis was undertaken to explore the 
socioeconomic dynamics of this group (see Appendix C, Table C.1). This showed that low 
educated and unemployed single mothers and non-white respondents were more likely to 
report their income as missing. Clearly, this preliminary analysis suggests some caution should 
be exercised when using the income variable, although this would be a likely issue with all 
such variables. Weighting is used throughout the analysis (discussed below) which may 
remove some bias. Nonetheless, 13 per cent is a high number of missing and the 





Table 6.1. Missingness of data for Income, Working-Age Female 
Respondents, BRFSS 2000-2015. 
Income Less 
than $10,000 
2000 2005 2010 2015 Total Percentages 
No 67,467 121,820 145,465 122,775 457,527 81.8 
Yes 4,275 7,450 9,890 7,829 29,444 5.3 
Don't Know 4,276 8,049 9,595 11,568 33,488 6.0 
Refusal 5,788 8,440 10,485 12,637 37,350 6.7 
Other Missing 0 54 177 1,227 1,458 0.3 
Total Missing 10,064 16,543 20,257 25,432 72,296 13.0 
Total 81,806 145,813 175,612 156,036 559,267 100.0 
 
Finally, the following individual level variables are included: low educated single mother, 
unemployed single mother, age, marital status, ethnicity and education. The first two of these 
に low educated & unemployed single mothers に are exposure variables of substantive 
interest. The other five variables are used as controls. The BRFSS does not have a question 
around whether or not someone has children. The closest approximation to this is a question 
which asks how many children under the age of 16 live in the household67. All women that 
live within a household with one or more children are considered parents. The variable for 
single mothers is then created by selecting unmarried/not cohabiting women with at least 
one child in the household. It is unfortunate that the BRFSS does not have a variable that 
directly ascertains whether someone is a parent as clearly in some cases adult respondents 
living in households with children will not be parents. Nonetheless, the generated variable for 
single mothers is a reasonable approximation, based on the same method as that of Basu et 
al. (2016).  
This variable is further refined to represent only those single mothers with a low level of 
education. This was based on a question around the number of years of school completed. 
The recommended approach for operationalising education was taken from the BRFSS 
IﾗSWHﾗﾗﾆが ┘ｴWヴWH┞ デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ けSｷS ﾐﾗデ ｪヴ;S┌;デW ｴｷｪｴ ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉげ ┘Wre coded as 1, those that 
                                                          
67 This variable was cleaned so that all those that claimed to have more than seven children in the household 
were deleted as these were likely to be missing and in any case this represented less than 0.1 per cent of the 
sample. Moreover, these are unlikely to represent families in receipt of TANF benefits as the majority of these 




けｪヴ;S┌;デWS ｴｷｪｴ ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉげ ┘WヴW IﾗSWS ;ゲ ヲが デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ け;デデWﾐSWS IﾗﾉﾉWｪW ﾗヴ デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉげ 
weヴW ン ;ﾐS デｴﾗゲW デｴ;デ けｪヴ;S┌;デWS aヴﾗm college or technical schoolげ ┘Wre 4. The final dummy 
variable is then single mothers that did not graduate high school. A dummy is also created for 
unemployed single mothers. 
All observations for males and those of non-working age (<18 or >65) 68 are dropped from the 
sample. Age is included as a standardised variable (z values). Marital status is also made in to 
a dummy, where 0 = not married or a member of an unmarried couple and 1 = married or a 
member of an unmarried couple. A control is also included for race using a dummy where 0 
= white and 1 = non-white. Last, the regression models include a control for wave to hold 
constant the effect of any changes in outcome variables between waves. In all forthcoming 
inferential analyses, the populations are weighted to adjust for unequal probabilities of 
selection and non-coverage/nonresponse biases69.  
 
Research Strategy and Statistical Approach 
As with the previous empirical chapters, this chapter seeks evidence for causal pathways that 
connect cash benefits policies and health inequalities. It is structured in a similar way to 
Chapters Four and Five. The first stage in the analysis explores the impact of TANF policies via 
process and employment effects. It then ends by assessing the full impact of TANF on health 
inequalities. At each stage, ; けデヴW;デﾏWﾐデげ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ｷゲ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWS ┘ｷデｴ ; けIﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉげが ┘ｷデｴ 
the aim of gaining further insights in to the effects of policies through these pathways. The 
three relationships of central interest are described in Table 6.2 alongside the dependent 
variables and population groups used to investigate these. 
                                                          
68 Retirement age in the US is traditionally 65 years old. It is possible to take early retirement at age 62 and take 
a smaller proportion of retirement benefits. 
69 In the BRFSS there are two steps to weighting: design weighting and iterative proportional fitting. Prior to 
2010, the BRFSS used post-stratification weighting methods to adjust for sociodemographic characteristics (e.g. 
age, gender, ethnicity and geographic region). In 2011, a different statistical method was used に raking に which 
extended the number of characteristics which could be weighted (including education, marital status, home 
ownership). To account for this, sensitivity tests are conducted which re-run the analysis removing the 2015 




Table 6.2. Summary of Stages of Research Strategy in Chapter Six. 
 
TｴW aｷヴゲデ ゲデ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWゲ デｴW けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa TANF IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲく 
The outcome variable is the continuous measure of mental ill-health and the interest is in 
differences in the impact of TANF on the mental health of unemployed single mothers 
(treatment) vs employed (control) mothers (see Table 6.2). A series of OLS and fixed effects 
regression models are created where the interaction term is for unemployed vs employed 
single mothers70 71. The following research hypothesis is tested here: 
                                                          
70 Throughout this chapter the data has a three-level structure of 件 噺 な ┼ 券 individuals within 倹 噺 な ┼ 券 states 
and 倦 噺 な ┼ 券 time points. A series of cluster-robust OLS regression models are fitted where the final model is 
as follows:  
 MHEALTH辿棚谷 噺  が待辿棚谷 髪  が怠DEM辿棚谷 髪  が態CONTEXT辿棚谷 髪 が戴TANF棚谷 髪 が替UNEM辿棚谷 髪 が泰GDP棚谷 髪  が滞TANF棚谷茅 が胎UNEM辿棚谷 髪  が腿GDP棚谷 茅 が苔UNEM辿棚谷 髪  が怠待WAVE 髪  鉛辿棚谷 
 
ぐ┘ｴWヴW デｴW ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏW ｷゲ ; Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ﾗ┌ゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴ ﾗa ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ 岫MHEALTH岻┻ I control for socio-demographic 
characteristics of age, marital status, ethnicity and education, denoted by DEM┻ The confounding influence of 
GDP, maximum monthly benefits and political/citizen ideology are also included (denoted CONTEXT above). 
The three TANF variables に sanctions, welfare-to-work spending and job search に are interacted separately in a 
series of models with the dummy for unemployed single mother. These interaction effects are shown by が滞TANF棚谷 茅 が胎UNEM辿棚谷┸ where the effect of TANF policies is denoted by TANF棚谷 and unemployed single 
mothers are UNEM┻ Each model also includes a control for GDP and unemployed single mother (が腿GDP棚谷 茅が苔UNEM辿棚谷岻┸ for the survey wave 岫が怠待WAVE) and a random error term (鉛辿棚谷岻┻  
 
 
71 The fixed effects model is the same as above, except an extra parameter 紅怠怠 is included for N-1 dummy 
variables for each state. In each case, fixed effects models are calculated on Stata using ordinary regression 
techniques (REGRESS or LOGISTIC commands) with state controls. The results from each of these fixed effects 
ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ ┘WヴW Wケ┌ｷ┗;ﾉWﾐデ デﾗ ┌ゲｷﾐｪ デｴW XT‘EG ﾗヴ XTLOGIT Iﾗﾏﾏ;ﾐSゲが ゲヮWIｷa┞ｷﾐｪ けゲデ;デWげ ;ゲ デｴW ヮ;ﾐWﾉ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ふ┌ゲｷﾐｪ 
XTSET) and including the けaWげ ﾗヮデｷﾗﾐく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが IﾗﾐaｷSWﾐIW ｷﾐデWヴ┗;ﾉゲ ┘WヴW ﾏﾗヴW Bｷゲﾏ;ヴIﾆｷ;ﾐ ┘ｴWﾐ ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ‘EG ﾗヴ 
Conceptual Interest Empirical Interest Outcome 
Variable 
Treatment Population Control 
Population 
     
Process Effects Mental health of 
unemployed 
Mental Health Unemployed Single Mother Employed 
mothers 
Employment Effects Employment and income 
outcomes 
Unemployment; 
Income < $10,000 
Low Educated Single Mother Other 
mothers 
Health Inequalities Inequalities in Mental 
Health 




H1:  States with high welfare-to-work spending, stricter work requirements and less 
stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental health between 
unemployed single mothers and employed mothers. 
TｴW ゲWIﾗﾐS ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｷゲ デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa TANF ┗ｷ; けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげく WｴｷﾉW ゲヮ;IW 
does not permit the use of mediation analysis (as with Chapter Five), the chapter nonetheless 
explores whether the level of self-reported unemployment varies as a function of TANF 
policies. To arrive at a better understanding of the impact of TANF, the effect of TANF policies 
is similarly split across treatment (low educated single mothers) and control (other mothers) 
groups. Logistic regression methods are then used to regress the binary outcome (self-
reported unemployment) on TANF policies across these population groups72. Odds ratios are 
then reported where a value <1= lower odds of reporting unemployment and a value >1 = 
higher odds. As before, the robustness of these models is tested using a fixed effects model, 
with dummy variables for N-1 states. At this stage, a second outcome is considered: the 
impact of TANF policies on deep poverty for low educated single mothers. Logit models are 
similarly fitted with a binary outcome where 1 = those earning less than $10,000 per year73, 
and the effect of TANF policies is compared for low educated single mothers (treatment) and 
                                                          
LOGISTIC commands. This option is also preferable as it allows the inclusion of weights, where the XT commands 
do not. 
 
72 Here, the LOGISTIC function on Stata is used to calculate the probability of unemployment as: 
 Pr盤UNEMP 噺 な弁x辿棚匪 噺 �淡┅痴岫な 髪 �淡┅痴岻 噺 lo�it岫x┅が岻 
 
The outcome of self-reported unemployment 岫UNEMP) is regressed on to a logit model with the same control 
variables as above, except the interest is in the effect for low educated (rather than unemployed) single mothers 
(where low educated single mothers are denoted as LOWED辿棚谷: 
 Pr岫 UNEMP弁x辿棚谷匪 噺  Lo�it岫が待辿棚谷 髪 が怠DEM辿棚谷 髪  が態CONTEXT辿棚谷 髪 が戴TANF棚谷 髪 が替LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が泰GDP棚谷 髪 が滞TANF棚谷 茅 が胎LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が腿GDP棚谷 茅 が苔LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が怠待WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚谷岻. 
 
Once again, the fixed effects specification includes an additional covariate 紅怠怠 for N-1 state dummies. 
 
73 The final model for low income is identical to the logit model above for unemployment, except the outcome 
is low income 岫INC岻 rather than self-reported unemployment.  
 Pr岫 INC弁x辿棚谷匪 噺  Lo�it岫が待辿棚谷 髪  が怠DEM辿棚谷 髪  が態CONTEXT辿棚谷 髪 が戴TANF棚谷 髪 が替LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が泰GDP棚谷 髪 が滞TANF棚谷 茅 が胎LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が腿GDP棚谷 茅 が苔LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が怠待WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚谷岻. 
 




all other mothers (control). Controls for N-1 states are also included in the fixed effects model. 
The chapter tests the following two-part hypothesis as stated in Chapter Three: 
H2: a. States with harsh sanctions will have a wider gap in the level of self-reported 
unemployment and deep poverty between low educated single mothers and 
other mothers. 
b. States with high welfare-to-work spending and strict work requirements will 
have a narrower gap in the level of self-reported unemployment and deep 
poverty between low educated single mothers and other mothers.  
 
Finally, the analysis explores the overall relationship between TANF conditionality and health 
inequalities. It does this by examining the relationship between TANF policies and inequalities 
in mental health between low educated single mothers (the treatment group) and all other 
mothers (the control) (see Table 6.2). Linear and fixed effects regression models are fitted to 
see whether these inequalities vary across states and if this variation is linked with differences 
in the design and generosity of the three TANF variables (welfare-to-work policies, work 
requirements and sanctions) 74. Based on the prior theoretical discussions, the following 
research hypothesis is tested: 
H3:  States with more generous welfare-to-work programmes, stricter work 
requirements and less stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental 




Table 6.3 presents summary statistics for the individual level variables from the BRFSS across 
the four waves from 2000 to 2015. Excluding men and those of non-working age, there were 
a total of 559,267 observations across 4 waves and 50 states. Of these, 10,090 were low 
educated single mothers and 8,062 were unemployed single mothers. The mean days of 
mental ill-health was 7.8 for low educated single mothers and 8.2 for unemployed single 
                                                          
74Here the final OLS model can be expressed as follows: 




mothers, while it was 4.4 days for other mothers. The median number of days is also reported. 
This was 0 among women and mothers, and 2 for low educated/unemployed single mothers. 
Low educated single mothers were around five times more likely to have an income less than 
$10,000 compared with other women and mothers (30.5 per cent), while unemployed single 
mothers were more likely still (32.6 per cent). Mothers were younger than the average female 
and low educated/unemployed single mothers were younger still. There were 113,263 non-
white women, accounting for 20.5 per cent of the total sample. The proportion of non-white 
women was highest among low educated single mothers (50.1 per cent). A table with a fuller 
breakdown of the employment and income variables is available in Appendix C, Table C.2. 
 





Single Mothers Mothers Women 
     
Total n (nonmissing) 10,090 8,062 242,193 559,267 
     
Mental Health     
  n (nonmissing) 9,811 7,925 239,231 551,494 
  Mean days ill-health  7.8 8.2 4.4 4.4 
  Median days ill-health 2 2 0 0 
      
Employment Status     
  n (nonmissing) 10,015 8,062 241,396 556,617 
  Unemployed (%) 16.1 100 6.3 5.9 
  Employed (%) 42.6 - 65.8 64.4 
  Other (%) 41.3 - 27.9 29.7 
     
Income     
  n (nonmissing) 8,115 6,790 216,186 486,971 
  <$10,000 (%) 30.5 32.6 5.5 6.1 
  >$10,000 (%) 69.5 67.4 94.5 94.0 
     
 
Table 6.4 then provides descriptive information on the core state-level TANF variables which 
are combined with the BRFSS data. In Appendix C, Table C.3 similar descriptive statistics are 
shown for the control variables (maximum monthly benefit, GDP, unemployment rate, citizen 
and political ideology). Over 4 waves and 50 states there are 196 total observations. Thirty-
164 
 
aﾗ┌ヴ ゲデ;デWゲ ｴ;S ; け┗Wヴ┞ ﾉWﾐｷWﾐデげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ;デ ゲﾗﾏW ヮﾗｷﾐデ ﾗ┗Wヴ the four years, while 78 had a 
け┗Wヴ┞ ゲW┗WヴWげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐく Oﾐﾉ┞ ンヴくヵ ヮWヴ IWﾐデ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS ; ﾃﾗH ゲW;ヴIｴ ;デ ﾗﾐW ヮﾗｷﾐデが ┘ｴｷﾉW ﾐW;ヴﾉ┞ デ┘ﾗ-
thirds did not. On average, states spent $697 on welfare-to-work programmes although there 
was substantial variance in this figure (S.D. = $766.2). Four observations needed to be 
dropped for this variable as these were missing, yielding 196 total observations.  
 
Table 6.4. Summary Statistics for State-Level TANF Variables 2000-2015, 




N (Non-Missing) 196 
Very Lenient (N) 301 
Lenient (N) 71 
Severe (N) 18 
Very Severe (N) 77 
  
Job Search  
N (Non-Missing) 196 
No (%) 65.5 
Yes (%) 34.5 
  
Welfare-to-Work  
N (Non-Missing) 196 
Mean ($) 697.4 
Standard Deviation ($) 766.2 
  
 
Notes: 1N refers to the number of states which had a sanction within this category at some point in 
2000, 2005, 2010 or 2015. 
 
The next part of the descriptive analysis explores whether there are within-state similarities 
in the severity of sanctions and job search requirements and expenditure on welfare-to-work 
policies. This is examined in Figures 6.3 to 6.5 which show the relationships between job 
search and welfare-to-work, sanctions and welfare-to-work and sanctions and job search, 
respectively. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show a clear tendency for states that have stringent job 















programmes. Conversely, Figure 6.5 does not show any strong evidence of a relationship 
between job search and sanctions.  
The approach in this thesis has been to treat welfare-to-work policies as a separate and 
SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ふデｴW け;Iデｷ┗;デｷﾗﾐげ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW aW;デ┌ヴe). Yet these 
descriptive statistics suggest that states with higher welfare-to-work spending also tend to 
have more stringent conditionality policies. On this basis, we can surmise that states can be 
divided conceptually in to two categories: those which combine positive and negative 
incentive structures to encourage and enforce labour market participation and those with 
weaker conditionality policies which have less of both positive and negative incentives.    
 

















































TANF Trends 2000-2015 
The analysis in this chapter is concerned with both variation across states in TANF policies and 
changes over time in TANF policies within states. To assess, descriptively, the extent to which 
states changed their TANF practices over the period 2000-2015, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 give some 
basic information on trends in the TANF data. 
 
 Sanction 
Job Search Lenient Stringent 
None (N) 18 48 
  Percent 60.0 61.5 
    
Required (N) 12 30 
  Percent 40.0 38.5 
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Table 6.5. Trends in TANF Policies 2000-2015, Welfare Rules Database & 







Table 6.5 shows averages for sanction severity and welfare-to-work spending in each of the 
four years and variations in the number of states that required job search over this fifteen-
year period. From this table, there is evidence that states became marginally more severe in 
their sanctioning policies throughout the period with the greatest change between 2000 and 
2005. It also shows that there was a rise in the number of states requiring job search through 
to 2010, although this declined somewhat by 2015. Moreover, spending on welfare-to-work 
rose dramatically between 2005 and 2010, as a likely response to the 2008 financial crisis and 
probably also reflecting the extra resources available to states through the 2009 American 










TANF Variable 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Sanction Severity 
(Mean across States) 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.9 
Number of States 
Requiring Job Search 16 18 21 17 
Welfare-to-work 
(Mean Expenditure) 333.4 363.8 955.2 904.3 
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Table 6.6. Type of Change in TANF Policies 2000-2015, Welfare Rules 
Database & TANF Financial Data, Percentages. 







Sanction Severity 65 2975 0 6 
Requires Job Search 61 16 14 10 
Welfare-to-work  0 0 33 67 
 
 
To gain a better picture of the kinds of changes that occurred across states throughout the 
period, Table 6.6 shows the percentage of states that had no change, became more 
severe/stringent, more lenient or generous or whose policies did not exhibit a clear trajectory 
towards greater stringency or generosity (fluctuated). Twenty-nine per cent of all states 
becoming more stringent in their sanctioning policies throughout this period. Three states 
(Arkansas, Indiana and Texas) even went from maximum leniency to maximum stringency in 
their sanctioning policies. No states became more lenient and only 6 per cent fluctuated, 
while 65 per cent of states stayed the same. For job search, the majority similarly stayed the 
same (61 per cent), while a more even balance became more stringent/lenient or fluctuated. 
For welfare-to-work spending, no states remained the same or became more stringent. One- 
third became more lenient, while two-thirds fluctuated. Overall, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 suggest 
that there were meaningful changes in TANF policies across states over the period of 2000 to 
2015. There appears to be a general trend of tighter sanctions, alongside greater investment 
in welfare-to-work policies. The majority of states remained fairly stable in their TANF policies, 
with the exception of welfare-to-work spending which was highly variable across years.  
 
                                                          
75 While 29 per cent of all states became more severe in their sanctioning practices (according to the 1-4 scale), 
6 per cent of states became dramatically more stringent, increasing from 1 to 4 in severity. These three states 
were Arkansas, Indiana and Texas. 
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Trends in Health Inequalities, 1995-2015 
The interest in this chapter is how the TANF policies described above affect health 
inequalities. This section assesses evidence from the BRFSS on inequalities in mental health 
in the United States throughout the period in question. In the BRFSS, data are available prior 
to the passage of TANF so the analysis is extended to include mental health data from 1995 
to 2015. In the remainder of this chapter, it is only possible to look back as far as 2000 as TANF 
data only stretches back this far. 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show (respectively) how i) the mental health gap between low and high 
educated people (both men and women) has evolved over the past twenty years and ii) how 
single and low educated single mothers have fared in mental health terms compared with 
other low educated people. Figure 6.6 suggests that the mental health of low educated 
people has got worse over the period in question, although the confidence intervals overlap 
in all cases except 1995 to 2000. Hence, while these trends are evident for members of the 
sample, we cannot be certain that they are true of the entire population. In contrast, Figure 
6.6 also suggests that the mental health of the highest educated (those that have completed 
college education) has remained stable and good (less than 3 days on average) throughout 


















































To further understand the possible effects of TANF, Figure 6.7 subdivides trends in mental 
health into further population groups. The blue bars show the same results as for Figure 6.6 
(low educated) and indicate a clear trend of worsening mental health up till 2010, with a slight 
improvement between 2010 and 2015. This is compared against the: average mental health 
trajectory for all education groups in the dotted red line, mental health of single mothers 
(green bar) and low educated single mothers (yellow bar). The results show that being a single 
mother per se appears to have a (negative) impact on mental health of a similar magnitude 
to being low educated. There appears to be a slight increase in mental ill-health for single 
mothers over the period which follows a similar gradient to that of the population at large 
(mean dotted line). However, the graph suggests that low educated single mothers do 
consistently worse than both low educated people and (average) single mothers throughout 
デｴW ヮWヴｷﾗSく Iﾐ ゲｴﾗヴデが デｴWヴW ;ヮヮW;ヴゲ デﾗ HW ; けSﾗ┌HﾉW H┌ヴSWﾐげ ﾗa ﾉﾗ┘ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ゲｷﾐｪﾉW 
motherhood. However, for low educated single mothers the confidence intervals were wide 
                                                          
76 The data in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 represent average marginal effects from cluster-robust regression models, 
































Low Educated Single Mother
Low Educated Single Mother Mean
due to smaller sample sizes and this was particularly the case in 2010. As a more general point, 
we should be somewhat cautious of these results as confidence intervals frequently overlap 
between the population groups, suggesting that differences might not represent true 
population effects. 
 
Figure 6.777: Trends in Mental Health by Education and Single Mother Status, 











In sum, these early bits of analysis suggest that i) both low education and single motherhood 
are associated with poor mental health ii) the gap between low and high educated people 
may have widened over time iii) being both a single mother and low educated is a high risk 
for poor mental health and this risk seems to have risen over time. The latter finding implies 
that changes in TANF provision may have had an impact on mental health, as those women 
most likely to receive TANF will be both single mothers and low educated. The chapter now 
                                                          
77 The mean change in mental health was significant at p<0.01. The interaction between education and wave 
was significant at p<0.01, while that of single mothers and low educated single mothers was non-significant. 
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proceeds to evaluate the effects of TANF on health inequalities, beginning with the causal 




The first causal pathway of interest is the impact of TANF policies on mental health during 
┌ﾐWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ふけヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげぶく “ヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が ┘W デWゲデ デｴW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ｴ┞pothesis: 
H1:  States with high welfare-to-work spending, stricter work requirements and less 
stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental health between 
unemployed single mothers and employed mothers. 
Table 6.7 shows the effect of each of the TANF variables on the mental health of unemployed 
single mothers, relative to employed mothers (M1-M3), with full controls (M4) and state fixed 
effects (M5). In this table and all those that follow in this chapter, figures in bold indicate 
coefficients which differ significantly from zero or one (depending on whether the outcome 
is continuous or binary). Each model controls for the mean effect of TANF policies, contextual 
and individual confounders (coefficients shown in Appendix C, Table C.4). The analysis 
suggests that only job search requirements have a differential impact on the mental health of 
unemployed single mothers (紅 噺 な┻にぬ┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻にば┸ に┻なひ in model 5), relative to employed 
mothers. For the other TANF variables, the 紅 values are changeable across models and the 
confidence intervals contain zero, suggesting that the coefficients may not significantly differ 
from a null effect. Contrary to the above hypothesis, the effect of job search seems to be 
detrimental, whereby states with job search requirements have wider inequalities in mental 
health between these two groups. There is therefore some evidence for a causal connection 
HWデ┘WWﾐ TANF IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ┗ｷ; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげが ;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ 
this seems to suggest that more stringent conditionality may contribute to wider health 
inequalities. It is also worth noting that the R-squared value does not increase by much 
between models 4 and 5, suggesting that the TANF and other contextual variables explain the 
majority of cross-state variation in mental health. 
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Notes: each model controls for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, education, the mean effect of TANF policies, GDP, GDP*single unemployed mother, 
government and citizen ideology and wave. Full results for these coefficients are shown in Appendix C, Table C.4. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 
2Reference group: no job search, 3Z-values where the coefficient represents the change in each one standard deviation increase in spending, 4Reference 












Fixed Effects (M5) 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
           
TANF* Single Unemployed 
Mother 
          
 Stringent Sanction1 0.26 (-1.58  2.09)     0.96 (-0.40  2.31) 0.96 (-0.40  2.31) 
 Job Search Required2   1.26 (0.28  2.23)   1.28 (0.32  2.23) 1.23 (0.27  2.19) 
 Welfare-to-Work3     -0.20 (-0.60  0.20) -0.24 (-0.59  0.11) -0.23 (-0.59  0.12) 
 Max. Monthly Benefit       0.62 (0.02  1.21) 0.64 (-0.00  1.27) 
           
Individual           
 Single Unemployed 
Mother4 1.97 (0.75  3.18) 1.83 (1.11  2.56) 2.29 (1.76  2.82) 1.21 (0.05  2.37) 1.24 (0.07  2.40) 






















To further assess the causal pathways, the next part of the analysis explores the impact of 
TANF ┗ｷ; けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デ┘ﾗ-part hypothesis: 
H2: a. States with harsh sanctions will have a wider gap in the level of self-reported 
unemployment and deep poverty between low educated single mothers and 
other mothers. 
b. States with high welfare-to-work spending and strict work requirements will 
have a narrower gap in the level of self-reported unemployment and deep 
poverty between low educated single mothers and other mothers.  
 
In Tables 6.8 and 6.9 the outcome variables are (respectively) i) self-reported unemployment 
and ii) low income (< $10,000) and these are regressed on to interactions between TANF 
policies and low educated single mothers. The interaction coefficients therefore represent 
the difference in the effects of TANF policies between low educated single mothers and other 
mothers. Each model uses cluster-robust logistic regression and odds ratios are reported with 
95% confidence intervals. Any odds ratios where the confidence interval differs significantly 
from one are highlighted in bold. In both tables, models 1-3 include each interaction 
separately, model 4 has all controls and model 5 is the fixed effects model which controls for 
N-1 state dummy variables. 
Turning first to the impact of TANF policies on self-reported unemployment (H2a), there are 
indications from Table 6.8 that in states with stringent sanctions, harsher job search 
requirements and generous welfare-to-work policies, low educated single mothers are more 
likely to report themselves unemployed, relative to other mothers. Each of the odds ratios is 
above one, with the strongest effect in states with higher sanctions (e.g. in model 5 頚穴穴嫌 迎欠建件剣 噺 な┻なば┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻ぱば┸ な┻のぱ岻. However, in each case the odds ratios were 
reasonably wide and contained one, suggesting that the effects could be weak or non-
significant. Given this, the evidence is not strong enough to conclude that these TANF policies 
are causally related on employment outcomes. 
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Table 6.8. Relationship between TANF Policies and Self-Reported Unemployment for Low Educated Single Mothers 












Notes: each model controls for age, marital status, ethnicity, the mean effect of TANF policies, GDP, GDP*single low educated mother, government and 
citizen ideology, and wave. Full results for these coefficients are shown in Appendix C, Table C.5. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 2Reference group: 
no job search, 3Z-values where the coefficient represents the change in each one standard deviation increase in spending, 4Reference group: other mothers.
Variables Logit (M1) Logit (M2) Logit (M3) Logit (M4) Fixed Effects (M5) 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
           
Policy* Single Low Ed. 
Mother 
          
  Stringent Sanction1 1.17 (0.89  1.53)     1.19 (0.88  1.61) 1.17 (0.87  1.58) 
  Job Search Required2   1.11 (0.92  1.35)   1.11 (0.91  1.37) 1.12 (0.91  1.38) 
  Welfare-to-Work3     1.06 (0.96  1.17) 1.04 (0.92  1.18) 1.04 (0.92  1.17) 
  Max. Monthly Benefit       1.04 (0.91  1.19) 1.02 (0.89  1.18) 
           
Individual           
  Single Low Ed. Mother4 2.03 (1.69  2.44) 2.27 (2.03  2.54) 2.41 (2.20  2.64) 1.95 (1.60  2.38) 1.91 (1.58  2.31) 




















To explore these relationships further, the three TANF policy variables were correlated with 
state unemployment rates using bivariate statistics (see Appendix C, Figures C.2, C.3 and C.4). 
While this is less convincing as evidence for causality as low educated single mothers are the 
key target group of TANF and we would therefore expect stronger effects in this group, it is 
an important robustness test nonetheless. Mirroring the results from Rector and Yousseff 
(1999) (although with a larger number of observations (N=195) and more up-to-date data), 
the bivariate analysis found no evidence that states with more stringent conditionality 
requirements have lower unemployment rates. In fact, it (similarly to Rector and Yousseff) 
found that unemployment is slightly higher in these states. Overall, we cannot be confident 
that TANF policies have a significant relationship with the incidence of self-reported 
unemployment due to the uncertainty around the estimates in Table 6.8 and the results of 
these supplementary analyses. 
NﾗﾐWデｴWﾉWゲゲが ｷデ ｷゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デｴ;デ ┘W aｷﾐS ゲデヴﾗﾐｪWヴ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ﾗa けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ｷa ┘W 
examine the relationship between these policies and self-reported income. Table 6.9 explores 
this through a series of logistic regression models which model the impact of TANF on 
inequalities in self-reported low income between single low educated and other mothers. A 
value above one indicates a greater likelihood of reporting an income below $10,000, where 
a value below one suggests lower odds. The full tables with all odds ratios are in Appendix C, 
Table C.6. Table 6.9 shows that states with harsh sanctions (M1) and higher spending on 
welfare-to-work (M3) each had higher odds of deep poverty among low educated single 
mothers, relative to other mothers. These effects were moderate 岫紅 噺 な┻には┸ sanctions┸ 紅 噺な┻など┸ w�l�ar� to work), although the lower bounds for the confidence intervals of each of 
these variables were only just above 1, suggesting the effect could be weak. In model 4, the 
magnitude of the effects of each of these variables reduced and confidence intervals moved 
further to the left, reducing confidence in these effects. This is even true for maximum 
monthly benefit, which does not significantly impact on the magnitude of the gaps in self-
reported income between single low educated and other mothers. In sensitivity tests, the 
same models were inputted using $15,000 as the outcome variable. The results from this are 
discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
Overall, there is no convincing evidence, based on the methods used in this chapter, that 
TANF ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ｴ;┗W ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ┗ｷ; けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげく Tｴe 
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stringency of TANF conditionality did not have an impact on the odds of low educated single 
mothers reporting themselves as either unemployed or earning less than $10,000. While 
there may be some unavoidable measurement issues (e.g. high missing data for income), the 
approach has been careful and has included a range of control variables as well as fixed effects 
for states. It is also reassuring that the results from the bivariate analysis of TANF and 
unemployment rates supported the main findings, as well as those of Rector and Yousseff 
(1999). The chapter ends by assessing the full effects of TANF conditionality on health 
inequalities, to see whether there is evidence of an overall relationship despite so far finding 






Table 6.9. Impact of TANF Policies on Odds of Deep Poverty (<$10,000) for Single Low Educated Mothers relative to 













Notes: each model controls for age, marital status, ethnicity, the mean effect of TANF policies, GDP, GDP*single low educated mother, government and 
citizen ideology, and wave. Full results for these coefficients are shown in Appendix C, Table C.6. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 2Reference group: 
no job search, 3Z-values where the coefficient represents the change in each one standard deviation increase in spending, 4Reference group: other mothers.
Variables Logit (M1) Logit (M2) Logit (M3) Logit (M4) Fixed Effects (M5) 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Policy* Single Low Ed.  
Mother 
          
  Stringent Sanction1 1.26 (1.03  1.55)     1.13 (0.86  1.49) 1.13 (0.85  1.50) 
  Job Search Required2   1.02 (0.82  1.28)   0.98 (0.79  1.21) 0.98 (0.80  1.22) 
  Welfare-to-Work3     1.10 (1.01  1.20) 1.08 (0.97  1.21) 1.08 (0.97  1.20) 
  Max. Monthly Benefit       0.93 (0.83  1.05) 0.92 (0.82  1.05) 
           
Individual           
  Single Low Ed. Mother4 2.67 (2.35  3.03) 3.17 (2.82  3.57) 3.28 (2.92  3.69) 2.81 (2.38  3.31) 2.71 (2.28  3.21) 





















The final stage in the analysis therefore tests the third research hypothesis: 
H3:  States with more generous welfare-to-work programmes, stricter work 
requirements and less stringent sanctions will have less inequalities in mental 
health between low educated single mothers and other mothers. 
Table 6.10 shows the results from a series of interaction effects which model the differential 
impact of the TANF policies variables on the mental health of low educated single mothers, 
relative to other mothers. As before, models 1-4 include interaction effects for the three TANF 
policy variables and monthly benefit in model 4. Model 5 then includes all these interaction 
effects, as well as state fixed effects. A table with all control coefficients is available in 
Appendix C, Table C.7. 
For each of the TANF policy variables, the coefficients in the interaction effects are positive 
and reasonably substantial. This is even the case in models 4 and 5 with full controls and fixed 
effects. The confidence intervals were also significantly different from zero, although in each 
case they were also wide, due to the reasonably small sample sizes (N=195 state-wave 
observations). This suggests that states with more stringent sanctions, compulsory job search 
and higher welfare-to-work spending have greater inequalities in mental health between low 
educated single mothers and other mothers. This part of the results is partially in line with 
the expectations of the above hypothesis (H3). States with less stringent sanctions did have 
less health inequalities. Yet contrary to expectations, states with higher welfare-to-work 
spending and stricter work requirements had greater inequalities in mental health. For each 
of these policy areas there was also evidence that the magnitude of inequalities in mental 
health widened when states became more stringent in their sanctions, introduced job search 




Table 6.10. Impact of TANF Policies on inequalities in mental health between single low educated mothers and other 
mothers, Coefficients. 
 
Notes: each model controls for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, wave, unemployment rate, the mean effect of TANF policies, GDP, GDP*Single Low Ed. 
Mother. Full results for these coefficients are shown in Appendix C, Table C.7. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 2Reference group: no job search, 3Z-










Fixed Effects (M5) 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
           
Policy* Single Low Ed. 
Mother 
          
 Stringent Sanction1 1.17 (0.18  2.16)     1.09 (0.13  2.06) 1.04 (0.06  2.03) 
 Job Search Required2   1.33 (0.45  2.22)   1.21 (0.33  2.10) 1.10 (0.20  1.99) 
 Welfare-to-Work3      0.48 (0.13  0.83) 0.40 (0.05  0.76) 0.39 (0.03  0.74) 
 Max. Monthly Benefit       0.31 (-0.08  0.69) 0.27 (-0.13  0.67) 
           
Individual           
   Single Low Ed. Mother4 0.78 (0.04  1.51) 1.17 (0.69  1.65) 1.67 (1.23  2.12) 0.55 (-0.11  1.21) 0.58 (-0.09  1.25) 





















These findings are surprising given that there was only tentative evidence for causal 
IﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐゲ ┗ｷ; けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲく They suggest that there may be other 
causal pathways connecting TANF conditionality with health inequalities, which are not 
accounted for in this analysis. To investigate these interaction effects further, the coefficients 
from Table 6.10, model 5 are shown as predicted probabilities. Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 show 
the effect of sanctions, job search and welfare-to-work, respectively.  
Figure 6.8 shows that the effect of stringent sanctions is weak, while job search and welfare-
to-work policies have a stronger detrimental effect on the mental health of low educated 
single mothers. For both job search and welfare-to-work spending, the difference equates 
with approximately one day worse mental health for low educated single mothers between 
most and least stringent states. Figure 6.8 also suggests that for reasons which are unclear, 
states with more stringent sanctions have worse mental health among other mothers, 
suggesting that there are background factors which are not accounted for in the models. In 
each case confidence intervals are wide meaning that we cannot be certain of the magnitude 
of the effects. Nonetheless, the overall implication of these results is that low educated single 
mothers living in states with more stringent conditionality requirements tend to report worse 
mental health than those in less stringent states.  
To interpret these results correctly, it is helpful to refer to the descriptive statistics presented 
earlier in the chapter. These showed that states with compulsory job search requirements 
and harsh sanctions also tended to spend more on welfare-to-work programmes. These states 
┘WヴW SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ デｴﾗゲW ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;S けｷﾐデWﾐゲW IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げく WｴｷﾉW T;HﾉW ヶくヱヰ ゲｴﾗ┘ゲ that each 
of the TANF policies have effects net of one another (in models 4 and 5) it seems likely that 
these effects represent an overall impact of intense conditionality, which seems to impact 
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Notes: Average Marginal Effects based on the sanctions interaction effect with low educated single 
mother in Table 6.10, model 5. Interaction is significant at p<0.05. 
 
 










Notes: Average Marginal Effects based on the job search interaction effect with low educated single 














Notes: Average Marginal Effects based on the welfare-to-work interaction effect with low educated 




The regression modelling procedure in this chapter has been largely similar to that in Chapters 
Four and Five. In the most part, it has relied on cluster-robust regression techniques with the 
addition of fixed effects models in the final stages of each analysis. Both of these approaches 
are suitable for dealing with clustered data such as that in this chapter. Appendix C, Tables 
C.4 to C.7 show the full list of coefficients for each of the stages in the analysis. 
 
Random Effects Modelling 
The main sensitivity tests check the robustness of the key findings using another approach to 
clustered data に random effects. The main difference between the random and fixed effects 
models is that the former allows the estimation of a random error term for the level 2 data. 
It is only possible to use this approach in this chapter as the number of level 2 cluster variables 
is large (N=195). Here, the random effects procedure allows us to estimate the proportion of 
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explained by state or time effects. The multilevel structure is a simple two-level model of 
individuals within states/waves. A recent paper suggested that for data such as these a more 
complex procedure should be adopted (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2015). Yet this was not 
standard practice at the time of writing this chapter and is not felt to be necessary given that 
the random effects models are for the purposes of sensitivity only. 
A mixture of random effects maximum likelihood linear models and random effects logit 
models are fitted78, again depending on whether the outcome is continuous or binary. Table 
6.11 displays results from each of these models for the three main stages of the analysis: 
けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげが けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ヴWﾉationship. The outcomes of interest in each 
case are listed in the column headings and cross-level interaction effects are included for 
either TANF*single unemployed mother (for process effects) or TANF*single low educated 
mother. Beta values are presented for the impact of TANF where the outcome is continuous 
(mental health). Odds Ratios are reported for the impact of TANF policies on dichotomous 
variables (self-reported unemployment and income <$10,000). In each model, all controls are 
included as usual including interactions between GDP and education. An important limitation 
of the random effects approach is that it cannot handle the weights used in this chapter79. 
Given this, we should be especially careful in the reading of confidence intervals from Table 
6.11. Tables with full covariates for these random effects models are available in Appendix C, 
Tables C.8 to C.11. 
                                                          
78 TｴWゲW ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ W;Iｴ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ;ゲ デｴﾗゲW ゲｴﾗ┘ﾐ ｷﾐ W;ヴﾉｷWヴ aﾗﾗデﾐﾗデWゲが ;ゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷWS デﾗ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS 
けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲが ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ デｴW ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮく Hﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ｷﾐ ヴ;ﾐSﾗﾏ Wffects models the data structure 
is different as variance is partitioned at two levels. In statistical terms this means we are able to estimate both 
a random state/wave-level intercept and a random error term. The random effects model for the overall 
relationship between TANF and inequalities in mental health can be written as follows: 
 
 MHEALTH辿棚谷 噺  が待辿棚谷 髪 ぐ待辿棚谷 髪 が怠DEM辿棚谷 髪  が態CONTEXT辿棚谷 髪 が戴TANF棚谷 髪 が替LOWED辿棚谷 髪 が泰GDP棚谷髪  が滞TANF棚谷 茅 が胎LOWED辿棚谷 髪  が腿GDP棚谷 茅 が苔LOWED辿棚谷 髪  が怠待WAVE 髪 鉛辿棚谷 髪 紘沈珍賃  
 
Here, the only difference from the earlier equation is that this model includes a random state-wave intercept 
(ぐ待辿棚谷岻 and a random error term 岫紘沈珍賃岻┻ TｴW ゲ;ﾏW ｷゲ デヴ┌W aﾗヴ デｴW ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ aﾗヴ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲく 
Tﾗ aｷデ デｴWゲW ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ ﾗﾐ “デ;デ;が デｴW Iﾗﾏﾏ;ﾐSゲ XT‘EG ;ﾐS XTLOGIT ;ヴW ┌ゲWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW けﾏﾉWげ ﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ｪｷ┗W ; 
ﾏ;┝ｷﾏ┌ﾏ ﾉｷﾆWﾉｷｴﾗﾗS Wゲデｷﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW I;ゲW ﾗa XT‘EG ;ﾐS けヴWげ ｷﾐ デｴW I;ゲW ﾗa XTLOGITく   
 
79 The final population weight is a combination of weights from each wave of the BRFSS (2000, 2005, 2010 and 
ヲヰヱヵぶく “デ;デ;げゲ XT‘EG Iﾗﾏﾏ;ﾐS ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ┘Wｷｪｴデゲ ;ヴW Iﾗﾐゲデ;ﾐデ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ┘;┗Wゲく Tｴｷゲ I;ﾐﾐﾗデ HW ;IｴｷW┗WS 
with the weights available in the BRFSS. 
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The first column shows the results for process effects, as measured by the impact of TANF 
policies on the mental health of unemployed single mothers relative to employed mothers. 
When mental health is regressed on a cross-level interaction which splits the effect of TANF 
policies between single unemployed and employed mothers, the coefficients for each policy 
variable are in the same direction as in the fixed effects model in Table 6.7, model 5. Both 
stringent sanctions and required job search are associated with worse mental health among 
unemployed single mothers, while higher welfare-to-work spending is associated with less 
symptoms of mental ill-health. However, in the random effects specification the confidence 
intervals for each of these variables are wide and suggest that each effect could as likely be 
null or in the opposite direction. Overall, we can be less confident of these effects based on 
Table 6.11. In particular, the significant effect of job search found in Table 6.7 warrants 
greater scepticism. 
In the next two columns of Table 6.11, results are presented for the impact of TANF policies 
on self-reported unemployment and low income, respectively (employment effects). Using 
this modelling procedure, there is stronger evidence that in states with stringent sanctions 
and job search requirements, low educated single mothers have higher odds of self-reported 
unemployment, compared with other mothers. In both cases the odds ratios were above one 
and the confidence intervals differed significantly from one. However, in the case of job 
search this effect was small and only fractionally above one (lower bound of confidence 
interval = 1.01). As with Table 6.9, there was no convincing evidence that state-level 
differences in TANF conditionality had an impact on the odds of low educated single mothers 
















Notes: All models control for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, mean effect of TANF policies, GDP, GDP*single low educated/unemployed mother, 
maximum monthly benefit, unemployment rate, government and citizen ideology and wave. Full results for these coefficients are shown in Appendix C, 
Tables C.8 to C.11. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 2Reference group: no job search.
 Process Effects Employment Effects Health Inequalities 
Outcome Variable Mental Health 
Self-reported 
Unemployment 
Self-reported Income <  
$10,000 Mental Health 
 紅 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
TANF*Unemployed Single 
Mother          
  Stringent Sanction1 0.36 (-0.28  0.99)       
  Job Search Required2 0.18 (-0.22  0.58)       
  Welfare-to-Work -0.15 (-0.35  0.05)       
         
TANF*Low Ed. Single Mother         
  Stringent Sanction1   1.31 (1.14  1.50) 0.95 (0.79  1.15) 0.97 (0.42  1.53) 
  Job Search Required2   1.11 (1.01  1.22) 0.96 (0.84  1.02) 0.44 (0.06  0.79) 
  Welfare-to-Work   0.96 (0.91  1.01) 1.03 (0.96  1.10) -0.01 (-0.21  0.20) 

















The final column in Table 6.11 shows the results from the random effects model for health 
inequalities, as examined through the impact of TANF on the mental health of low educated 
single mothers, relative to other mothers. In this case, two of these variables (sanctions and 
job search) have a significant positive relation with mental health, suggesting that states with 
more stringent conditionality requirements have worse mental health among low educated 
single mothers, relative to other mothers. In each case, confidence intervals are narrower 
than they were in Table 6.10, model 4 which is most likely because there are no weights 
applied. The effect of both variables is less than in Table 6.1080. However, in each case the 紅 
estimates for sanction/job search fell within the range of confidence intervals in Table 6.10, 
model 4. We can therefore be reasonably confident that each of these variables has a 
differential mental health impact on low educated single mothers somewhere in the range of 
the confidence intervals presented in Table 6.10, model 4. In contrast, the effect of welfare-
to-work spending in Table 6.11 is weakly negative, while it was positive in Table 6.10, model 
4 (紅 噺 ど┻ねど┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻どの┸ ど┻ばは岻. Given that the coefficients were markedly different in Table 
6.11 and that the confidence intervals each suggested that the effect could be close to zero, 
we can be less confident of this as a true finding than sanctions and job search. 
Overall, the results from the random effects models lend some support to the findings in this 
chapter. As before, there was no convincing evidence that TANF policies mattered for health 
ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ WｷデｴWヴ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ﾗヴ けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWcts. However, both stringent 
sanctions and job search requirements were associated with greater health inequalities as 
indicated by worse mental health for low educated single mothers, relative to other mothers. 
In these models, welfare-to-work spending was not associated with health inequalities, while 





                                                          
80 For stringent sanctions: Table 6.10, model 5: 紅 噺  な┻どね┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻どは┸ に┻どぬ. For job search: Table 6.10, model 
5: 紅 噺  な┻など┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻にど┸ な┻ひひ. 
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Further Sensitivity Checks 
Two other sensitivity tests are conducted based on different operationalisations of two of the 
independent variables に mental health and low income. In the first set of tests, the mental 
health variable is treated as a binary indicator and the impact of TANF policies is re-examined 
using logit models. The variable is recoded to create a dummy where mental ill-health is 
defined as reporting five days or more mental ill-health in a month (this was the top quartile 
of respondents). Appendix C, Tables C.12 and C.13 report the results of binary logistic models 
for the two stages in the modelling procedure that used the mental health varｷ;HﾉW ふけヮヴﾗIWゲゲ 
WaaWIデゲげ ;ﾐS ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ, respectively). Full covariates are included in each of these 
models. Income is also recoded so that the outcome is the odds of reporting an income of less 
than $15,000, rather than $10,000. Appendix C, Table C.14 then replicates the analysis in 
Table 6.9, using this alternative measure. 
The findings from each of these tables are largely in line with those in the main analysis. The 
result for the けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ┘;s similar. When mental health was treated as a binary 
outcome, states with compulsory job search requirements had higher odds of mental ill-
health for single unemployed mothers, relative to employed mothers (Appendix C, Table C.12 Mod�l の 頚迎 噺 な┻にの┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ な┻どの┸ な┻のな岻. However, as with before, the confidence interval 
was wide and the lower bound suggested that this effect may be weak. With regards to the 
overall relationship with health inequalities, Appendix C, Table C.13, shows that stringent 
sanctions were associated with a 22 per cent higher risk of mental ill-health among low 
educated single mothers, relative to other mothers (頚迎 噺 な┻にに┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ な┻どば┸ な┻ぬひ岻, while 
compulsory job search was associated with a 37 per cent higher risk 岫頚迎 噺な┻ぬば┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ な┻なば┸ な┻のひ 件券 Tabl� C┻ なぬ┸ mod�l ね with stat� �ix�d ����cts 岻. The effect of 
welfare-to-work was weak and possibly non-significant 岫頚迎 噺 な┻どひ┸ ひのガ 系荊┺ ど┻ひぱ┸ な┻にな岻┸ as 
in Table 6.11.  
When the income variable was recoded, there was no evidence of an effect of TANF policies 
on the odds of low educated single mothers reporting a low income. As with Table 6.9, all 
TANF variables were non-significantly related with the odds of having an income less than 




Finally, I check what impact a substantial change in sampling methodology post-201181 may 
have had on the results by re-running the core analyses with only the years 2000-2010. 
Appendix C, Table C.15 shows the results for the three stages of the analysis with full controls. 
Some minor differences can be seen. The results are largely similar for けprocess effectsげ. For 
けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ, more stringent sanctions are significantly related with higher odds of 
self-reported unemployment and low income among low educated single mothers relative to 
other mothers, where the effect was smaller with a confidence interval that contained one 
when 2015 was included. In terms of the overall relationship with health inequalities, the 
coefficients for the impact of sanctions, job search and welfare-to-work are similar as in the 
main analysis (Table 6.10, model 5), although the effect of sanctions becomes greater and the 
confidence interval is wider. The impact of job search is weaker and the confidence interval 
is wider when 2015 is excluded. This suggests the loss of some statistical power with the 
removal of 2015. The same is true for welfare-to-work spending where the confidence 
interval is considerably wider without 2015. However, overall it seems more likely that the 
differences in results are attributable to lower variation in TANF variables than in any 





The key findings from this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
• There was no convincing evidence that TANF policies had an impact on health 
ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ┗ｷ; WｷデｴWヴ けprocessげ ﾗヴ けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲ. While at certain stages the 
TANF policy variables seemed to exert an influence through these pathways, these 
findings were generally not robust to sensitivity tests.  
 
• However, there were indications that states with harsher sanctions and job search 
requirements had wider gaps in mental health between low educated single mothers 
                                                          
81 In 2011, the sampling frame was extended to include cellular telephones. While there was no evidence of 
changes in response rates after this year, it is plausible that such a change could have had an impact on the 
responses of underrepresented and disadvantaged groups such as single mothers. 
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and other mothers. There was also some evidence that higher spending on welfare-
to-work increased health inequalities, although this was less robust to sensitivity 
checks. There is reasonable evidence that these effects are causal as they were robust 
to the inclusion of a range of controls, as well as state fixed-effects (Table 6.10, model 
5). It seems plausible that the effects of these TANF policy variables represent an 
ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa けｷﾐデWﾐゲｷ┗W IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げく “デ;デWゲ ┘ｴｷIh spent more on welfare-to-work also 
tended to have harsher sanctions and required job search. The results may therefore 
ヴWaﾉWIデ デｴW IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS WaaWIデゲ ﾗa デｴWゲW けヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗Wげ ;ﾐS けﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wげ ｷﾐIWﾐデｷ┗W ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲく 
 
The evidence is therefore rather tentative and does not follow a clear theoretically-convincing 
narrative. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families policies had a detrimental effect on the 
mental health of low educated single mothers, which was significantly worse than that of 
other mothers. However, there was no conclusive evidence that these effects were due to 
the impact of these policies on i) the mental health of unemployed recipients or ii) the odds 
of recipient populations experiencing either unemployment or poverty. 
While we can cautiously conclude that TANF policies matter for inequalities in mental health 
(although it is unclear why), we can be more confident from the descriptive analysis that 
inequalities in mental health have widened in the US over the period in question. Figure 6.6 
and 6.7 showed that while mental ill-health rose slightly for everyone between 1995 and 
2015, low educated single mothers experienced a much steeper rise in poor mental health. 
To this authorげs knowledge, this is the first evidence on trends in inequalities in mental health 
in the US over the past twenty years, using these data. The findings provoke an important 
question. If TANF policies have not influenced trends in inequalities in mental health, or only 
played a minor role, then what has caused a widening of these inequalities?  
A possible explanation for this is that an increasing proportion of single mothers (and 
especially those with multiple disadvantages and barriers to work) have become 
けSｷゲIﾗﾐﾐWIデWSげ aヴﾗﾏ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ U“ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞く Tｴｷゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;┞ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ デhe rise in mental 
ill-health among these groups. Several studies have found evidence for a rise in single mothers 
that are without cash from either employment or benefits and this has been linked with the 
intensification of work-related conditionality linked with receipt of TANF benefits (Blank, 
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2007; Turner et al., 2006). Moreover, Blank (2007) finds that among this group more than 70 
per cent have a high school degree or less. This suggests that the treatment group in this 
Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ﾗa けﾉﾗ┘ WS┌I;デWS ゲｷﾐｪﾉW ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲげ ﾏ;┞ ｷﾐ a;Iデ HW ; ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;HﾉW ヮヴﾗ┝┞ aﾗヴ けSｷゲIﾗﾐﾐWIデWS 
ゲｷﾐｪﾉW ﾏﾗデｴWヴげく TｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS WIﾗﾐomic exclusion of this group, compared with other 
mothers, may explain the widening of inequalities in mental health between these groups. 
The weight of evidence from both this chapter and elsewhere, suggests that TANF policies 
may have reinforced, rather than mitigated this exclusion. 
 
Contextual Differences in Activation Policies 
 Although Chapters Five and Six each W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS けヮヴﾗIWゲゲげ ;ﾐS けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲ ﾗa 
activation (and, in Chapter Six, conditionality) policies, there were some clear differences in 
デｴW ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪゲく Cｴ;ヮデWヴ “ｷ┝ aﾗ┌ﾐS ﾐﾗ W┗ｷSWﾐIW aﾗヴ けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデゲ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ 
either activation or conditionality policies, while Chapter Five found (reasonably) strong 
evidence that higher spending on welfare-to-work was associated with better mental health 
through reducing self-reported unemployment. Neither chapter found that welfare-to-work 
(or active LMP) spending had mental health benefits for recipients during unemployment. 
Moreover, Chapter Six found evidence that higher welfare-to-work spending and more 
stringent work-related requirements could be detrimental to the mental health of low 
educated single mothers, a recipient group that are likely to face wider social disadvantage.  
The inconsistencies in these findings may be partly attributable to qualitative differences 
between the US and Europe in the design and administration of labour market activation and 
conditionality policies. The US welfare-to-work model in the 1990s drew heavily on a 
け┘ﾗヴﾆa;ヴWげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴが ┘ｴWヴWH┞ デｴW Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷs of policy was on compulsion, rather than support 
(Mead, 1997; Peck & Theodore, 2001). This approach starts with the principle of 
けSWヮWﾐSWﾐI┞げぎ unemployed and workless populations are considered to be け┘Wﾉa;ヴW 
SWヮWﾐSWﾐデげ ;ﾐS SｷゲIﾗﾐﾐWIデWS aヴﾗﾏ ┘ﾗヴﾆ S┌W デﾗ their own failings (Murray, 1996; Mead, 
ヱΓΓヲぶく PﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷゲ デｴWﾐ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS デﾗ けIﾗヴヴWIデげ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴく Iﾐ デｴW U“ IﾗﾐデW┝デが デｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ 
most clearly evidenced in the welfare reforms in Wisconsin, whereby individuals were 
required to work in community work sites in return for benefits (Nightingale & Mikelson, 
2000). While the picture is not entirely black and white, European social policy in the 1990s 
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and 2000s tended in contrast, to follow a けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ (Lødemel & Trickey, 
2001: 10). Welfare-to-work policies involved both demand and supply-side elements, starting 
from the understanding that the causes of unemployment and worklessness are structural, 
while accepting the need to encourage and enforce labour market participation (Giddens, 
1998; Pascual, 2007).  
It seems plausible that these two broadly defined approaches to labour market conditionality 
will result in different health outcomes for cash benefit recipients. There may be differences 
in the extent to which each are successful at improving the experience of unemployment 
(process effects) and reducing the wider incidence of unemployment (employment effects). 
The findings from this chapter suggest that the US system is less effective at reducing 
unemployment, possibly because it places the onus on the individual and provides only 
minimal support to move towards work for disconnected groups (such as low educated single 
mothers). This is in line with research from elsewhere that finds that punitive workfare 
programmes such as Wisconsin Works are less effective at tackling unemployment for groups 
with multiple barriers to work, such as low educated single mothers (Alfred, 2005). The wider 
conditionality environment of the US also appears to be detrimental to the mental health of 
low educated single mothers. This may be due to the emphasis on compulsion instead of 
support, which, as evidence reviewed earlier in the chapter suggested, may be damaging to 
the mental health of disadvantaged groups (Garthwaite, 2014; Reeves & Loopstra, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
TｴWヴW ;ヴW ; ヴ;ﾐｪW ﾗa IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴｷゲ Iｴ;ヮデWヴく Nﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ｷゲ ｷデ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ゲデ┌S┞ ふデﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ 
knowledge) to explicitly link data on conditionality with mental health outcomes, it is also the 
first to do this using TANF policy data from 50 US states over the course of a fifteen-year 
period. It has examined both the relationship between TANF policies and health inequalities 
and the specific pathways which may explain this relationship, thus contributing to wider 
understanding about how welfare state and labour market conditionality matters for health 
inequalities. Throughout the analysis steps were taken to reduce the risk of confounding. 
Various sensitivity tests have been done and the fixed effects specification in the final models 
controls for all (time-invariant) between-state differences, theoretically removing the risk of 
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omitted variable bias (at least in the case of time-invariant confounders). It is possible that 
external economic events (such as the 2008 crisis) may have introduced a source of time-
variant confounding in to the models. This should be recognised when interpreting these 
results. Given this and other possible limitations of the data, it is still possible that the results 
could be artefactual. This is the first study to explicitly link TANF policy variables with 
inequalities in mental health and further research is needed to support, contradict and 





















Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This thesis began by identifying a gap within the extant literature on the links between cash 
benefits policies and social inequalities in health. It was argued that researchers had failed to 
explore the causal pathways in a direct sense, despite many recommending that future 
scholarship should do just that (Bambra, 2011; Bergqvist et al., 2013; Muntaner, 2013). This 
thesis represents a systematic attempt to understand and provide evidence around the causal 
pathways connecting cash benefits and health inequalities. It has used three different 
methodological approaches to do this and has focused on a specific research question to 
generate empirical evidence. As stated in the introduction, the thesis had the following more 
precise research objectives: 
1. To expand theoretical understanding about how cash benefits policies shape 
inequalities in mental health. 
2. To explore the empirical connections between cash benefits policies and inequalities 
in mental health using approaches which are attentive to the causal pathways that 
connect cash benefits with health inequalities.  
3. To critically assess the explanatory power of three methodological approaches に 
welfare regime, social expenditure and policy-specific に for understanding the 
causality of the link between cash benefits and inequalities in mental health. 
The first part of this discussion chapter evaluates the extent to which each of these objectives 
have been met. In so doing, it draws out the key contributions of the thesis. 
 
Research Objective One 
 
さTﾗ W┝ヮ;ﾐS デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ;Hﾗ┌デ ｴﾗ┘ I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ゲｴ;ヮW ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ 
ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴくざ 
The first and second chapters of the thesis provided a theoretical platform for the empirical 
contributions which followed in Chapters Four to Six. A conceptual argument was developed 
which responded to two critiques of the literature set out in the introduction. The broad 
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contention was that prior research had paid inadequate attention to the causal pathways that 
connected cash benefits with health inequalities. These pathways were defined as empirically 
measurable connections between cash benefits policies and health inequalities.  
The second related critique was around the lack of specificity within the prior literature about 
the characteristics of cash benefits policies which matter for health inequalities. It defined 
three health-ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ┘ｴｷIh were operationalised 
in different ways in Chapters Four to Six: generosity, activation and conditionality. Chapter 
One noted that most research has focused on the generosity attached to receipt of cash 
benefits, with some consideration given to the role of active labour market policies (Coutts et 
al., 2014; Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Stuckler et al., 2009). It was argued that less empirical 
attention has been given to the third design feature に conditionality requirements に despite 
the likely importance of this for health inequalities in contemporary welfare states.  
The approach of Chapters Four to Six was therefore to explore the empirical links between 
cash benefits policies, as operationalised in terms of generosity, activation and conditionality, 
and health inequalities via specific causal pathways. The overarching conceptual approach 
was illustrated in Chapter Two, Figure 2.1. The broad connections described in Chapter One 
were refined further within the empirical chapters. These specific causal pathways were as 
follows:  
• Stress: Cｴ;ヮデWヴ Fﾗ┌ヴ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲWS デｴW けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ ヮ;デｴ┘;┞く Iデ ヮヴWSｷIデWS デｴ;デ デｴW 
connection between welfare regimes and health inequalities would be explained 
through the influence of regimes on inequalities in stress. This was examined through 
analyses which explored the relationship between welfare regimes and inequalities in 
depressive symptoms. 
 
• Income Effects: Chapter Five evaluated the impact of cash benefits on the mental 
health of unemployed people. It was hypothesised that more generous cash benefits 
might reduce the material consequences of unemployment, with benefits for mental 




• Process Effects: Chapters Five and Six assessed the impact of labour market activation 
and conditionality on the mental health of unemployed people. This causal pathway 
┘;ゲ SWaｷﾐWS ;ゲ けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげ ふHﾗヴヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa C;ヴデWヴ ;ﾐS Wｴｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ 
(2016)) as it referred to the impact of each of these design features on the 
psychosocial consequences of unemployment. 
 
• Employment Effects: Chapters Five and Six also explored the impact of cash benefits 
policies on the labour market prospects of recipient groups. Both chapters 
investigated the relationship between labour market activation and conditionality 
policies and self-reported unemployment. Chapter Five took this a stage further and 
quantified the effect of two types of cash benefits policies (passive and active LMPs) 
on mental health through their impact on self-reported unemployment. While 
Chapter Six did not use mediation analysis, it briefly explored a further associated 
けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデげ WaaWIデぎ デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗSSゲ ﾗa ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデ 
groups reporting a low income.  
 
• Differential Impacts: Chapter Five further examined income, process and employment 
effects in terms of whether the health impact of cash benefits differed for low vs high 
educated individuals. Drawing on a conceptual approach by Diderichsen and 
colleagues (Diderichsen et al., 2001; Diderichsen & Hallqvist, 1998), it suggested that 
I;ゲｴ HWﾐWaｷデゲ ﾏ;┞ ｴ;┗W ┗;ヴ┞ｷﾐｪ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲ SWヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW けSｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ 













Research Objective Two 
 
さTo explore the empirical connections between cash benefits policies and inequalities in 
mental health using approaches which are attentive to the causal pathways that connect 
cash benefits with health inequalities.ざ 
The five pathways stated above were investigated using a mixture of empirical methods and 
datasets in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The results are summarised below in relation to each 
of these pathways, followed by the key findings on the overall relationship between cash 
benefits and social inequalities in mental health. 
 
• Stress 
o Based on a population of older working age adults (50-64) in Europe, Chapter 
Four adopted a welfare regime approach to evaluate whether welfare regimes 
had an effect on health inequalities via their impact on psychosocial stress. It 
looked at variations across welfare regimes in inequalities in the incidence of 
depressive symptoms, as a likely indicator of stress. Combining elements of the 
conceptual framework in Chapter Two with FWヴヴWヴ;げゲ (1996) welfare regime 
theory, it was anticipated that the Scandinavian regime would be most 
effective at redressing inequalities in stress by providing disadvantaged groups 
with the greatest economic and social security. As such, it was anticipated to 
have the least inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
o Support was found for this hypothesis: inequalities in this outcome were least 
in the Scandinavian regime. The Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon and Southern 
regimes performed similarly while the Eastern regime consistently performed 
the worst.  
 
• Income Effects 
o Merging data from the OECD and Eurostat with survey data from three waves 
of the European Social Survey (2006, 2012 and 2014), Chapter Five explored 
the effects of cash benefits (passive LMPs) on the mental health of 
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unemployed people. It found that countries with more generous passive LMPs 
had less depressive symptoms among the unemployed and this effect was 
significantly greater than for employed people. 
 
 
• Process Effects  
o Using data on active LMP expenditure in Europe, Chapter Five found that 
labour market activation programmes were not clearly related with depressive 
symptoms among unemployed people. 
o Focusing on TANF policies in the United States, Chapter Six explored whether 
the health effect of conditionality varied for single unemployed mothers vs. 
employed mothers. There were some indications that more intensive TANF 
conditionality (as measured by required job search) was detrimental to the 
mental health of single unemployed mothers, where it was not for employed 
mothers. However, this was not robust in sensitivity tests. 
 
• Employment Effects 
o Chapter Five used mediation analysis to examine whether countries with more 
generous passive and active LMPs had less self-reported unemployment, with 
less depressive symptoms as a consequence. Evidence was found for a small 
effect of active LMP spending on depressive symptoms via unemployment, 
whereby countries with higher active LMP spending had lower unemployment 
and, as a result, less depressive symptoms. In contrast, more generous passive 
LMPs were associated with higher odds of unemployment and this translated 
to a slight increase in the likelihood of reporting mental ill-health. However, in 
each case the lower bounds of the confidence intervals for the indirect effects 
were close to zero, suggesting that the effect size could be small. There may 
also have been methodological issues in examining the relationship between 
active LMPs and self-reported unemployment, which makes it harder still to 
be confident of these effects. While Chapter Six did not use a mediation 
analysis, it did look at whether any of the TANF variables had a bearing on the 
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employment outcomes for low educated single mothers (the expected 
けデヴW;デﾏWﾐデげ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮぶが Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWS ┘ｷデｴ ﾗデｴWヴ ﾏﾗデｴWヴゲく Nﾗ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ┘;ゲ aﾗ┌ﾐS aﾗヴ 
a relationship between the conditionality requirements of TANF policies and 
the incidence of self-reported unemployment. This was also confirmed in 
bivariate analyses of the relationship between TANF policies and 
unemployment rates which found that more stringent states did not have less 
unemployment. Chapter Six also examined the relationship between TANF 
policies and low income among recipient populations. Specifically, the chapter 
looked at links between state-level variation in conditionality and the 
magnitude of deep poverty (<$10,000) for low educated single mothers 
relative to other mothers. It found tentative evidence that stringent 
sanctioning practices and higher spending on welfare-to-work were associated 
with higher odds of single low educated mothers experiencing deep poverty. 
However, these findings were not robust to controls and were not found in 
sensitivity analyses. It was suggested that the inconsistencies between the 
findings in Chapters Five and Six may be linked to the approach to 
activation/conditionality in Europe vs the US. The evidence suggests that the 
US workfare-oriented approach is less effective at reducing unemployment 
among recipient groups, potentially due to its focus on the individual without 
providing the same level of state-support. 
 
• Differential Impacts 
o Chapter Five also investigated the differential impacts of LMPs via the income, 
process and employment pathways described above (i.e. the effect for low 
educated people). It found some evidence that low educated people were less 
likely to be unemployed in countries with higher active LMP spending, resulting 
in better mental health for this group. However, this effect was stronger than 
we might plausibly expect, which similarly suggests that there may be 
methodological issues. There were no indications that passive LMPs have 
differential impacts on self-reported unemployment for low vs high educated 
people, although the effect on health seemed to be greater for low educated 
people compared with the average effect. Due to limitations in the data, the 
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chapter could not say anything conclusive about whether either aspect of cash 
benefits policies had differential impacts on the mental health of low vs high 
educated unemployed people. However, there was no suggestive evidence of 
this. 
 
• The Overall Relationship between Cash Benefits and Inequalities in Mental Health 
o Chapter Four found strong evidence that countries with generous cash 
benefits policies had less inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
o Yet in Chapter Five there was no conclusive evidence that benefit generosity 
reduced inequalities in depressive symptoms, despite strong indications that 
it improved the mental health of unemployed people. Chapter Five also did not 
find that labour market activation policies were related with health 
inequalities. In contrast, Chapter Six found that spending on welfare-to-work 
policies widened inequalities in mental health between low educated single 
mothers and other mothers. It was also found that states with more stringent 
sanctions and job search requirements had wider inequalities in mental health. 
It was suggested that the effect for welfare-to-work policies may therefore 
have represented a more general impact of TANF conditionality, rather than 
labour market activation policies per se. While conditionality (i.e. penalties) 
were not directly examined in Chapter Five, it was similarly suggested that the 
impact of the TANF activation and conditionality regime as a whole may have 
ヴWaﾉWIデWS ; ┘ｷSWヴ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ｷﾐ デｴW U“ ﾗﾐ デ;Iﾆﾉｷﾐｪ けSWヮWﾐSWﾐI┞げが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ 
けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐげく Iﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIWが デｴｷゲ ﾏ;┞ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ｷﾐ ; ｴ;ヴゲｴWヴ Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ 
disadvantaged groups such as low educated single mothers. 
 
 
While there is some evidence for a causal relationship between cash benefits and health 
inequalities, the broader conclusion is that the findings from this thesis are mixed and often 
inconsistent. For example, Chapter Five found evidence for causal connections, yet there was 
no indication of an overall relationship with health inequalities. In Chapter Six, the opposite 
was true に TANF conditionality policies were associated with greater health inequalities, yet 
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it was unclear why. While this may appear confusing, it is illustrative of the practical 
difficulties of an extended research project such as this. I have aimed throughout the 
empirical chapters to subject all analyses to the highest levels of scrutiny and have critically 
reflected on the explanatory power of the data and methods in my interpretation of the 
results. Nevertheless, the findings tell a broader story about the challenges of conducting 
causally-focused research and of relying on data that often have a host of limitations. 
 
Further Empirical Contributions of the Thesis 
Although the outcomes from the various analyses have sometimes been unclear, there were 
nonetheless three standout findings from the empirical chapters (Four, Five and Six) which 
are worthy of note: 
• The Scandinavian regime performed best for inequalities in depressive symptoms 
(Chapter Four): This casts doubt on the finding of some research that the Scandinavian 
welfare regime does not perform better in terms of health inequalities than the other 
regimes. Instead, it reaffirms the argument that highly decommodifying welfare 
regimes reduce material and psychosocial stresses among disadvantaged groups 
where other regimes do not, possibly resulting in less inequalities in depressive 
symptoms. It implies that the conclusion that generous welfare regimes do not reduce 
health inequalities may be premature, as others have recently argued (Muntaner et 
al., 2017b; Popham et al., 2013).  
 
• Active Labour Market Policies may reduce inequalities in mental health by reducing 
unemployment among disadvantaged populations (Chapter Five): In Chapter Five, this 
empirical finding was robust to a range of controls and sensitivity checks. However, it 
is still prudent to be cautious about this finding for two reasons: i) active LMP data 
have a range of methodological problems (as summarised in Clasen et al., 2016) and 
ii) no relationship was found between welfare-to-work spending and self-reported 
unemployment in Chapter Six (although it has been suggested that this may reflect a 
different welfare-to-work policy context).. Nonetheless, if this is a real-life effect then 
it has important implications for social policy research which has tended to emphasise 
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the mental health benefits of participation in active labour market programmes 
relative to open unemployment ふｷくWく デｴW けヮヴﾗIWゲゲ WaaWIデゲげぶ (Carter & Whitworth, 2015, 
2016; Coutts, 2005; Sage, 2015b). Chapter Five suggests that researchers should also 
ヮ;┞ ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW けWﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ WaaWIデゲげ ﾗa ゲ┌Iｴ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWゲく  
 
• Conditionality requirements attached to receipt of cash benefits may widen 
inequalities in mental health between advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Chapter 
Six): Chapter Six found tentative evidence that stringent state-level conditionality 
practices attached to receipt of TANF cash benefits were detrimental to the mental 
health of single low educated mothers, where they were not for other mothers. 
However, there was no convincing evidence that this was due to any of the 
hypothesised causal pathways. There is therefore a clear need for future research to 
explore the relationship between conditionality and health inequalities in other 
settings and using different data. Further scrutiny of the causal pathways is also 
necessary. 
Although the above were particularly strong findings, there were a number of further 
noteworthy contributions of the chapters which are briefly summarised below. 
 
Chapter Four 
1. While there are a large number of studies which look at how health inequalities vary 
across welfare regimes, a minority of these have done so with an explicit focus on 
depressive symptoms82. Moreover, デﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWが デｴWヴW ｷゲ デｴ┌ゲ a;ヴ ﾐﾗ 
evidence on educational inequalities in depressive symptoms across welfare regimes.  
2. Relatively few welfare regime papers have used the SHARE dataset and, to date, no 
one has used such up-to-date data (2004, 2007, 2011 and 2013) from this dataset to 
explore inequalities in the prevalence of depressive symptoms across regimes.  
 
                                                          
82 Chapter One identified the following studies with a depression focus: (Chung et al., 2013; Dragano et al., 2011; 




Where Chapter Four made modest, albeit important, substantive contributions to the 
research field, Chapter Five made more significant empirical contributions. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. It was one of only a handful of social expenditure studies to look at the links between 
active and passive LMPs and health inequalities (Carr & Chung, 2014; Niedzwiedz et 
al., 2016; Shahidi, Siddiqi, et al., 2016; Wulfgramm, 2014). It was the first study to 
explore the links between each of these areas of welfare state spending and 
educational inequalities in depressive symptoms. 
2. Chapter Five was careful in its modelling strategy, including more controls than other 
similar studies (e.g. Niedzwiedz et al., 2016) and conducting a series of sensitivity 
checks to lead to defensible and qualified conclusions about the impact of LMPs on 
health inequalities. It therefore provides some of the most robust evidence as of yet. 
3. It provides the first evidence of links between active and passive LMP spending and 
the prevalence of self-reported unemployment in Europe. No study to date has looked 
at the links between LMP spending and unemployment with such large sample sizes 
(n=57,817). It is also the first to explore how the effect of LMPs on unemployment 
prevalence varies as a function of education level. 
4. Fﾗヴ デｴW aｷヴゲデ デｷﾏW ふデﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWぶが Chapter Five used mediation analysis 
to quantify the effect of cash benefits policies through a social determinant of health 




Finally, Chapter Six made the following concrete additions to the literature: 
1. It was the first piece of research to link data on TANF policies with individual-level data 
on mental health. Exploiting variation across the US states and over time, Chapter Six 
provides a case study of how differences in cash benefits policies within one country 
can matter for health inequalities. 
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2. Tﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWが Chapter Six was the first piece of quantitative empirical 
research to explore links between cash benefits conditionality (sanctions, job search, 
welfare-to-work spend) and health inequalities.  
3. Chapter Six showed for the first time how cash benefits policies shape the mental 
health of two sub-populations に low educated and unemployed single mothers. While 
other studies have looked at health inequalities between single and couple mothers 
across European welfare regimes (Burstrom et al., 2010; Fritzell et al., 2012, 2007; 
Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Van de Velde et al., 2014; Whitehead et al., 2000), none have 
explored this using data on policies specifically targeted at such groups and none have 
looked at the effect of policies on the double-burden of low education/unemployment 
and single motherhood. 
4. Aside from being the first study to show the relationship between TANF conditionality 
practices and inequalities in mental health, Chapter Six also explored the impact of 
TANF conditionality via a series of causal pathways as outlined earlier. 
5. As a result of larger level 2 sample sizes, Chapter Six was able to use both fixed and 
random effects regression modelling strategies. The former was particularly useful as 
it enabled the chapter to make stronger claims about the impact of TANF policies by 
controlling for unobservable state differences, thus theoretically isolating the effect 












Research Objective Three  
 
さTo critically assess the explanatory power of three methodological approaches に welfare 
regime, social expenditure and policy-specific に for understanding the causal pathways that 
connect cash benefits policies and inequalities in mental health.ざ 
 
The first two research objectives focused on the theoretical and empirical contributions of 
this thesis. A further aim was methodological. An underlying concern throughout the thesis 
has HWWﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾏ;デデWヴ ﾗa I;┌ゲ;ﾉｷデ┞が ;ゲ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐぎ さ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ デｴW 
causal link between cash benefits policies ;ﾐS WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｴW;ﾉデｴいざ 
Each empirical chapter adopted a different methodological approach to answer this question 
and below a brief assessment is given of the causal power of these approaches. 
The welfare regime approach used in Chapter Four was in some ways the least effective in 
terms of its ability to address the issue of causality. The regime approach is broad, with an 
independent variable に welfare regime に which is vague and captures a wide range of cross-
national cultural variation outside of cash benefits systems (Bambra, 2011; Bergqvist et al., 
2013; Pfau-effinger, 2005). The empirical application of the regime approach in Chapter Four 
aﾗI┌ゲWS ﾗﾐ ; ゲヮWIｷaｷI けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴWゲゲげ pathway by looking at variations across regimes in 
inequalities in depressive symptoms. Causality was inferred if evidence was found for this 
pathway which fitted with a logical theoretical narrative. The chapter concluded that there 
was some evidence that higher decommodification (i.e. cash benefits generosity) reduced 
inequalities in stress, as implied through less stress-related health inequalities in the 
Scandinavian regime. However, it was impossible to divorce this welfare regime effect from a 
wider cultural impact. As such, the evidence for causality remained tentative in this chapter. 
Recognising the limitations of the regime approach, Chapters Five and Six each 
operationalised cash benefits policies using specific independent variables. Chapter Five 
focused primarily on two measures of social expenditure に active and passive LMP spending. 
Unlike Chapter Four, the approach in Chapter Five did not make any assumptions about the 
stability of cash benefits policies over time. Independent social expenditure variables were 
included for each year (2006, 2012 and 2014), allowing for changes in spending over this 
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period. To improve confidence in a causal interpretation, Chapter Five included control 
variables to show the impact of LMPs net of country-level differences in wealth. Unlike some 
previous studies (Niedzwiedz et al., 2016; Shahidi, Siddiqi, et al., 2016), a control was included 
for an interaction between GDP and education/GDP and unemployment (for process effects). 
These interactions substantially moderated the effect of LMPs, improving confidence in the 
conclusions of this chapter. Chapter Five also used mediation analysis to show how the 
expenditure approach can be used to (empirically) unpack causal pathways, where this is 
more difficult with the regime approach. Overall, the methodological approach used in 
Chapter Five provided stronger empirical evidence for causality than Chapter Four. This is 
mostly because the independent variable was more specific. However, it is also because 
certain steps were taken when using this methodology (as outlined above) to make it more 
persuasive as a means of evidencing causality.  
Nevertheless, Chapter Six was the most attentive to causal pathways of all three chapters. 
The impact of TANF policies was compared across treatment and control population groups, 
mirroring a quasi-experimental design. This allowed stronger inference about the effects of 
policies and was particularly important in the US context where such a small proportion of 
the population receive TANF cash benefits. Large sample sizes within the BRFSS made this 
possible. Merging multiple years of TANF policies with multiple waves of the BRFSS, it was 
possible to control for unobserved state-level effects using a fixed effects regression 
approach. This then allowed claims to be made about the relationship between changes in 
policies between years and health outcomes. Overall, the methodology used in Chapter Six 
(which loosely resembled a quasi-experimental approach) provided the most convincing 
evidence of causal connections of the three chapters. 
 
Limitations  
While the thesis has been relatively successful in meeting the three research objectives 
described above, it has been limited in its claims in other ways. First and most significantly, 
the thesis has relied throughout on cross-sectional data. This is problematic given the interest 
in causality as longitudinal data with repeated individual observations can provide a stronger 
basis for examining causal relationships. In the case of this thesis, it would have been 
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preferable to see whether individual mental health changed as a response to changes in cash 
benefits policies. As it stands, the thesis is able only to show how mental health is related to 
cash benefits policies at a given point in time. While Chapter Six showed how changes in 
policies were related with year-on-year changes in mental health, these mental health 
outcomes were for different individuals. This makes it hard to claim that the effects are truly 
causal as we cannot observe the relationship between changes in cash benefits policies and 
within-person trajectories of mental health (Raudenbush, 2001).  
Second, the thesis has been limited by the available data on cash benefits policies. In Chapters 
Five and Six, the analysis relied on imperfect and crude measures of design and generosity. 
Social expenditure data have been subject to much criticism, particularly measures related to 
labour market policies (Adema & Ladaique, 2009; Clasen et al., 2016; Gilbert, 2009; Siegel, 
2007). Three important criticisms with regards to the measures used in this thesis are 
highlighted below: 
• Higher social expenditure may simply represent a response to higher demand. 
Chapters Five and Six addressed this by conditioning LMP spending on unemployment 
rates. However, Clasen et al. (2016) note a problem with this approach in relation to 
active LMP spending: active LMPs deliberately change the employment status of 
beneficiaries, by no longer counting this group as unemployed (2016: 27). This may 
falsely give the impression that countries with higher active LMP spending have lower 
unemployment because more people are working, when in reality this could represent 
a substitution effect (i.e. unemployed for active LMP participant). This should caution 
us in relation to the strong negative relationship which was found in Chapter Five 
between active LMP spending and self-reported unemployment. 
 
• Conditionality can affect unemployment benefit entitlement. Conditionality 
requirements attached to receipt of cash benefits have the explicit aim of reducing 
the number of unemployed people entitled to benefits. As such, it can also be 
problematic to condition unemployment benefit spending on unemployment rates, as 
receipt of benefit is likely to depend on the eligibility rules within a country/state 
(Siegel, 2007). This matters in Chapters Five and Six which each make the problematic 
assumption that being unemployed automatically entitles someone to unemployment 
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benefit. The extent to which this will be true will depend on the stringency of 
conditionality within a given country/state/region. It is therefore possible that the 
indicators of passive cash benefits spending will suffer from validity problems as a 
result of variations in conditionality across cash benefits systems. 
 
• There is likely to be a gap between what people get paid and what they actually 
receive. Measures of social expenditure are gross indicators of government 
expenditure, while many countries impose heavy taxes prior to distributing welfare 
services (Siegel, 2007). The measures used in Chapter Five were all gross indicators of 
social expenditure, as equivalent net measures were not available. However, the TANF 
data held by the Office for Family Assistance refers to non-taxable income 
administered direct to beneficiaries. While this may lead to some over and under-
estimates in the proportion of spending across countries and states, one health 
inequalities study found that the gross/net distinction makes little difference in 
practice (Dahl & van der Wel, 2013). 
 
While there are established issues with social expenditure data, particularly when used 
comparatively (Clasen & Siegel, 2007), the two variables for conditionality linked with TANF 
cash benefits (job search and sanctions) also have measurement problems. Each provide a 
very rough gauge of policy characteristics, which have yet to be validated in other health 
inequalities research. There was ambiguity in the sanctions variable between what could be 
IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS けﾉW;ゲデげ ;ﾐS けﾏﾗゲデげ ゲデヴｷﾐｪWﾐデ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ;ﾐS ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ヮ┌ﾐｷゲｴﾏWﾐデゲく “ｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴﾉ┞が デｴW 
variable for job search requirements is a crude indicator of labour market conditionality which 
provides only a glimpse of the approach that a state may take to disciplining cash benefits 
recipients.  
These measurement issues constitute real limitations which undoubtedly impact on the 
claims that this thesis can make. While steps have been taken throughout to improve, 
methodologically, on much of the prior literature (described within the chapters themselves), 
the research findings carry a greater level of uncertainty than we would like due to the 
measurement issues described above and the difficulties with causality. Nevertheless, these 
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limitations are a partial consequence of the ambitiousness of the thesis. It has made both 
conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge and has done this in a way which has 
challenged the conventional approach in this field through its emphasis on causal pathways. 
As such, I argue that it has been successful in answering the research question stated in the 
introduction, notwithstanding its shortcomings. A one-paragraph summary below explains 
how this question has been addressed, drawing together the main points made so far in this 
chapter. 
 
One-Paragraph Summary  
This thesis has explored the causal pathways connecting welfare states with health 
inequalities, using the specific example of cash benefits policies and educational inequalities 
in mental health. It has found some evidence for a causal connection between cash benefits 
and educational inequalities in mental health. However, the findings have been inconsistent 
and have not always followed a clear theoretical narrative. It was shown that more generous 
benefit systems have less educational inequalities in mental health among older Europeans, 
suggesting a social stress pathway. Generous cash benefits also differentially improved 
mental health for unemployed people, implying that there are income effects. Yet no 
evidence was found for process effects: labour market activation and conditionality policies 
did not have a significantly greater impact on the mental health of unemployed people. There 
were indications that active labour market policies had employment effects by encouraging 
unemployment exit, with associated benefits for mental health. However, these effects were 
not found in the United States, perhaps because there was less cross-state variation in 
policies. There was also some evidence to suggest that labour market activation policies had 
differential impacts on the employment prospects of low educated people, which further 
reduced health inequalities. Conditionality policies also seemed to increase health 






Research Implications  
 
The chapter has so far focused on the contributions of the thesis to the body of research to 
which it speaks, as summarised in the above paragraph. It has also highlighted some 
limitations of the research. Expanding this discussion, the remainder of this chapter considers 
the research and policy implications of the thesis.  
 
Implications for research on the link between cash benefits policies and health inequalities  
The key message that this thesis has tried to convey is that it is valuable to understand more 
about the way in which cash benefits policies and health inequalities are connected. Cash 
HWﾐWaｷデゲ ┘WヴW HヴﾗﾆWﾐ Sﾗ┘ﾐ ｷﾐ デﾗ デｴヴWW けSWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲげ ;ﾐS evidence was found in relation 
to five causal pathways, which enabled the chapters to draw stronger conclusions about how 
cash benefits influenced inequalities in mental health. As such, the most basic implication for 
scholars interested in the same question is that this research strategy is a promising avenue 
for future scholarship. In particular, it may help increase understanding about why health 
inequalities are not consistently less in countries with equality-promoting cash benefits 
ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ふデｴW けｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ヮ;ヴ;Sﾗ┝げが M;IﾆWﾐH;Iｴ ふヲヰヱヲぶぶく Tｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ ｴ;ゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS 
evidence to suggest that this research paradox may partly be explained through i) the impact 
of the activation and conditionality sides of cash benefits policies on health inequalities and 
ii) adverse health effects of generous benefits through reducing unemployment exit (although 
this finding requires further corroboration).  
This research strategy should be pursued using longitudinal individual-level data to establish 
more convincing evidence of causality. This thesis has not been able to address time-
dependent questions such as: is there evidence that cash benefits policies increase the 
chances of someone becoming unemployed or re-entering the labour market? Does this then 
influence their health status? This limitation has been restated at a number of points 
throughout and it is crucial that future scholarship exploits the advantages of longitudinal 
data wherever possible. While there are a small collection of papers in this field that have 
used longitudinal data (Avendano et al., 2009; Dragano et al., 2011; Muntaner et al., 2017b), 
this needs to be extended. The research field is limited by a paucity of high-quality data, which 
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prevents the acquisition of stronger evidence. Comparative individual-level longitudinal data 
in particular is in short supply and SHARE is the only panel dataset freely available to 
researchers83.  
There is also a lack of data containing multiple measures of health status, explaining why 
research has often relied on vague and imperfect measures such as self-assessed health. To 
understand more about the range of causal links, it is important to look at the pathways from 
cash benefits to a multitude of health outcomes. While this thesis has only had space to look 
at one health outcome (mental health), there is room for future research to extend this. A 
promising development is the publication of the 2014 wave of the European Social Survey 
(ESS) which contains new data on a wider range of health indicators, alongside a range of 
social determinants of health (e.g. childhood/housing/working conditions) (see Eikemo et al., 
2017 for a full description). This has resulted in a series of papers on the current state of 
health inequalities across Europe84. These papers have not had a direct cash benefits focus 
and future research should develop on this to look at the links between cash benefits policies, 
the social determinants of health and the range of health outcomes available in surveys such 
as these. 
Another research implication of this thesis is that there is a need for more programme-specific 
social policy data as the reliance on broad institutional or expenditure measures is less than 
ideal. For example, the indicators of active LMP spending used in Chapters Five and Six were 
crude and suffered from a number of validity issues (Clasen et al., 2016). Mechanisms 
connecting policies with outcomes (such as health, wellbeing and health inequalities) will 
necessarily be specific and there is a need for data which can capture this. For instance, there 
exists virtually no data on benefit conditionality in Europe85, despite major shifts towards 
activation and conditionality across most European welfare states (Clasen & Clegg, 2007; 
                                                          
83 The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset also has a longitudinal 
component, although this is not freely downloadable to researchers and requires an application process. The 
EU-SILC also suffers from some methodological problems (Davis & Geiger, 2017) which make it a less desirable 
dataset to use for comparative purposes. 
 
84 Balaj et al., 2017; Huijts, Gkiouleka, et al., 2017b; Huijts, Stornes, et al., 2017b; McNamara et al., 2017; 
Thomson et al., 2017. 
 
85 Knotz and Nelson (2013) are working on a conditionality dataset for European welfare states. However, after 
correspondence with these authors they confirmed that the dataset was not yet available for public use. 
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Pascual, 2007). This is partly due to problems with measuring and collecting such data に the 
so-I;ﾉﾉWS けSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ (Clasen & Siegel, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2004; 
Kühner, 2007). However, these issues are not insurmountable. This is demonstrated through 
work conducted by researchers at Stockholm University who have constructed a Social Policy 
Indicators (SPIN) database (http://www.sofi.su.se/spin), consisting of a collection of datasets 
with comparable institutional data on child care, parental leave and social insurance86. Data 
such as this is important for the research question of this thesis but also for comparative social 
policy scholarship more widely.   
Alongside these methodological issues related to shortcomings in the available data, this 
thesis has exposed some evidence gaps. First, there is a need for more research which uses 
the approach of Chapter Six. Stronger evidence for causality can be inferred through studies 
which focus on specific countries and policy areas, as well as the effect on health of policy 
change. In this sense, the paper by Beckfield and Bambra (2016) (described in Chapter Six) 
represents an important contribution to this field. Using lagged fixed effects models, these 
authors showed how changes in welfare state policies within a particular country に the United 
States に were related with trends in life expectancy. By using a modelling strategy which 
allows for delays in the health effects of policies に which are particularly likely with an 
outcome such as life expectancy に the methods used by these authors further strengthen the 
case for causality.  
Longitudinal policy-specific studies such as these should be accompanied by case study, 
qualitative and realist-inspired approaches. This thesis has shown how quantitative research 
methods can be used to address aims that are generally thought of as qualitative (i.e. 
exploring causal pathways); however there remain limitations with this research approach. In 
particular, the reliance on crude measures of cash benefits policies and health outcomes 
limits how precise we can be about causal connections. Garthwaite et al. (2014) provide an 
example of how a qualitative approach can reveal more about the heterogeneous health 
impact of policies. Using a longitudinal mixed methods design, these authors investigated the 
impact of changing definitions of incapacity linked with receipt of sickness benefits in the UK. 
                                                          
86 These datasets were consulted and considered for Chapter Five. However, they were not entirely suited to 
the research questions of interest. Moreover, as the data collection was in its early stages, the data were not 
completely ready for public use. 
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They found that the increased conditionality attached to receipt of sickness benefits led to 
feelings of stigmatisation and shame, which had varying impacts on pre-existing health issues 
among recipients (ibid.: 15).  
Similarly, Moffatt et al. (2015) showed the wide-ranging social and health impacts of a change 
in policy around social housing in the UK に デｴW ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW け‘Wﾏﾗ┗;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW “ヮ;ヴW ‘ﾗﾗﾏ 
“┌HゲｷS┞げ ｷﾐ ヲヰヱン に through interview and focus-group data. Testimonies from participants 
revealed adverse effects on mental health, family and social relationships. Last, Mehdipanah 
et al. (2015) illustrate how a realist case study approach can be employed to show how a 
specific policy に urban renewal programs - shapes health inequalities and how this impact 
varies according to differences in the type of interventions. An obvious drawback of 
qualitative approaches is that the results are less generalisable. However, the findings from 
these studies suggest it might be necessary to exchange some generalisability for greater 




The research implications described above have centred on the need to collect more high-
quality evidence. Part of the impetus for this is to improve the policy recommendations that 
can be made. The overarching policy implication of this thesis is for greater awareness of the 
contribution of non-health-related policies to health outcomes. More specifically, it is 
proposed ふSヴ;┘ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa ;S┗ﾗI;デWゲ ﾗa デｴW けHW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐ ;ﾉﾉ PﾗﾉｷIｷWゲげ ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデ87) 
that governments should evaluate non-health-related policies on health grounds, where at 
present, they tend only to be evaluated on equality or cost-benefits terms (Comptroller & 
Auditor General, 2014; Department for Work and Pensions, 2011).  
An important tool for this is Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) and it is suggested that these 
should be used more widely in relation to non-health-related policies, (again echoing the 
arguments of Health in all Policies advocates, e.g. Collins & Koplan, 2009). Health Impact 
Assessments involve a series of steps to assess the social and environmental risks that policies 
                                                          
87 See, for example, Collins & Koplan, 2009; Koivusalo, 2010; World Health Organisation, 2014. 
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pose to health (Department of Health, 2010; Suther & Sandel, 2013). A range of methods exist 
to evaluate HIAs and there is evidence that HIAs not only improve the health-sensitivity of 
policymaking, but also make policymakers more aware of the social determinants of health 
(Mindell et al., 2004; Veerman et al., 2005). To this end, such evaluative tools may improve 
awareness of the health impact of cash benefits policies, while also keeping the issue of health 
inequalities on the political agenda. 
While the key policy message is for consideration to be given to the health and health equity 
consequences of cash benefits policies, more specific recommendations can be made based 
on the empirical findings in Chapters Four to Six: 
 
- Out-of-work benefits should be sufficiently generous to protect the health of 
unemployed people. Chapter Four found evidence that more generous welfare states 
had fewer inequalities in depressive symptoms. In Chapter Five, The health benefits 
of generous out-of-work benefits seemed to outweigh any negative health effects 
linked with employment disincentives, contrary to commonly-held beliefs in policy 
circles (Centre for Social Justice, 2013; Freud, 2007). This makes a health case for 
sustained investment in out-of-work benefits. 
 
- Active LMPs should aim to reduce unemployment among disadvantaged groups, with 
health equity goals in mind. Higher spending on labour market activation policies was 
associated with better employment outcomes and better mental health as a result. 
This effect was stronger for low educated unemployed people. Although this finding 
came from cross-sectional data (and thus has some limitations), it was consistent with 
a substantial body of literature which shows that i) active LMPs reduce unemployment 
and ii) unemployment is causally-related with ill-health (evidence reviewed in 
chapter).  
 
- Benefit conditionality should be subject to health (equity) impact assessment 
Tentative evidence was found for a relationship between cash benefits conditionality 
and wider health inequalities between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. While 
there are some qualifications to this finding (i.e. it was based on imperfect measures 
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of conditionality and there was no evidence for any of the causal pathways), this and 
other research (e.g. Garthwaite, 2014; Garthwaite et al., 2014; Reeves & Loopstra, 
2016) nonetheless suggests that conditionality can be damaging to the health of 
vulnerable groups. Refusals to evaluate the health effects of conditionality (e.g. Stone, 
2015) should be challenged and practices reviewed where appropriate. 
 
- More conditional cash benefits may not reduce unemployment. Conditionality has 
often been justified on the grounds that it reduces unemployment (Couling, 2013: 4; 
Freud, 2007; Gregg, 2008b; Mead, 1997; Waddell & Burton, 2006). Yet there was no 
evidence in Chapter Six that states with more stringent TANF conditionality practices 
had less unemployment among target groups (echoing the results of Rector & Youssef, 
1999). While conditionality has shown to generally increased short-term job entry 
(Griggs & Evans, 2010), the inconsistency of these findings suggests that policymakers 
should be cautious in assuming that conditionality will universally lead to better 
employment outcomes. 
The above policy recommendations are narrow in their focus and draw directly on the key 
findings from the thesis. Yet they also feed in to wider debates about the direction of travel 
of welfare state policies in Western societies (and especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, see 
(Humpage, 2014)). In particular, they are linked with policy debates about the extent to which 
cash benefits policies should focus on immediate poverty relief or longer-term goals of 
reducing unemployment and worklessness through conditionality and activation. This thesis 
has been concerned with how cash benefits policies reduce and protect against both poverty 
and unemployment. It has therefore cut to the heart of this debate, with policy implications 
which potentially stretch much further than those proposed in the section above. Drawing on 
the key conclusions of this thesis, the final part of this chapter considers a more ambitious set 
of reforms to cash benefits policies and reviews these in terms of debates around 






Wider implications for public policyぎ TｴW ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ aﾗヴ ; けヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐIﾗﾏWげい 
This thesis has shown that cash benefits are related to health inequalities through a range of 
causal pathways, demonstrating the complex effects of cash benefits policies in 
contemporary welfare states. One proposed alternative to the current method of distributing 
cash benefits is the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI), a cash benefit which is 
offered unconditionally as a right of citizenship. The argument for this has been set out by 
Standing (2002) and others (Basic Income Earth Network, 2017; Van Parijs, 2004) and has 
even been raised in political circles (Painter & Thoung, 2014). According to the Basic Income 
Earth Network (2017), a UBI would have five defining characteristics: 
- Periodic: Paid at regular intervals rather than as a lump sum 
- A cash benefit: Paid as cash rather than an in-kind benefit (e.g. food stamps) 
- Individual: Paid to individuals rather than families or households; 
- Universal: Paid to all 
- Unconditional: Paid without any work-related requirements.  
Basic income would also be set above the poverty line and would guarantee the income of 
the working poor at a minimum level after-tax, thus theoretically eliminating poverty and 
unemployment traps (Clark & Kavanagh, 1996: 400).  
There are therefore some possible advantages of the UBI in terms of its ability to tackle 
poverty and unemployment, which would also be likely to result in reductions in health 
inequalities. First, UBI would theoretically eliminate poverty among both working and non-
working adults. Second, advocates argue that the universality of UBI would break down 
divisions between in- and out-of-work populations and would also contribute to reductions 
in gender inequality by ensuring that unpaid labour was economically valued (Sage & 
Diamond, 2017). This in turn may lead to health improvements among the unemployed. Third, 
by removing unemployment and poverty traps, UBI should make it easier for the unemployed 
to take up work, thus potentially reducing unemployment and increasing public confidence 
in the benefits system. 
On the basis of these arguments a UBI should theoretically cut through the entire debate 
described in the last section by both eliminating poverty and reducing disincentives to work. 
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By the same token, it should reduce health inequalities by addressing the health determinants 
at the centre of this thesis. However, the small amount of evidence that exists from trials of 
UBI programmes in Europe and North America suggests that even with the removal of poverty 
and unemployment traps, a completely unconditional cash benefits system creates some 
work disincentive effects, as feared by critics. 
For example Forget (2008) reviewed evaluations from five UBI experiments across North 
America and Canada between 1970 and the present day. She reported that the experiments 
resulted in an average of a 13 per cent reduction in work effort across a family where all 
persons were given a UBI, as well as downward impacts on the numbers of working hours of 
secondary earners (Levine et al., 2005: 99). While not based on a direct UBI experiment, 
Gaffney (2015) similarly argues that the case of cash benefits for single parents in the UK 
offers evidence that a UBI would create work disincentives. He notes that prior to 2008 single 
parents had no obligation to seek work, although tax credits ensured that most would be 
financially better off in work (i.e. removing the unemployment trap). Yet significant increases 
in the employment rates of single parents followed the introduction of reforms brought in by 
the New Labour government to get single parents back to work, providing evidence that some 
incentives are necessary to encourage unemployment exit. 
This modest body of evidence suggests that the UBI may have some adverse effects on 
employment outcomes, even if it is successful in reducing poverty and unemployment traps 
(thus addressing one of the key problems of current out-of-work cash benefits policies). This 
not only makes it less convincing as means of tackling health inequalities but also makes it 
harder for advocates to argue for a UBI, given deeply-held public suspicions that many benefit 
ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデゲ ;ヴW けｪ;ﾏｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ (Baumberg et al., 2012).  
As such, this thesis ends by proposing an alternative to both the UBI and the current method 
of distributing cash benefits which seems to follow a trajectory of ever-encroaching 
conditionality. Drawing on a proposal by Atkinson (1996, 2015: 205-237), it suggests a 
けP;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ IﾐIﾗﾏWげく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾐIﾗﾏW デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ヮ;ｷS デﾗ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
participationげが ;ゲ SWaｷﾐWS ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ ヮ;ｷS Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデが ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗WS aﾗヴﾏゲ ﾗa 
education or training, voluntary or care work (Atkinson, 1996). As with UBI, the Participation 
Income would be set above the poverty threshold and would ensure that those in work had 
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higher after-tax wages, thus theoretically removing poverty/unemployment traps. However, 
it has the obvious (political) benefit over UBI of requiring recipients to be involved in some 
form of socially meaningful activity, thus imposing a basic level of conditionality on recipients, 
according to their capabilities.  
The argument in this thesis has been that it is the material and psychosocial costs of 
unemployment which are particularly damaging to health. The Participation Income 
addresses both these problems in a number of ways. First, it removes the poverty associated 
with unemployment. Second, it requires healthy unemployed people to participate in work-
related activities, education or training programmes, which have been shown to reduce the 
psychosocial health costs of unemployment (Carter & Whitworth, 2016; Sage, 2015b). 
Moreover, this thesis has shown that participation in such programmes may ultimately reduce 
unemployment, with health benefits.  
While the emphasis of this thesis has mostly been on policies to tackle unemployment, the 
ゲIﾗヮW ﾗa Aデﾆｷﾐゲﾗﾐげゲ けP;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ IﾐIﾗﾏWげ ヴWﾏｷﾐSゲ us of the wider remit of cash benefits 
policies. The health effects of other forms of worklessness, such as care work, have not been 
directly addressed. However, it is plausible that by reducing the poverty associated with these 
forms of work and recognising them as legitimate forms of social contribution, the 
Participation Income has the potential to mitigate against both material and psychosocial 
health consequences of such work (e.g. Whitehead et al., 2000).   
In sum, the Participation Income seems the most radical way in which cash benefits policies 
I;ﾐ HW ヴWaﾗヴﾏWS デﾗ ヴWS┌IW ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲく Iﾐ Aデﾆｷﾐゲﾗﾐげゲ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉが P;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐ IﾐIﾗﾏW ｷゲ 
paid to all children and participating adults (Atkinson, 1996). It therefore has the potential to 
reduce lifetime health inequalities by tackling child poverty, while ensuring that adults have 
the resources to play a valuable social role and enjoy the psychosocial health benefits that 








Tｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ ｷゲ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデが デﾗ デｴｷゲ ;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWが デｴ;デ ｴ;ゲ aﾗI┌ゲWS 
exclusively on how cash benefits policies shape health inequalities. The overarching aim has 
been to explore the empirical evidence for causal pathways that might connect welfare states 
and health inequalities. To do this, it has focused on the example of cash benefits policies and 
educational inequalities in mental health. It has found evidence that Scandinavian welfare 
systems have less inequalities in depressive symptoms, possibly due to their impact on stress. 
Evidence was also found to suggest that spending in European countries on active and passive 
labour market policies influences health inequalities via its impact on the prevalence of 
unemployment, although this requires further corroboration. In a case study of the United 
States, sanctions and job search requirements were linked with health inequalities overall, 
yet there was no convincing evidence that this was through their impact on wellbeing during 
unemployment or employment/income outcomes. 
The final comment is about the role of cash benefits within what Krieger (1994) describes as 
デｴW け┘WH ﾗa I;┌ゲ;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲく V;ヴｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ｴW;ﾉデｴ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが 
states and regions results from current and historical differences in customs, traditions, 
micro- and macro-level policies. Contemporary welfare states were developed out of the 
けｪWﾐデﾉWﾏWﾐげゲ IﾗﾏヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWげ ﾗa デｴW ヮﾗゲデ-war period (Hutton, 1996). They represent concessions 
to both capital and labour, allowing economic and social inequality to continue while 
mitigating the worst effects. Cash benefits systems were never meant to eradicate 
inequalities. We can therefore expect them to have some impact on health inequalities. 
However, it should not come as a surprise that empirical evidence is patchy and does not 
consistently show that more generous cash benefits policies, which do a better job at reducing 
poverty and unemployment, have less health inequalities.  
Nevertheless, the case for sustained investment in welfare states is strong. The uncertainty 
of the future in terms of ageing populations, climate change, globalisation and the changing 
nature of work, necessitates that advanced economies maintain strong safety nets. Cash 
benefits systems play a crucial role in pooling risk. To ensure that we meet the challenges of 
the future fairly including the likely health consequences of these global changes, we must 
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continue to argue for not only the survival, but also the revival of the welfare state as a 
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Figure A.1 List of Questions used to construct the EURO-D, SHARE 2004-2013. 
 
 
The EURO-D symptom scale measures the current depression and is constructed from questions in the mental health 
module (mh002_ に mh017_) as a composite index of twelve items: depressed mood, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, 
interest, irritability, appetite, fatigue, concentratiﾗﾐが Wﾐﾃﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS デW;ヴa┌ﾉﾐWゲゲく TｴW ゲI;ﾉW ヴ;ﾐｪWゲ aヴﾗﾏ ヰ さﾐﾗデ SWヮヴWゲゲWSざ 
デﾗ ヱヲ さ┗Wヴ┞ SWヮヴWゲゲWSざく 
1. In the last month, have you been sad or depressed? IWER: IF PARTICIPANT ASKS FOR 
CLARIFICATION, SAY 'BY SAD OR DEPRESSED, WE MEAN MISERABLE, IN LOW SPIRITS, OR BLUE' 1. Yes 5. No 
 
2. What are your hopes for the future? IWER: NOTE ONLY WHETHER HOPES ARE MENTIONED OR NOT 1. Any hopes 
mentioned 2. No hopes mentioned 
 
3. In the last month, have you felt that you would rather be dead? 1. Any mention of suicidal feelings or wishing to be 
dead 2. No such feelings 
 
4. Do you tend to blame yourself or feel guilty about anything? 1. Obvious excessive guilt or self-blame 2. No such 
feelings 3. Mentions guilt or self-blame, but it is unclear if these 
constitute obvious or excessive guilt or self-blame 
 
5. Have you had trouble sleeping recently? 1. Trouble with sleep or recent change in pattern 2. No trouble sleeping 
 
6. In the last month, what is your interest in things? 1. Less interest than usual mentioned 2. No mention of loss of 
interest 3. Non-specific or uncodeable response 
 
7. Have you been irritable recently? 1. Yes 5. No 
 
8. What has your appetite been like? 1. Diminution in desire for food 2. No diminution in desire for food 3. Non-
specific or uncodeable response 
 
9. In the last month, have you had too little energy to do the things you wanted to do? 1. Yes 5. No 
 
10. How is your concentration? For example, can you concentrate on a television programme, film or radio 
programme? 1. Difficulty in concentrating on entertainment 2. No such difficulty mentioned Can you concentrate 
on something you read? 1. Difficulty in concentrating on reading 2. No such difficulty mentioned 
 
11. What have you enjoyed doing recently? 1. Fails to mention any enjoyable activity 2. Mentions ANY enjoyment from 
activity 
 
12. In the last month, have you cried at all? IWER: END OF NON-PROXY SECTION. IF THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT 




Table A.1 Frequencies across welfare regimes and waves, population aged 






Welfare Regime 2004 2006 2011 2013 Total 
      
Bismarckian      
Austria 775 34 2,281 84 3,174 
Germany 1,563 558 26 2,525 4,672 
Netherlands 1,702 583 531 942 3,758 
France 1,605 534 1,970 113 4,222 
Switzerland 499 440 1,419 42 2,400 
Belgium 1,984 234 1,890 854 4,962 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 894 894 
Total 8128 2383 8117 5454 24,082 
      
Scandinavian      
Sweden 1,590 339 44 1,131 3,104 
Denmark 917 791 429 1,026 3,163 
Total 2,507 1,130 473 2,157 6,267 
      
Anglo-Saxon      
Ireland 0 565 0 0 565 
Total 0 565 0 0 565 
      
Southern      
Spain 1,048 458 944 1,520 3,970 
Italy 1,342 601 823 954 3,720 
Portugal 0 0 995 0 995 
Greece 1,454 545 0 0 1,999 
Total 3,844 1,604 2,762 2,474 10,684 
      
Eastern      
Czech Republic 0 1,498 2,100 697 4,295 
Poland 0 1,350 128 0 1,478 
Hungary 0 0 1,620 0 1,620 
Slovenia 0 0 1,403 499 1,902 
Estonia 0 0 3,013 109 3,122 
Total 0 2848 8264 1305 12,417 










   
Bismarckian   
    Austria 3.31 3.37 
    Germany 1.22 1.95 
    Netherlands 2.13 2.61 
    France 4.86 6.94 
    Switzerland 0.67 2.25 
    Belgium 1.43 1.81 
    Luxembourg 2.24 1.57 
    Average 2.30 3.10 
   
Scandinavian   
    Sweden 1.26 2.64 
    Denmark 1.39 1.26 
    Average 1.32 1.95 
   
Anglo-Saxon   
    Ireland 1.95 0.35 
    Average 1.95 0.35 
   
Southern   
    Spain 2.90 2.95 
    Italy 1.32 2.37 
    Portugal 2.41 3.42 
    Greece 1.90 0.80 
    Average 2.12 2.39 
   
Eastern   
    Czech Rep. 2.58 1.09 
    Poland 2.10 7.10 
    Hungary 0.80 0.06 
    Slovenia 1.84 0.68 
    Estonia 4.93 0.93 







Table A.3 Coefficients of Depressive Symptoms (CES-D) across Countries and 
by Education Level, SHARE 2004-2013. 
Variables M1 M2 
 Individual   
  Age 0.00 0.00 
  Not Born in Country  0.44** 0.45** 
  Married 0.51** 0.51** 
  Female 0.76** 0.76** 
  Education (ref: low)   
     Med -0.47** -0.53* 
     High -0.72** -0.71** 
  Wave (ref: 2010)   
    2004 -0.02 -0.02 
    2006 -0.17** -0.17** 
    2012 0.27+ 0.27+ 
 Country (ref: Austria)   
  Germany 0.15 0.23 
  Netherlands 0.10 -0.04 
  France 0.77** 0.65** 
  Switzerland 0.05 -0.14 
  Belgium 0.49** 0.32 
  Luxembourg 0.20 0.37 
  Sweden 0.05 -0.21 
  Denmark 0.07 -0.07 
  Ireland 0.32** 0.25 
  Spain 0.32** 0.34 
  Italy 0.30** 0.30 
  Portugal 0.84** 0.87** 
  Greece -0.08+ -0.14 
  Czech Rep. 0.17+ 0.07 
  Poland 1.55** 1.45** 
  Hungary 1.15** 1.73** 
  Slovenia 0.16 0.01 
  Estonia 1.03** 1.07** 
Country*Education (Austria*Low (ref.))   
    Germany*High  -0.18 
    Netherlands*High  0.19 
    France*High  0.12 
    Switzerland*High  0.39 
    Belgium*High  0.20 
    Lux*High  -0.59** 
    Sweden*High  0.28 
    Denmark*High  0.15 
    Ireland*High  0.22 
    Spain*High  0.04 
    Italy*High  -0.20 
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    Portugal*High  0.42+ 
    Greece*High  -0.05 
    Czech Rep.*High  -0.04 
    Poland*High  0.27 
    Hungary*High  -1.33** 
    Slovenia*High  0.02 
    Estonia*High  -0.28 
n 51558 51558 
N 55 55 
R-squared 0.091 0.093 
     






















Table A.4 Coefficients of Depressive Symptoms (CES-D) across Welfare 
Regimes and by Education Level, SHARE 2004-2013. 
 
Variables M1 M2 
Individual   
  Age -0.00 0.00 
  Not Born in Country  0.43** 0.43** 
  Married 0.50** 0.50** 
  Female 0.77** 0.77** 
  Education (ref: low)   
    Medium -0.52** -0.19 
    High -0.78** -0.45** 
  Wave (ref: 2010)   
    2004 -0.11 -0.11 
    2006 -0.20 -0.20 
    2012 0.06 0.06 
Welfare Regime (ref: 
Scandinavian)   
  Bismarckian 0.25* 0.50** 
  Anglo-Saxon 0.18 0.35* 
  Southern 0.19+ 0.47** 
  Eastern 0.87* 1.00* 
Welfare Regime*Education (ref: 
Scandinavian*Low)   
  Bismarckian*Med  -0.32* 
  Bismarckian*High  -0.33* 
  Anglo-Saxon*Med  -0.59** 
  Anglo-Saxon*High  -0.04 
  Southern*Med  -0.44** 
  Southern*High  -0.35* 
  Eastern*Med  -0.14 
  Eastern*High  -0.33 
n 52,229 51,558 
N 55 55 
 





















Figure A.2 Welfare Regime Differences in Educational Inequalities in 
















Notes: Predicted values for EURO-D are based on welfare regime*education interaction effects from 
a Logistic regression model, controlling for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, wave. Pseudo R-
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Notes: Predicted values for EURO-D are based on welfare regime*education interaction effects from 
a Logistic regression model, controlling for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, wave. Pseudo R-







Table B.1 Mean contextual variables across ESS countries, 2006-2014 







Austria 13.60 25.38 41777.96 2.61 2.37 3272 
Belgium 9.13 24.98 39286.79 2.74 1.89 4091 
Czech Rep. 5.05 3.50 27595.19 2.20 2.92 3167 
Germany 12.16 17.40 41172.03 2.01 2.68 6523 
Denmark 28.26 30.04 42728.96 3.60 2.18 3448 
Estonia 2.54 4.80 24358.33 2.01 1.81 3162 
Spain 5.70 14.41 32323.61 1.27 2.28 2908 
Finland 11.60 20.06 38284.07 3.08 2.17 4399 
France 9.49 14.41 36426.82 2.90 2.38 2776 
Great Britain 5.72 3.35 37663.32 2.96 1.26 1729 
Hungary 3.79 3.74 21758.44 3.10 2.00 1571 
Ireland 8.89 16.91 44794.78 3.14 1.35 3341 
Italy 3.45 14.68 33333.43 1.39 2.76 726 
Netherlands 13.68 28.71 44797.23 1.37 2.82 2702 
Norway 16.27 9.96 59918.21 2.88 2.33 3734 
Poland 4.14 3.87 20838.95 1.22 2.23 4060 
Portugal 3.56 9.89 25603.30 1.22 3.43 2274 
Sweden 15.33 7.86 42513.97 3.60 2.61 2585 
Slovenia 4.14 7.67 27138.38 1.96 2.60 2046 





Table B.2 Impact of LMPs on depressive symptoms for employed vs 
unemployed people, CES-D. 
    
Variables M1 M2 M3 
    
Individual    
  Age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
  Age Squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
  Female 0.68** 0.68** 0.68** 
  Married -1.10** -1.10** -1.10** 
 Not Born in Country 0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 
 Wave -0.48** -0.48** -0.48** 
 Unemployed 1.25** 1.26** 1.29** 
 Education (ref: High) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   Medium 0.50** 0.51** 0.50** 
   Low 1.21** 1.21** 1.21** 
    
Policy    
  Passive LMP -0.20* -0.21** -0.19* 
  Active LMP 0.07 0.00 0.06 
  Family Policy -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  GDP -0.54** -0.54** 0.00 
  Employment Reg. 0.08 0.08 0.08 
    
Employment Status*Policy    
  Unemployed*Passive LMP -0.15  -0.34* 
  Unemployed*Active LMP  0.03 0.11 
  Unemployed*GDP   0.17 
n 56775 56775 56775 
N 41 41 41 
 
NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 






Table B.3 Relationship between Self-Reported Unemployment and 





  Age 0.03** 
  Age Squared -0.00** 
  Female 0.68** 
  Married -1.10** 
 Not Born in Country -0.48** 
 Wave  
 Unemployed 1.26** 
 Education (ref: High)  
   Medium 0.51** 
   Low 1.21** 
  
Policy  
  Passive LMP -0.21* 
  Active LMP 0.07 
  Family Policy -0.03 
  GDP -0.54** 





NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 









Table B.4 Impact of Labour Market Policies on Educational Inequalities in 



















NﾗデWゲぎ D;デ; デ;ﾆWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
     
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
     
Individual      
 Age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 Age Squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 Female 0.66** 0.67** 0.67** 0.66** 
 Married -1.16** -1.16** -1.16** -1.16** 
 Not Born in Country 0.77** 0.77** 0.77** 0.77** 
 Wave -0.45** -0.44** -0.44** -0.44** 
 Education (ref: high) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Medium 0.53** 0.56** 0.56** 0.56** 
    Low 1.31** 1.33** 1.33** 1.32** 
     
Policy     
  Family Policy -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  Employment Reg. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
  GDP Per Capita -0.55** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  High Ed.*GDP  0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Med Ed.*GDP  -0.19** -0.17+ -0.16+ 
    Low Ed.*GDP  -0.22 -0.12 -0.14 
     
Education*LMPs    
  Passive LMP -0.19* 0.00 -0.19* -0.21** 
  High*Passive LMP (ref.)  0.00  0.00 
    Med*Passive LMP  -0.03  -0.01 
    Low*Passive LMP  0.05  0.13 
  Active LMP 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.11 
  High*Active LMP (ref.)   0.00 0.00 
    Med*Active LMP   -0.05 -0.04 
    Low*Active LMP   -0.10 -0.18 
n 57038 57038 57038 57038 




Table B.5 Effect of Sensitivity Variables on Depressive Symptoms for 
employed vs unemployed people, CES-D. 
     
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
     
Individual     
  Age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
  Age Squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
  Female 0.68** 0.67** 0.68** 0.68** 
  Married -1.10** -1.08** -1.09** -1.11** 
 Not Born in Country 0.69** 0.69** 0.69** 0.67** 
 Wave -0.43* -0.58** -0.39* -0.50** 
 Unemployed 1.28** 1.29** 1.27** 1.27** 
 Education (ref: High) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   Medium 0.50** 0.50** 0.49** 0.50** 
   Low 1.21** 1.20** 1.22** 1.22** 
     
Policy     
  Active LMP -0.11 0.00 -0.02  
  Passive LMP    -0.15* 
  Employment Reg. 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.11 
  Family Policy 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.04 
  Unemployment Rate -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 
  Unemployed*GDP 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.04 
     
Employment Status*Policy     
  Unemployed*Short Term RR -0.06    
  Unemployed*Long Term RR  -0.05   
  Unemployed*Duration   -0.06  
  Unemployed*PES    0.03 
  Unemployed*Non-PES    -0.06 
n 56775 56775 56775 56775 
N 41 41 41 41 
R-Squared 0.075 0.079 0.076 0.077 
 
Notes: Data taken aヴﾗﾏ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “┌ヴ┗W┞ ヲヰヰヶが ヲヰヱヲが ヲヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 





Table B.6 Impact of Sensitivity Variables on Self-Reported Unemployment, 
Odds Ratios. 
 
Notes: Data taken from European Social Survey 2006, 2012, 2ヰヱヴが E┌ヴﾗゲデ;デ ;ﾐS OECDが ゆ ヮаヰくヱヰが ゅ 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 
 
     
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
     
Individual     
  Age 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 
  Age Squared 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
  Female ヰくΒΓゆ 0.89 ヰくΒΓゆ ヰくΒΓゆ 
  Married 0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 
 Not Born in Country 1.83** 1.82** 1.81** 1.82** 
 Wave ヱくンヰゆ 1.42* ヱくヲΓゆ 1.34* 
 Education (ref: High) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
   Medium 1.50** 1.51** 1.53** 1.51** 
   Low 2.97** 2.98** 2.92** 2.89** 
     
Policy     
  Active LMP 0.68** 0.67** 0.63**  
  Passive LMP    1.23** 
  Employment Reg. 1.03 1.09 1.12 1.11 
  Family Policy 1.14 1.09 ヱくヱヶゆ 1.15 
  GDP 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.94 
  Short Term RR 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.04 
  Long Term RR 1.13*    
  Duration  1.11   
  PES   1.16*  
  Non-PES    0.78** 
n 57817 57817 57817 57817 
N 41 41 41 41 




Table B.7 Odds Ratios for Impact of Sensitivity Variables on Unemployment 
by Education. 
Variables  M1 M2 M3 M4 
Individual     
  Age 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 
  Age-Squared 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
  Female ヰくΒΓゆ ヰくΒΓゆ ヰくΒΓゆ ヰくΒΓゆ 
  Married 0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 
  Not Born 1.81** 1.79** 1.80** 1.77** 
  Wave 1.16 ヱくヲヱゆ 1.15 ヱくヲヰゆ 
  Education (ref.: High) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    Medium 1.52** 1.52** 1.54** 1.50** 
    Low 2.77** 2.75** 2.76** 2.68** 
     
Policy     
  Active LMP 0.81** 0.81** 0.77**  
  Passive LMP    1.20** 
  Emp. Regulation 1.10 ヱくヱヱゆ 1.13* 1.15* 
  GDP 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Family Policy 1.19** 1.16* 1.20** 1.24** 
  Unemployment Rate 1.34** 1.34** 1.33** 1.35** 
  High Education*GDP (ref.)     
    Med*GDP -0.23** -0.10 -0.20** -0.18* 
    Low*GDP -0.23 -0.10 -0.30* -0.18 
     
Education*Policy     
  High*Short RR (ref.) 1.09    
    Med*Short RR 0.97    
    Low*Short RR 0.93    
  High*Long RR (ref.)  1.19   
    Med*Long RR  0.97   
    Low*Long RR  0.81   
  High*Duration (ref.)   1.16+  
    Med*Dur   0.95  
    Low*Dur   0.91  
  High*PES (ref.)    1.05 
    Med*PES    0.83** 
    Low*PES    1.02 
  High*Non-PES (ref.)    0.76** 
    Med*Non-PES    1.07 
    Low*Non-PES    0.89* 
n 57817 57817 57817 57817 
N 41 41 41 41 




Table B.8 Impact of Sensitivity Variables on Educational Inequalities in 
Depressive Symptoms (CES-D), Full Controls. 
Variables  M1 M2 M3 M4 
Individual     
  Age 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
  Age-Squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
  Female 0.66** 0.66** 0.67** 0.67** 
  Married -1.16** -1.14** -1.15** -1.17** 
  Not Born 0.76** 0.77** 0.76** 0.75** 
  Wave -0.40* -0.55** -0.36* -0.49** 
  Education (ref.: High) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Medium 0.56** 0.55** 0.55** 0.55** 
    Low 1.34** 1.32** 1.34** 1.33** 
     
Policy     
  Active LMP -0.11 -0.01 -0.02  
  Passive LMP    -0.14+ 
  Emp. Regulation 0.14+ 0.12 0.08 0.12 
  GDP -0.42** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Family Policy 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.05 
  Unemployment Rate -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.05 
  High Education*GDP (ref.)     
    Med*GDP -0.23** -0.10 -0.20** -0.18* 
    Low*GDP -0.23 -0.10 -0.30* -0.18 
     
Education*Policy     
  High*Short RR (ref.) -0.07    
    Med*Short RR 0.05    
    Low*Short RR -0.03    
  High*Long RR (ref.)  -0.33**   
    Med*Long RR  -0.16   
    Low*Long RR  -0.14   
  High*Duration (ref.)   -0.18*  
    Med*Dur   -0.02  
    Low*Dur   0.14+  
  High*PES (ref.)    0.18* 
    Med*PES    0.08 
    Low*PES    0.03 
  High*Non-PES (ref.)    -0.02 
    Med*Non-PES    -0.12+ 




























N 57038 57038 57038 57038 
N 41 41 41 41 






Figure C.1 Example of Sanctions Data from the Welfare Rules Database 2015, 



























Detail about operationalisation of Sanctions Policies 
 
There remains some controversy in the prior literature about how best to operationalise TANF 
sanctioning practices. To begin, it is worth noting the following points of consensus: 
- Aﾐ けWﾐデｷヴW HWﾐWaｷデげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ けI;ゲW IﾉﾗゲWSげ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデゲ デｴW ﾏﾗゲデ ゲW┗WヴW SWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐく 
- Severity can be divided further around whether aﾐ けWﾐデｷヴW HWﾐWaｷデげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ ﾗヴ 
ｷﾏヮﾗゲWS ;ゲ ; SWﾉ;┞WS けﾏﾗゲデ ゲW┗WヴWげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐく 
On this basis, all agree that the most stringent states are those that initially sanction the entire 
benefit or close the case. Those that have a delayed full sanction/case closure are also viewed 
as severe, however this severity depends on how much benefit is deducted initially. 
TｴW ｷゲゲ┌W デｴWﾐが ｷゲ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ デﾗ Sｷ┗ｷSW けヮ;ヴデｷ;ﾉげ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴWヴW are some differences 
across studies in how this is done. In the WRD, partial sanctions are defined in three ways: 
ヮWヴIWﾐデ;ｪWゲ ﾗa デｴW a┌ﾉﾉ WﾐデｷデﾉWﾏWﾐデが け;S┌ﾉデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa HWﾐWaｷデげ ﾗヴ ; aｷ┝WS ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデ ふWくｪく ガヵヰぶく 
TｴW ﾏﾗゲデ ;ﾏHｷｪ┌ﾗ┌ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴｷゲ ｷゲ け;S┌ﾉデ ヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa HWﾐWaｷデげ ;ゲ デｴｷゲ ┗;ヴｷWゲ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ゲデ;デWゲ ;ﾐS 
family types and it is thus hard to equate this with a percentage. Conversely, fixed amounts 
can be estimated as percentages of the maximum monthly amount for an average TANF 
family. Most ゲデ┌SｷWゲ ｴ;┗W デヴW;デWS デｴW け;S┌ﾉデ ヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa HWﾐWaｷデげ ;ゲ ; ヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ﾏｷﾉS ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ 
as the m;ﾃﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa TANF ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデゲ ;ヴW a;ﾏｷﾉｷWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗﾐW ﾗヴ ﾏﾗヴW IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐく HWヴWが け;S┌ﾉデ ヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ 
ﾗa HWﾐWaｷデげ ｷゲ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ Iﾉ;ゲゲWS ;ゲ ; ﾏｷﾉS ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐd categorised as being below 33 per cent 
of the total amount as we can expect this to be true in many cases (e.g. in a family with three 
children it will represent a maximum of one quarter of the full amount).  Another question is 
how to classify states in terms of the percentage reduction. Analysts have taken different 
approaches to this. Some are quite crude and adopt broad gradations of sanction severity 
(e.g. Stahl, 2008 uses 50 per cent as the cut-ﾗaa ;ﾐS Iﾉ;ゲゲWゲ ;ﾉﾉ ゲデ;デWゲ ;Hﾗ┗W デｴｷゲ ;ゲ けゲW┗WヴWげぶ ﾗヴ 
simply place all states with a sanction less than 100 per cent within the same category (GAO, 
2000). 
Here, I draw on part of the approach of Burke and Gish (1999), who classify states that 
sanction 33 per cent ﾗヴ ﾉWゲゲ ;ゲ けﾉW;ゲデ ゲW┗WヴWげく Iデ ┘;ゲ aﾗ┌ﾐSが ;aデWヴ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲｷﾐｪ ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ S;デ; aﾗヴ 




approximately half had a sanction less than 33 per cent (including adult portion of benefit) 




























Table C.1 Socioeconomic differences in the Odds of Reporting Missing for 
Income, BRFSS 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015  
 
Variables M1 M2 
 Odds Ratio 95% CI Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Age 0.73 (0.70  0.75) 0.75 (0.73  0.78) 
Married 0.88 (0.83  0.93) 0.86 (0.81  0.91) 
Non-White 1.25 (1.18  1.32) 1.15 (1.09  1.21) 
Single Low ed. Mother 1.74 (1.57  1.93)   
Single Unemployed  
Mother   1.25 (1.11  1.41) 
Education (ref.: No School)     
  High School   0.70 (0.65  0.76) 
  Some College   0.49 (0.45  0.53) 
  College   0.46 (0.42  0.50) 
     
n 233716 233716 


































Single Mothers Mothers Women 
     
Employment Status    
  Employed for Wages 3,802 0 140,854 316,180 
  Self-Employed 468 0 17,941 42,436 
  Out of Work for More Than 1 Year 820 3,635 7,032 16,355 
  Out of Work for Less Than 1 Year 792 4,427 8,115 16,508 
  Homemaker 1,423 0 44,495 66,123 
  Student 574 0 8,535 17,832 
  Retired 137 0 2,311 36,263 
  Unable to Work 1,999 0 12,113 44,920 
  Refused 71 0 768 2,489 
     
Income     
  less than $10000 2,473 2,215 11,875 29,444 
  less than $15000 1,595 1,131 10,952 25,559 
  less than $20000 1,746 1,271 16,515 34,785 
  less than $25000 1,117 962 19,799 43,104 
  less than $35000 669 557 24,328 56,715 
  less than $50000 255 321 32,390 77,051 
  less than $75000 133 172 36,756 85,466 
  $750000 or more 127 161 63,571 134,847 
  Don't know 1,692 1,072 14,174 33,488 
























Notes: 1Citizen and Government Ideology based on scales from 0 to 100 constructed by Berry et al. 
(1998) where a higher score signifies a more Anglo-Saxon ideological orientation.
Variable Statistic 
  
Maximum Monthly Benefit 
(PPP-adjusted)  
  N (Non-Missing) 200 
  Mean ($) 431.3. 
  Standard Deviation ($) 142.2 
  
GDP Per Capita  
  N (Non-Missing) 200 
  Mean ($) 45851.6 
  Standard Deviation ($) 8617.8 
  
Unemployment Rate  
  N (Non-Missing) 200 
  Mean (%) 5.6 
  Standard Deviation (%) 2.3 
  
Citizen Ideology1  
  N (Non-Missing) 200 
  Mean  48.5 
  Standard Deviation  15.4 
  
Government Ideology1  
  N (Non-Missing) 199 
  Mean  48.3 




Table C.4 Full Controls for Impact of TANF policies on Mental Health for Unemployed Single Mothers, Coefficients. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age -0.17 (-0.28  -0.06) -0.17 (-0.28  -0.06) -0.17 (-0.28  -0.06) -0.17 (-0.28  -0.06) 
  Married -1.23 (-1.40  -1.07) -1.24 (-1.40  -1.07) -1.24 (-1.40  -1.07) -1.22 (-1.39  -1.06) 
  Non-White -0.86 (-1.07  -0.66) -0.88 (-1.08  -0.69) -0.88 (-1.08  -0.68) -0.86 (-1.06  -0.65) 
  Single Unemployed Mother   1.97 (0.75  3.18) 1.83 (1.11  2.56) 2.29 (1.76  2.82) 1.24 (0.07  2.40) 
  Education (ref.: No School)         
    High School -0.86 (-1.29  -0.43) -0.87 (-1.30  -0.43) -0.86 (-1.29  -0.42) -0.91 (-1.35  -0.48) 
    Some College -0.72 (-1.20  -0.25) -0.73 (-1.21  -0.25) -0.73 (-1.20  -0.25) -0.77 (-1.25  -0.30) 
    College -2.07 (-2.49  -1.65) -2.07 (-2.49  -1.65) -2.07 (-2.49  -1.65) -2.12 (-2.53  -1.70) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 -0.07 (-0.34  0.20) -0.14 (-0.41  0.13) -0.14 (-0.41  0.14) -0.06 (-0.39  0.27) 
    2010 -0.21 (-0.72  0.29) -0.29 (-0.77  0.18) -0.33 (-0.82  0.15) -0.11 (-0.71  0.49) 
    2015 0.01 (-0.27  0.30) -0.05 (-0.31  0.21) -0.08 (-0.35  0.20) -0.11 (-0.47  0.26) 
  GDP per capita -0.11 (-0.22  0.00) -0.09 (-0.20  0.02) -0.09 (-0.20  0.02) 0.23 (-0.09  0.54) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ -0.01 (-0.11  0.09) 0.00 (-0.10  0.10) -0.00 (-0.10  0.10) -0.03 (-0.14  0.08) 
  Citizen Ideology -0.05 (-0.18  0.08) -0.03 (-0.16  0.10) -0.02 (-0.14  0.11) -0.10 (-0.36  0.16) 
  Unemployment  Rate 0.08 (-0.12  0.28) 0.08 (-0.11  0.28) 0.08 (-0.11  0.28) -0.00 (-0.23  0.22) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit         
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  Welfare-to-Work     0.06 (-0.01  0.14) 0.10 (0.03  0.18) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   -0.01 (-0.18  0.16)   -0.23 (-0.45  -0.01) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent -0.18 (-0.43  0.07)     -0.70 (-1.05  -0.35) 
         
TANF*Single Unemployed 
Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.26 (-1.58  2.09)     0.96 (-0.40  2.31) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.26 (0.28  2.23)   1.23 (0.27  2.19) 
  Welfare-to-work     -0.20 (-0.60  0.20) -0.23 (-0.59  0.12) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.64 (-0.00  1.27) 
         
GDP*Single Unemployed 
Mother 0.16 (-0.54  0.85) 0.09 (-0.36  0.54) 0.11 (-0.34  0.55) -0.16 (-0.98  0.65) 
  n 151420 151420 151420 151420 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.5 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policy variables on Self-Reported Unemployment for Low Educated Single 
Mothers, Odds Ratios. 
 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.74 (0.72  0.76) 0.74 (0.72  0.76) 0.74 (0.72  0.76) 0.74 (0.72  0.76) 
  Married 1.27 (1.18  1.37) 1.27 (1.18  1.38) 1.28 (1.18  1.38) 1.26 (1.17  1.36) 
  Non-White 1.21 (1.12  1.31) 1.22 (1.12  1.33) 1.22 (1.11  1.34) 1.16 (1.08  1.23) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   2.03 (1.69  2.44) 2.27 (2.03  2.54) 2.41 (2.20  2.64) 1.91 (1.58  2.31) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.39 (1.24  1.56) 1.32 (1.15  1.51) 1.29 (1.12  1.50) 1.22 (1.15  1.30) 
    2010 1.59 (1.40  1.81) 1.49 (1.30  1.72) 1.52 (1.28  1.80) 1.45 (1.37  1.53) 
    2015 1.54 (1.38  1.72) 1.41 (1.24  1.60) 1.43 (1.24  1.65) 1.36 (1.28  1.44) 
  GDP per capita 0.97 (0.92  1.04) 1.02 (0.97  1.07) 1.03 (0.97  1.09) 0.99 (0.92  1.05) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.97 (0.92  1.02) 0.99 (0.93  1.04) 0.99 (0.93  1.06) 0.97 (0.95  0.99) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.95 (0.89  1.00) 0.98 (0.92  1.05) 0.96 (0.89  1.03) 1.07 (1.00  1.14) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       1.07 (1.00  1.14) 
  Welfare-to-Work     0.96 (0.93  0.99) 0.98 (0.97  1.00) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.82 (0.74  0.91)   0.93 (0.90  0.97) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.72 (0.61  0.84)     1.01 (0.93  1.09) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.26 (0.92  1.71)     1.27 (0.93  1.74) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.15 (0.93  1.42)   1.16 (0.92  1.46) 
  Welfare-to-work     1.09 (0.97  1.21) 1.06 (0.93  1.20) 
  Monthly Benefit       1.04 (0.90  1.21) 
         
  GDP*Single Low Ed. Mother 0.94 (0.82  1.08) 0.91 (0.81  1.03) 0.91 (0.80  1.03) 0.91 (0.76  1.08) 
  N 236455 236455 236455 236455 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.6 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policy variables on Self-Reported Low income (<$10,000) for Low Educated 
Single Mothers, Odds Ratios. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.81 (0.76 0.87) 0.81 (0.75 0.87) 0.81 (0.75 0.87) 0.81 (0.76 0.88) 
  Married 0.34 (0.27 0.42) 0.34 (0.27 0.43) 0.34 (0.27 0.43) 0.33 (0.26 0.41) 
  Non-White 2.12 (1.74 2.58) 2.14 (1.73 2.64) 2.11 (1.68 2.64) 2.12 (1.78 2.53) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   2.67 (2.35 3.03) 3.17 (2.82 3.57) 3.28 (2.92 3.69) 2.71 (2.28 3.21) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.33 (0.93 1.90) 1.08 (0.72 1.61) 1.01 (0.66 1.56) 1.24 (1.01 1.52) 
    2010 0.69 (0.38 1.24) 0.38 (0.20 0.75) 0.37 (0.18 0.79) 1.31 (0.90 1.91) 
    2015 1.14 (0.84 1.54) 0.83 (0.58 1.19) 0.83 (0.56 1.23) 1.14 (0.88 1.48) 
  GDP per capita 0.99 (0.89 1.10) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.98 (0.89 1.07) 0.98 (0.88 1.10) 0.99 (0.89 1.11) 0.92 (0.86 0.99) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.80 (0.71 0.89) 0.83 (0.75 0.93) 0.79 (0.71 0.89) 1.07 (0.91 1.25) 
  Unemployment Rate 1.46 (1.21 1.77) 1.75 (1.40 2.19) 1.79 (1.37 2.34) 1.05 (0.94 1.18) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       1.16 (0.92 1.46) 
  Welfare-to-Work     0.92 (0.85 0.99) 0.96 (0.89 1.04) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.72 (0.60 0.86)   0.95 (0.83 1.09) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.52 (0.41 0.66)     1.01 (0.77 1.32) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.29 (1.08 1.54)     1.18 (0.91 1.52) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.04 (0.85 1.28)   1.00 (0.82 1.22) 
  Welfare-to-work     1.12 (1.02 1.23) 1.09 (0.98 1.22) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.94 (0.84 1.06) 
         
  GDP*Single Low Ed. Mother 1.04 (0.94 1.16) 0.99 (0.88 1.10) 0.98 (0.88 1.09) 1.08 (0.95 1.22) 
  n 212310 212310 212310 212310 
  Pseudo R-Squared 0.127 0.122 0.120 0.137 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.7 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policies on Mental Health of single low educated mothers, Coefficients. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.19 (0.10  0.28) 0.19 (0.10  0.28) 0.19 (0.10  0.28) 0.20 (0.11  0.28) 
  Married -2.16 (-2.30  -2.03) -2.16 (-2.30  -2.02) -2.16 (-2.30  -2.02) -2.14 (-2.28  -2.00) 
  Non-White -0.76 (-0.97  -0.55) -0.77 (-0.98  -0.56) -0.77 (-0.98  -0.56) -0.70 (-0.90  -0.50) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   0.60 (-0.10  1.30) 0.96 (0.50  1.42) 1.47 (1.04  1.89) 0.44 (-0.21  1.08) 
  Unemployed 0.70 (0.62  0.78) 0.70 (0.62  0.79) 0.70 (0.62  0.79) 0.71 (0.62  0.79) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 0.05 (-0.22  0.32) -0.04 (-0.31  0.22) -0.03 (-0.30  0.24) 0.09 (-0.18  0.36) 
    2010 0.09 (-0.40  0.58) -0.07 (-0.53  0.38) -0.05 (-0.51  0.41) 0.32 (-0.21  0.84) 
    2015 0.23 (-0.05  0.51) 0.14 (-0.11  0.38) 0.14 (-0.12  0.40) 0.14 (-0.18  0.46) 
  GDP per capita -0.27 (-0.38  -0.16)     0.11 (-0.16  0.38) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.03 (-0.07  0.12) 0.04 (-0.05  0.14) 0.04 (-0.05  0.14) -0.01 (-0.11  0.08) 
  Citizen Ideology -0.04 (-0.16  0.09) -0.02 (-0.15  0.11) -0.02 (-0.14  0.11) -0.10 (-0.33  0.13) 
  Unemployment   Rate -0.05 (-0.26  0.15) -0.02 (-0.20  0.17) -0.02 (-0.21  0.17) -0.16 (-0.35  0.03) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       -0.06 (-0.29  0.17) 
  Welfare-to-Work     -0.02 (-0.08  0.04) 0.04 (-0.01  0.10) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   -0.01 (-0.19  0.16)   -0.23 (-0.42  -0.04) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent -0.29 (-0.52  -0.05)     -0.80 (-1.14  -0.45) 
TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
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  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.17 (0.18  2.16)     1.07 (0.09  2.05) 
  GDP Per Capita -0.45 (-0.95  0.06) -0.73 (-1.18  -0.27) -0.72 (-1.22  -0.23) -0.69 (-1.15  -0.23) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.33 (0.45  2.22)   1.18 (0.29  2.07) 
  Welfare-to-work     0.48 (0.13  0.83) 0.40 (0.04  0.76) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.29 (-0.11  0.68) 
         
  n 233716 233716 233716 233716 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.8 Full Controls for Impact of TANF policies on Mental Health for Unemployed Single Mothers, Random Effects 
Models, Coefficients. 
 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.19 (0.14  0.23) 0.19 (0.14  0.23) 0.19 (0.14  0.23) 0.19 (0.14  0.23) 
  Married -1.27 (-1.35  -1.19) -1.27 (-1.35  -1.19) -1.27 (-1.35  -1.19) -1.27 (-1.35  -1.18) 
  Non-White -0.98 (-1.06  -0.90) -0.98 (-1.06  -0.90) -0.98 (-1.06  -0.90) -0.98 (-1.07  -0.90) 
  Single Unemployed Mother   3.11 (2.63  3.59) 2.99 (2.76  3.23) 3.01 (2.82  3.21) 2.84 (2.30  3.37) 
  Education (ref.: No School)         
    High School -0.98 (-1.11  -0.85) -0.99 (-1.12  -0.86) -0.98 (-1.11  -0.85) -0.98 (-1.11  -0.85) 
    Some College -1.16 (-1.29  -1.03) -1.16 (-1.29  -1.03) -1.16 (-1.29  -1.03) -1.16 (-1.29  -1.03) 
    College -2.61 (-2.74  -2.48) -2.62 (-2.74  -2.49) -2.61 (-2.74  -2.48) -2.61 (-2.74  -2.48) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 0.07 (-0.13  0.27) 0.05 (-0.15  0.24) 0.05 (-0.15  0.24) 0.07 (-0.12  0.27) 
    2010 -0.29 (-0.60  0.01) -0.35 (-0.64  -0.05) -0.33 (-0.64  -0.03) -0.19 (-0.50  0.12) 
    2015 0.20 (0.00  0.41) 0.18 (-0.01  0.38) 0.19 (-0.01  0.40) 0.25 (0.04  0.46) 
  GDP per capita -0.12 (-0.19  -0.05) 0.00 (0.00  0.00) 0.00 (0.00  0.00) 0.00 (0.00  0.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.02 (-0.06  0.10) 0.04 (-0.04  0.12) 0.03 (-0.05  0.11) 0.02 (-0.06  0.10) 
  Citizen Ideology -0.07 (-0.15  0.02) -0.07 (-0.15  0.01) -0.06 (-0.14  0.02) -0.05 (-0.13  0.04) 
  Unemployment  Rate 0.24 (0.12  0.35) 0.25 (0.14  0.37) 0.25 (0.14  0.37) 0.20 (0.08  0.31) 
         
TANF         
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Notes: All coefficients in bold have confidence intervals that differ significantly from zero. 
 
 
  Monthly Benefit         
  Welfare-to-Work     -0.00 (-0.07  0.06) -0.00 (-0.07  0.06) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.08 (-0.05  0.22)   0.07 (-0.06  0.21) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent -0.09 (-0.29  0.12)     -0.19 (-0.41  0.03) 
         
TANF*Single Unemployed 
Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.02 (-0.55  0.59)     0.36 (-0.28  0.99) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   0.05 (-0.33  0.44)   0.18 (-0.22  0.58) 
  Welfare-to-work     -0.13 (-0.32  0.06) -0.15 (-0.35  0.05) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.17 (-0.07  0.40) 
         
GDP*Single Unemployed 
Mother 0.24 (0.05  0.43) 0.22 (0.04  0.40) 0.22 (0.04  0.40) 0.12 (-0.10  0.34) 
  n 233716 233716 233716 233716 
  N 195 195 195 195 
State*Wave Variance 0.355 0.359 0.360 0.345 
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Table C.9 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policy variables on Self-Reported Unemployment for Low Educated Single 
Mothers, Random Effects, Odds Ratios. 
 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.85 (0.84  0.86) 0.85 (0.84  0.86) 0.85 (0.84  0.86) 0.85 (0.84  0.86) 
  Married 1.21 (1.18  1.23) 1.21 (1.18  1.23) 1.21 (1.18  1.23) 1.21 (1.18  1.23) 
  Non-White 1.08 (1.05  1.10) 1.08 (1.05  1.10) 1.08 (1.05  1.10) 1.08 (1.05  1.10) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   0.84 (0.75  0.94) 0.96 (0.89  1.02) 0.98 (0.92  1.04) 0.77 (0.68  0.87) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.37 (1.25  1.51) 1.35 (1.23  1.49) 1.36 (1.23  1.49) 1.36 (1.24  1.48) 
    2010 1.65 (1.50  1.80) 1.63 (1.49  1.78) 1.63 (1.49  1.79) 1.68 (1.54  1.83) 
    2015 1.67 (1.52  1.83) 1.64 (1.49  1.80) 1.65 (1.50  1.82) 1.67 (1.53  1.83) 
  GDP per capita 0.96 (0.93  0.99) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 1.00 (0.96  1.04) 1.00 (0.97  1.05) 1.01 (0.97  1.05) 0.99 (0.96  1.03) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.95 (0.91  0.99) 0.96 (0.92  1.00) 0.95 (0.92  0.99) 0.98 (0.94  1.02) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       0.91 (0.88  0.94) 
  Welfare-to-Work     0.99 (0.96  1.02) 1.01 (0.98  1.04) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.93 (0.87  0.99)   0.91 (0.86  0.97) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.92 (0.83  1.02)     0.84 (0.76  0.93) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.19 (1.05  1.35)     1.31 (1.14  1.50) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.08 (0.98  1.18)   1.11 (1.01  1.22) 
  Welfare-to-work     0.99 (0.94  1.04) 0.96 (0.91  1.01) 
  Monthly Benefit       1.08 (1.02  1.14) 
         
  GDP*Single Low Ed. Mother 0.95 (0.91  0.99) 0.94 (0.90  0.98) 0.94 (0.90  0.98) 0.92 (0.87  0.97) 
  n 233716 233716 233716 233716 
  N 195 195 195 195 
 State*Wave Variance 0.206 0.207 0.210 0.188 
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Table C.10 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policy variables on Self-Reported Low Income (<$10,000) for Low Educated 
Single Mothers, Random Effects, Odds Ratios. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.86 (0.84  0.88) 0.86 (0.84  0.88) 0.86 (0.84  0.88) 0.86 (0.84  0.88) 
  Married 0.16 (0.16  0.17) 0.16 (0.16  0.17) 0.16 (0.16  0.17) 0.16 (0.16  0.17) 
  Non-White 2.18 (2.08  2.28) 2.18 (2.08  2.28) 2.18 (2.08  2.28) 2.18 (2.08  2.28) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   2.35 (2.05  2.70) 2.58 (2.40  2.77) 2.57 (2.42  2.73) 2.54 (2.39  2.70) 
  Unemployed  2.27 (2.22  2.32) 2.27 (2.22  2.33) 2.27 (2.22  2.33) 2.27 (2.22  2.33) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.19 (1.02  1.39) 1.14 (0.98  1.32) 1.14 (0.98  1.33) 1.14 (0.98  1.33) 
    2010 0.95 (0.75  1.20) 0.90 (0.72  1.13) 0.91 (0.72  1.16) 0.90 (0.71  1.14) 
    2015 1.06 (0.91  1.24) 1.00 (0.86  1.16) 1.02 (0.87  1.19) 1.01 (0.86  1.17) 
  GDP per capita 0.91 (0.86  0.96) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.99 (0.93  1.05) 0.99 (0.93  1.05) 0.99 (0.94  1.06) 1.00 (0.94  1.06) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.91 (0.85  0.97) 0.93 (0.88  0.99) 0.92 (0.86  0.98) 0.92 (0.86  0.99) 
  Unemployment Rate  1.16 (1.06  1.27) 1.17 (1.08  1.28) 1.16 (1.06  1.27) 1.17 (1.07  1.28) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       1.01 (0.95  1.07) 
  Welfare-to-Work     0.98 (0.94  1.04)   
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.87 (0.79  0.97)     
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.80 (0.68  0.94)       
283 
 








         
TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.07 (0.90  1.26)     0.95 (0.79 1.15) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   0.98 (0.86  1.11)   0.96 (0.84 1.09) 
  Welfare-to-work     1.02 (0.95  1.09) 1.03 (0.96 1.10) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.93 (0.87  1.00) 
         
  GDP*Single Low Ed. Mother 1.07 (1.01  1.13) 1.06 (1.00  1.13) 1.06 (1.01  1.13) 1.11 (1.04  1.19) 
  N 209821 209821 209821 209821 
  N 195 195 195 195 
 State*Wave Variance 0.288 0.290 0.297 0.297 
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Table C.11 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policies on Mental Health of single low educated mothers, Random Effects 
Models, Coefficients. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.12 (0.08  0.16) 0.12 (0.08  0.16) 0.12 (0.08  0.16) 0.12 (0.08  0.16) 
  Married -2.60 (-2.67  -2.52) -2.60 (-2.67  -2.52) -2.60 (-2.67  -2.52) -2.60 (-2.67  -2.52) 
  Non-White -0.73 (-0.81  -0.65) -0.73 (-0.82  -0.65) -0.73 (-0.81  -0.65) -0.74 (-0.82  -0.65) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   0.83 (0.42  1.24) 1.37 (1.16  1.58) 1.51 (1.34  1.69) 0.63 (0.17  1.08) 
  Unemployed 0.98 (0.94  1.02) 0.98 (0.94  1.02) 0.98 (0.94  1.02) 0.98 (0.94  1.02) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 0.03 (-0.18  0.23) -0.01 (-0.21  0.19) -0.00 (-0.20  0.20) 0.03 (-0.17  0.23) 
    2010 -0.36 (-0.67  -0.04) -0.43 (-0.73  -0.12) -0.39 (-0.71  -0.08) -0.25 (-0.57  0.08) 
    2015 0.08 (-0.13  0.29) 0.05 (-0.16  0.26) 0.07 (-0.14  0.28) 0.13 (-0.08  0.34) 
  GDP per capita -0.15 (-0.22  -0.08) 0.00 (0.00  0.00) 0.00 (0.00  0.00) -0.12 (-0.20  -0.05) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.02 (-0.06  0.10) 0.04 (-0.05  0.12) 0.03 (-0.05  0.12) 0.02 (-0.06  0.10) 
  Citizen Ideology -0.09 (-0.17  0.00) -0.08 (-0.17  0.00) -0.08 (-0.17  0.00) -0.07 (-0.16  0.02) 
  Unemployment   Rate 0.22 (0.10  0.34) 0.24 (0.13  0.36) 0.24 (0.12  0.36) 0.19 (0.06  0.31) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       -0.09 (-0.17  -0.01) 
  Welfare-to-Work     -0.03 (-0.10  0.03) -0.03 (-0.10  0.04) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.04 (-0.10  0.18)   0.04 (-0.10  0.18) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent -0.14 (-0.36  0.06)     0.14 (-0.15  0.42) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.86 (0.37  1.35)     0.97 (0.42  1.53) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   0.43 (0.06  0.79)   0.44 (0.07  0.82) 
  Welfare-to-work     0.10 (-0.10  0.30) -0.01 (-0.21  0.20) 
  Monthly Benefit       0.14 (-0.07  0.36) 
         
  GDP*Single Low Ed Mother -0.37 (-0.54  -0.20) -0.43 (-0.60  -0.27) -0.44 (-0.60  -0.27) -0.44 (-0.64  -0.24) 
  n 233716 233716 233716 233716 
  N 195 195 195 195 
State*Wave Variance 0.372 0.379 0.378 0.364 
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Table C.12 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policies on Mental Health of single unemployed mothers, Binary measure 
for >5 days mental ill-health in a month, Odds Ratios. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.89 (0.87  0.92) 0.89 (0.86  0.92) 0.89 (0.86  0.92) 0.89 (0.87  0.92) 
  Married 0.71 (0.68  0.75) 0.71 (0.68  0.75) 0.71 (0.68  0.75) 0.71 (0.68  0.75) 
  Non-White 0.77 (0.73  0.82) 0.77 (0.73  0.81) 0.77 (0.73  0.81) 0.78 (0.74  0.82) 
  Single Unemployed Mother   1.33 (1.05  1.70) 1.33 (1.15  1.54) 1.45 (1.30  1.62) 1.18 (0.92  1.50) 
  Education (ref.: No School)         
    High School 0.82 (0.74  0.91) 0.81 (0.73  0.90) 0.82 (0.74  0.90) 0.81 (0.73  0.90) 
    Some College 0.87 (0.78  0.98) 0.87 (0.77  0.97) 0.87 (0.77  0.97) 0.87 (0.78  0.97) 
    College 0.59 (0.54  0.66) 0.59 (0.53  0.65) 0.59 (0.54  0.65) 0.59 (0.54  0.66) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.00 (0.92  1.09) 0.97 (0.89  1.05) 0.97 (0.89  1.05) 0.98 (0.89  1.08) 
    2010 0.94 (0.82  1.08) 0.88 (0.77  1.00) 0.87 (0.76  0.99) 0.98 (0.82  1.19) 
    2015 1.00 (0.92  1.09) 0.96 (0.89  1.04) 0.95 (0.87  1.04) 0.94 (0.84  1.05) 
  GDP per capita 0.97 (0.94  1.01) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.99 (0.96  1.02) 1.00 (0.97  1.02) 0.99 (0.97  1.02) 0.98 (0.95  1.02) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.99 (0.95  1.04) 0.99 (0.95  1.04) 1.00 (0.95  1.04) 1.02 (0.94  1.11) 
  Unemployment  Rate 1.03 (0.97  1.08) 1.04 (1.00  1.09) 1.05 (1.00  1.10) 0.99 (0.92  1.06) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit         
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  Welfare-to-Work     1.01 (0.99  1.04) 1.03 (1.00  1.05) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.99 (0.94  1.04)   0.95 (0.89  1.01) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.90 (0.83  0.97)     0.81 (0.71  0.91) 
         
TANF*Single Unemployed 
Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.09 (0.76  1.57)     1.22 (0.93  1.60) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.26 (1.05  1.52)   1.25 (1.05  1.51) 
  Welfare-to-work     0.97 (0.90  1.04) 0.97 (0.91  1.03) 
  Monthly Benefit       1.13 (0.98  1.30) 
         
GDP*Single Unemployed 
Mother 1.02 (0.90  1.17) 1.00 (0.92  1.09) 1.01 (0.92  1.10) 0.97 (0.82  1.14) 
  n 151420 151420 151420 151420 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.13 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policies on Mental Health of single low educated mothers, Binary measure 
for >5 days mental ill-health in a month, Odds Ratios. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.97 (0.95  1.00) 0.97 (0.95  1.00) 0.97 (0.95  0.99) 0.97 (0.95  1.00) 
  Married 0.58 (0.56  0.60) 0.58 (0.56  0.60) 0.58 (0.56  0.60) 0.58 (0.56  0.60) 
  Non-White 0.79 (0.74  0.84) 0.79 (0.74  0.83) 0.79 (0.74  0.83) 0.79 (0.75  0.84) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   1.03 (0.87  1.22) 1.09 (0.99  1.20) 1.24 (1.13  1.36) 0.98 (0.85  1.14) 
  Unemployed 1.15 (1.13  1.18) 1.16 (1.13  1.18) 1.16 (1.13  1.18) 1.15 (1.13  1.18) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.02 (0.94  1.10) 0.97 (0.89  1.05) 0.97 (0.89  1.06) 1.02 (0.93  1.13) 
    2010 0.99 (0.87  1.13) 0.90 (0.79  1.02) 0.89 (0.78  1.02) 1.09 (0.89  1.34) 
    2015 1.06 (0.98  1.15) 1.01 (0.93  1.09) 1.00 (0.93  1.09) 1.04 (0.92  1.17) 
  GDP per capita 0.94 (0.91  0.97) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.00 (1.00  1.00) 1.02 (0.93  1.12) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 1.00 (0.97  1.02) 1.00 (0.98  1.03) 1.00 (0.98  1.03) 0.99 (0.95  1.02) 
  Citizen Ideology 1.00 (0.96  1.04) 1.00 (0.96  1.04) 1.00 (0.96  1.04) 1.01 (0.92  1.11) 
  Unemployment   Rate 1.00 (0.95  1.06) 1.03 (0.99  1.08) 1.03 (0.99  1.08) 0.95 (0.89  1.02) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       1.01 (0.95  1.07) 
  Welfare-to-Work     1.00 (0.98  1.02) 1.02 (1.00  1.03) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.98 (0.94  1.04)   0.95 (0.90  1.01) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.87 (0.81  0.94)     0.76 (0.65  0.89) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.28 (1.03  1.59)     1.22 (1.07  1.39) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.41 (1.16  1.71)   1.37 (1.17  1.59) 
  Welfare-to-work     1.09 (1.02  1.17) 1.09 (0.98  1.21) 
  Monthly Benefit       1.05 (0.93  1.18) 
  GDP*Single Low Ed Mother 0.93 (0.82  1.05) 0.88 (0.78  0.98) 0.88 (0.77  1.00) 0.89 (0.79  0.99) 
         
  n 233716 233716 233716 233716 
  N 195 195 195 195 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.019 
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Table C.14 Full Controls for Impact of TANF Policy Variables on Low Income (<$15,000), Odds Ratios. 
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 
 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 
Individual         
  Age 0.88 (0.83 0.93) 0.88 (0.83 0.93) 0.88 (0.83 0.93) 0.88 (0.83 0.93) 
  Married 0.29 (0.23 0.35) 0.29 (0.24 0.36) 0.29 (0.24 0.36) 0.28 (0.22 0.34) 
  Non-White 2.16 (1.81 2.58) 2.18 (1.80 2.65) 2.16 (1.76 2.65) 2.15 (1.84 2.51) 
  Single Low Ed. Mother   2.75 (2.38 3.17) 2.92 (2.51 3.39) 2.98 (2.57 3.45) 2.71 (2.26 3.23) 
  Unemployed  1.80 (1.72 1.88) 1.80 (1.73 1.88) 1.81 (1.74 1.89) 1.77 (1.70 1.85) 
         
Contextual         
  Year (ref: 2000)         
    2005 1.19 (0.88 1.61) 0.97 (0.68 1.38) 0.92 (0.63 1.34) 1.09 (0.90 1.32) 
    2010 0.59 (0.33 1.03) 0.32 (0.17 0.62) 0.32 (0.16 0.65) 0.90 (0.63 1.29) 
    2015 0.93 (0.72 1.21) 0.68 (0.50 0.93) 0.69 (0.49 0.97) 0.89 (0.71 1.11) 
  GDP per capita 0.99 (0.89 1.09) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 1.00 (1.00 1.00) 
  GげﾏWﾐデ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 0.99 (0.90 1.08) 1.00 (0.90 1.11) 1.01 (0.91 1.12) 0.93 (0.87 0.99) 
  Citizen Ideology 0.80 (0.72 0.89) 0.83 (0.74 0.92) 0.79 (0.71 0.89) 1.00 (0.87 1.15) 
  Unemployment Rate 1.42 (1.16 1.74) 1.71 (1.34 2.18) 1.74 (1.31 2.30) 1.11 (0.98 1.25) 
         
TANF         
  Monthly Benefit       1.23 (1.02 1.49) 
  Welfare-to-Work     0.92 (0.87 0.98) 0.97 (0.92 1.03) 
  Job Search (ref: none)         
   Required   0.74 (0.62 0.87)   0.98 (0.88 1.10) 
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 0.54 (0.43 0.68)     1.05 (0.85 1.31) 
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TANF*Single Low Ed Mother         
  Sanction (ref: V Lenient)         
    V. Stringent 1.10 (0.91 1.34)     1.06 (0.83 1.34) 
  Job Search (ref: none         
    Required   1.03 (0.84 1.27)   1.02 (0.85 1.24) 
  Welfare-to-work         
  Monthly Benefit     1.06 (0.98 1.14) 1.06 (0.97 1.16) 
       0.98 (0.88 1.08) 
GDP*Single Low Ed. Mother  1.08 (0.98 1.20) 1.06 (0.96 1.17) 1.06 (0.96 1.17) 1.10 (0.98 1.24) 
  n 209821 209821 209821 209821 
  Pseudo R-Squared 0.171 0.166 0.164 0.181 
  N 195 195 195 195 
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Table C.15 Results for four analytical stages of Chapter Six, coefficients and odds ratios, excluding BRFSS in 2015. 
 
 
Notes: All models coefficients control for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, GDP, GDP*single low educated mother, maximum monthly benefit, all other 
TANF interactions, unemployment rate, government and citizen ideology and wave. 1Reference group: very lenient sanction, 2Reference group: no job search.
 Process Effect Employment Effect Health Inequalities 




<  $10,000 Mental Health 
 紅 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 頚迎 95% CI 紅 95% CI 
TANF* Unemployed Single 
Mother         
  Stringent Sanction1 0.93 (-0.58  2.44)     1.42 (0.14  2.70) 
  Job Search Required2 1.10 (0.13  2.07)     1.06 (-0.20  2.32) 
  Welfare-to-Work -0.18 (-0.74  0.38)     0.42 (-0.03  0.88) 
         
TANF*Low Ed. Single Mother         
  Stringent Sanction1   1.41 (1.11  1.79) 1.22 (0.94  1.58)   
  Job Search Required2   0.96 (0.79  1.16) 1.01 (0.81  1.26)   
  Welfare-to-Work   1.12 (1.01  1.24) 1.03 (0.94  1.13)   
         
n 114232 
146 
0.030 
177277 
146 
0.051 
160360 
146 
0.206 
175189 
146 
0.026 
N 
(Pseudo) R-squared 
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